- The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics
- Biographical Sketches
- The Discursive Context of Reproductive Ethics
- Access to Basic Reproductive Rights: Global Challenges
- Constructing the Abortion Argument
- Victims of Trafficking, Reproductive Rights, and Asylum
- The Commodification of Women’s Reproductive Tissue and Services
- Twenty-First-Century Eugenics
- Procreative Rights in a Postcoital World
- Reproduction as a Civil Right
- Conscientious Objection in Reproductive Health
- The Role of Providers in Assisted Reproduction: Potential Conflicts, Professional Conscience, and Personal Choice
- Ethical Issues in Newborn Screening
- How We Acquire Parental Rights
- Mothers and Others: Relational Autonomy in Parenting
- Procreators’ Duties: Sexual Asymmetries
- Reproductive Control for Men: For Men?
- Societal Disregard for the Needs of the Infertile
- Is Surrogacy Ethically Problematic?
- Parents with Disabilities
- Late-in-Life Motherhood: Ethico-Legal Perspectives on the Postponement of Childbearing and Access to Artificial Reproductive Technologies
- Justice, Procreation, and the Costs of Having and Raising Disabled Children
- Ethical Issues in the Evolving Realm of Egg Donation
- Sperm and Egg Donor Anonymity: Legal and Ethical Issues
- Who Am I When I’m Pregnant?
- Contemplating the Start of Someone
- The Possibility of Being Harmed by One’s Own Conception
- Understanding Procreative Beneficence
- Opting for Twins in In Vitro Fertilization: What Does Procreative Responsibility Require?
- Procreative Responsibility in View of What Parents Owe Their Children
Abstract and Keywords
Parents have moral responsibilities to support and nurture their children. Whether and in what circumstances these duties extend to procreators’ duties to support and nurture is a separate ethical question, however, in which sexual asymmetries in reproduction play a role. Variations on the thought experiment of scientists creating a conceptus from inanimate materials and gestating it in an artificial womb illustrate the role of causal and moral responsibility for creation in generating obligations of support. The real world, however, is not so simple. Relying on a caveat copulator principle—which holds each voluntary party to a potentially procreative act responsible for support—would provide a simple solution but one that should be rejected, as it encourages irresponsible behavior and is not reflective of judgments about sexual morality more generally. When one party acts wrongfully in failing to terminate the procreative process, responsibilities similarly devolve on the wrongdoer.
Department of Philosophy The Ohio State University
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