- The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics
- Biographical Sketches
- The Discursive Context of Reproductive Ethics
- Access to Basic Reproductive Rights: Global Challenges
- Constructing the Abortion Argument
- Victims of Trafficking, Reproductive Rights, and Asylum
- The Commodification of Women’s Reproductive Tissue and Services
- Twenty-First-Century Eugenics
- Procreative Rights in a Postcoital World
- Reproduction as a Civil Right
- Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health
- The Role of Providers in Assisted Reproduction: Potential Conflicts, Professional Conscience, and Personal Choice
- Ethical Issues in Newborn Screening
- How We Acquire Parental Rights
- Mothers and Others: Relational Autonomy in Parenting
- Procreators’ Duties: Sexual Asymmetries
- Reproductive Control for Men: For Men?
- Societal Disregard for the Needs of the Infertile
- Is Surrogacy Ethically Problematic?
- Parents with Disabilities
- Late-in-Life Motherhood: Ethico-Legal Perspectives on the Postponement of Childbearing and Access to Artificial Reproductive Technologies
- Justice, Procreation, and the Costs of Having and Raising Disabled Children
- Ethical Issues in the Evolving Realm of Egg Donation
- Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues
- Who Am I When I’m Pregnant?
- Contemplating the Start of Someone
- The Possibility of Being Harmed by One’s Own Conception
- Understanding Procreative Beneficence
- Opting for Twins in In Vitro Fertilization: What Does Procreative Responsibility Require?
- Procreative Responsibility in View of What Parents Owe Their Children
Abstract and Keywords
Is it wrong for prospective parents not to select against having children with disabilities because these children impose substantial costs on society? Recent writers such as Stephen John have argued that the state should fund prenatal diagnosis based on expected cost savings and that parents who have had a reasonable opportunity to avoid having a child with a disability should bear some of the additional costs of raising the child. This chapter offers three responses to these social cost arguments: claims about increased costs and reduced productivity are greatly exaggerated, modern states subsidize many similar costs of childrearing and do not attempt to limit the number of children per family to reduce these costs, and luck-egalitarian theories of justice do not adequately respect the institution of the family.
David Wasserman (BA (Philosophy), Yale University; MA (Psychology), University of North Carolina; JD, University of Michigan) is a research scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs. His current work focuses on ethical and policy issues in genetic research and technology, assisted reproduction, health care, and disability. He has also written extensively about issues in procedural and distributive justice. In addition to numerous articles and book chapters, he is co-author of Disability, Difference, Discrimination (with Anita Silvers and Mary Mahowald, 1998) and co-editor of Genetics and Criminal Behavior (with Robert Wachbroit, 2001).
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