- The Oxford Handbook of Freedom
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Self-Ownership as a Form of Ownership
- Positive Freedom and the General Will
- Moralized Conceptions of Liberty
- On the Conflict Between Liberty and Equality
- Freedom and Equality
- Non-Domination
- The Point of Self-Ownership
- Platonic Freedom
- Aristotelian Freedom
- Freedom in the Scholastic Tradition
- Freedom, Slavery, and Identity in Renaissance Florence: The Faces of Leon Battista Alberti
- Freedom and Enlightenment
- Adam Smith’s Libertarian Paternalism
- Market Failure, the Tragedy of the Commons, and Default Libertarianism in Contemporary Economics and Policy
- Planning, Freedom, and the Rule of Law
- Freedom, Regulation, and Public Policy
- Boundaries, Subjection to Laws, and Affected Interests
- Democracy and Freedom
- Can Constitutions Limit Government?
- Freedom and Religion
- Freedom and Influence in Formative Education
- Freedom and the (Posthumous) Harm Principle
- Exploitation and Freedom
- Voluntariness, Coercion, Self-ownership
- The Impartial Spectator and the Moral Teachings of Markets
- Disciplinary Specialization and Thinking for Yourself
- Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment
- Prisoners of Misbelief: The Epistemic Conditions of Freedom
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
Claims of voluntariness and the converse notion of force are invoked as the bases for conclusions about people’s rights and responsibilities in a wide range of contexts. Yet the notion of voluntariness has received less direct attention than have the related notions of freedom, coercion, autonomy, and self-ownership. The aim of this chapter is to bring to light and assess the distinctive role and normative significance of voluntariness for our judgments about people’s rights and obligations. In particular, the chapter addresses two main questions about the relevance of voluntariness. The first is whether voluntariness itself, or only the absence of coercion, has normative significance. The second is whether the notion of self-ownership must be defined through voluntariness, and what implications this has for the theses that political philosophers make by appealing to the importance of self-ownership.
Keywords: voluntariness, coercion, self-ownership, force, freedom, responsibility, autonomy
Serena Olsaretti is ICREA Research Professor in the Law Department at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain.
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- The Oxford Handbook of Freedom
- Contributors
- Introduction
- Self-Ownership as a Form of Ownership
- Positive Freedom and the General Will
- Moralized Conceptions of Liberty
- On the Conflict Between Liberty and Equality
- Freedom and Equality
- Non-Domination
- The Point of Self-Ownership
- Platonic Freedom
- Aristotelian Freedom
- Freedom in the Scholastic Tradition
- Freedom, Slavery, and Identity in Renaissance Florence: The Faces of Leon Battista Alberti
- Freedom and Enlightenment
- Adam Smith’s Libertarian Paternalism
- Market Failure, the Tragedy of the Commons, and Default Libertarianism in Contemporary Economics and Policy
- Planning, Freedom, and the Rule of Law
- Freedom, Regulation, and Public Policy
- Boundaries, Subjection to Laws, and Affected Interests
- Democracy and Freedom
- Can Constitutions Limit Government?
- Freedom and Religion
- Freedom and Influence in Formative Education
- Freedom and the (Posthumous) Harm Principle
- Exploitation and Freedom
- Voluntariness, Coercion, Self-ownership
- The Impartial Spectator and the Moral Teachings of Markets
- Disciplinary Specialization and Thinking for Yourself
- Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment
- Prisoners of Misbelief: The Epistemic Conditions of Freedom
- Index