- The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics
- Biographical Sketches
- The Discursive Context of Reproductive Ethics
- Access to Basic Reproductive Rights: Global Challenges
- Constructing the Abortion Argument
- Victims of Trafficking, Reproductive Rights, and Asylum
- The Commodification of Women’s Reproductive Tissue and Services
- Twenty-First-Century Eugenics
- Procreative Rights in a Postcoital World
- Reproduction as a Civil Right
- Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health
- The Role of Providers in Assisted Reproduction: Potential Conflicts, Professional Conscience, and Personal Choice
- Ethical Issues in Newborn Screening
- How We Acquire Parental Rights
- Mothers and Others: Relational Autonomy in Parenting
- Procreators’ Duties: Sexual Asymmetries
- Reproductive Control for Men: For Men?
- Societal Disregard for the Needs of the Infertile
- Is Surrogacy Ethically Problematic?
- Parents with Disabilities
- Late-in-Life Motherhood: Ethico-Legal Perspectives on the Postponement of Childbearing and Access to Artificial Reproductive Technologies
- Justice, Procreation, and the Costs of Having and Raising Disabled Children
- Ethical Issues in the Evolving Realm of Egg Donation
- Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues
- Who Am I When I’m Pregnant?
- Contemplating the Start of Someone
- The Possibility of Being Harmed by One’s Own Conception
- Understanding Procreative Beneficence
- Opting for Twins in In Vitro Fertilization: What Does Procreative Responsibility Require?
- Procreative Responsibility in View of What Parents Owe Their Children
Abstract and Keywords
Procreative beneficence (PB) prescribes that reproducers should select the child (or children) they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information. Much criticized, this claim is also misunderstood: it is not an absolute obligation but similar in force to claims such as “you should give your child the best education.” This chapter clarifies the PB principle and explores competing reasons to it such as normative uncertainty, distributive justice, or reproductive liberty. It concludes that the two best objections to PB are that it requires a conception of human well-being and is committed to the existence of impersonal reasons. However, that person-affecting reasons are stronger than impersonal reasons lessens the force of some objections to PB such as that it involves sacrifices on the part of procreators.
Julian Savulescu is the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics and Director of the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics at Oxford University. Previously, he was Director of the Ethics of Genetics Unit at the Murdoch Children's Research Institute, Royal Children's Hospital, Melbourne, Australia. Julian Savulescu is qualified in medicine, bioethics, and analytic philosophy. He has published many articles in journals such as the British Medical Journal, Lancet, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Bioethics, the Journal of Medical Ethics, American Journal of Bioethics, Medical Journal of Australia and Philosophy, and Psychiatry and Psychology. Address is Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Littlegate House, St Ebbes, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Guy Kahane, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
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