- The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics
- Biographical Sketches
- The Discursive Context of Reproductive Ethics
- Access to Basic Reproductive Rights: Global Challenges
- Constructing the Abortion Argument
- Victims of Trafficking, Reproductive Rights, and Asylum
- The Commodification of Women’s Reproductive Tissue and Services
- Twenty-First-Century Eugenics
- Procreative Rights in a Postcoital World
- Reproduction as a Civil Right
- Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health
- The Role of Providers in Assisted Reproduction: Potential Conflicts, Professional Conscience, and Personal Choice
- Ethical Issues in Newborn Screening
- How We Acquire Parental Rights
- Mothers and Others: Relational Autonomy in Parenting
- Procreators’ Duties: Sexual Asymmetries
- Reproductive Control for Men: For Men?
- Societal Disregard for the Needs of the Infertile
- Is Surrogacy Ethically Problematic?
- Parents with Disabilities
- Late-in-Life Motherhood: Ethico-Legal Perspectives on the Postponement of Childbearing and Access to Artificial Reproductive Technologies
- Justice, Procreation, and the Costs of Having and Raising Disabled Children
- Ethical Issues in the Evolving Realm of Egg Donation
- Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues
- Who Am I When I’m Pregnant?
- Contemplating the Start of Someone
- The Possibility of Being Harmed by One’s Own Conception
- Understanding Procreative Beneficence
- Opting for Twins in In Vitro Fertilization: What Does Procreative Responsibility Require?
- Procreative Responsibility in View of What Parents Owe Their Children
Abstract and Keywords
Under what circumstances is it morally responsible to procreate with the intention of having children, in view of what parents owe their children? Three conditions are necessary for procreation to be morally responsible: the worthwhile-life condition, the doing-more condition, and the basic-needs condition. The worthwhile-life condition requires that a life be expected to be worth starting in the sense that existence is not noncomparatively bad for its subject, containing much that is bad without offsetting compensations. The doing-more condition requires that parents do more for their children than the worthwhile-life condition requires, if they can do so without undue sacrifice. The basic-needs condition provides that parents owe their children efforts to ensure that their basic needs or essential interests are met. Other considerations about the intentions of the parents are relevant to responsible procreation but do not bear on the parents’ responsibilities to the child.
David DeGrazia, Department of Philosophy, The George Washington University, Washington
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