- Oxford Library of Psychology
- Oxford Library of Psychology
- About the Editors
- Introduction to The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience: Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Are We Now?
- Salience, State, and Expression: The Influence of Specific Aspects of Emotion on Attention and Perception
- Emotion: Generation or Construction?
- The Neuroscience of Emotion Regulation: Basic Mechanisms and Their Role in Development, Aging, and Psychopathology
- The Impact of Emotion on Cognition
- Genetics and Emotion
- Visceromotor Sensation and Control
- Development of Emotion and Social Reasoning in Adolescence
- Perception of Nonverbal Cues
- Face Recognition
- The Cognitive and Neural Basis of Impression Formation
- Theory of Mind: How Brains Think about Thoughts
- The Pleasures and Pains of Social Interactions: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective
- The Neural Underpinnings of the Experience of Empathy: Lessons for Psychopathy
- Mirror Neurons and the Perception–Action Link
- The Early Development of the Brain Bases for Social Cognition
- Conflict Monitoring and Cognitive Control
- Hierarchical Cognitive Control and the Functional Organization of the Frontal Cortex
- Decision Neuroscience
- Expectancies and Beliefs: Insights from Cognitive Neuroscience
- Cognitive Neuroscience of Numerical Cognition
- Psychopharmacology of Cognition
- Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
- Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
- Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Social Phobia Considered from a Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective
- The Neurobiology of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder
- Epilogue to The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience Cognitive Neuroscience: Where Are We Going?
Abstract and Keywords
Social life depends in large part on the capacity to understand the intentional behavior of others. Which are the origins of this capacity? The classic cognitive view claims that intentional understanding can be explained only in terms of the ability to intellectually read the mind of others. Over the past few years, this view has been challenged by several neuroscientific findings regarding social cognition. In particular, the functional properties of mirror neurons and their direct matching mechanism indicate that intentional understanding is based primarily on the motor cognition that underpins one’s own potentiality to act. The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the role of such motor cognition, providing a biologically plausible and theoretically unitary account for the neural basis of basic forms of intentional understanding.
Vittorio Gallese, Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy Brain Center for Social and Motor Cognition, Italian Institute of Technology, Parma, Italy
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