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date: 27 February 2020

(p. 445) Index

(p. 445) Index

abstract values 206–12, 215–6
actual desire theory 62–4, 140, 164–6
additive separability 5–6, 251–2, 269
additivity 230, 234–5, 290–1
agent-neutrality 3, 96–112
of reasons 96, 104–5
of value 96–112, 211
agent-relativity 3, 96–112, 211
and consequentialism 3, 97, 100–5, 108–12
of reasons 96, 104–5
of value 96–112, 211
aggregation 4, 6, 225–31, 249–64, 267–83, 290–1, 300–14
and the separateness of persons 280–1, 306–8
aggregative principles 267–83, 302–3
argument from counterexamples 304–6
definition 301–4
in utilitarianism 226–7, 229, 249–64, 267–82
intrapersonal aggregation 227–8, 253–9, 267, 269, 301–2, 306–7
of subject-relative values 65–7
skepticism about 269–73, 280–3, 300–14
affective concepts. See thick concepts
anthropocentricism 388
archimedean property 225–33, 288
associativity 288–9, 292–3
atemporal goods 121–2
attitude-dependence 60–7, 75–6, 158–9, 164–70
attributive goodness 13–14, 21, 23, 37
axiological egalitarianism 252, 273–83, 303
basic person-based result 406–12
basic value relations 208–14
betterness relations 5, 177–200, 225–64, 293, 302, 329–30, 399–441
among worlds 399–441
and the dualism of practical reason 177–200
and discontinuity 225–46
general 5, 250–60
personal 5, 250–60
biocentrism 388–91, 394–5
biocentric holism 390–1
biocentric individualism 390–1
buck-passing view 22, 40, 56, 113, 171
capabilities approach 140–1, 160–2, 172, 351, 356, 375
cardinal measurement 205–7, 213–5, 221, 262–3, 298
collapsing principle 214–5
commutativity 288–9, 292–3
comparability 142–3, 150–3, 177–85, 188–91, 205–22
and justified choice 205–6, 216–20
and pluralism 150–3, 177–85, 188–91
definition 205–9
of abstract values 207, 209–11
of value-bearers 207, 211–2
comparativism 216–20
comparison function 210–12
conditional value 4, 175–7, 184–97, 276
consequentialism 1, 3–4, 15–20, 97, 100–14, 171, 175, 300, 303–5, 399, 401–2
and aggregation 300, 303–5
and relative-value 97, 100–14
contextualism 294–5
continuity 225–48, 302–3, 312, 322
contractualism 310–2
contributive value 228–38, 253–9, 269–71, 277, 331, 432
cost–benefit analysis 2, 6–7, 206–7, 317–34, 391–4
agency interpretation of 318–9
and desire-satisfactionism 318–28
and interpersonal comparisons 7, 318, 325–331
and nature 325, 391–4
distributive weighting of 330–1
counterfactual test for harm 412–4
covering value 180–5, 208–16
defective desires 62–4, 67
deontic constraints 18, 97, 101–3, 108, 195, 304
desire-satisfactionism 62–6, 118–21, 129, 140, 146–7, 164–71, 322–8, 365
diminishing marginal value 230, 236, 254–6, 269–71, 277–8
discontinuity 5, 225–46, 302–3, 312–3, 322
strong 5, 225–6, 232–7
(p. 446) discounting 128–9, 258
distribution-sensitivity 269–77
duration of a good 3, 117–9, 125–6
dynamic inconsistency 118, 130–1
egalitarianism 5–6, 121, 129, 142, 252, 267–8, 273–83, 303
emotions 3, 71, 76, 80–93, 168–9
perceptual theory of 81, 85, 90
equality 5–6, 121, 126–9, 142, 250, 252, 256–8, 267–83, 308–9, 388–9, 435
and personal good 256–8, 276
between species 8, 388–9
and time 121, 126–9
and utilitarianism 269–73
essentially comparative view 404–5, 425
eudaimonism 160–2, 168–9
existential question 424–41
expected utility theory 2, 5, 206–7, 250–4, 258–62, 321–4
experience machine 146–7, 163–4, 168
extended preferences 327–8
extrinsic value 2, 14, 29–41, 46–7, 286, 294
fairness 252, 256–8, 260, 273, 281
final extrinsicalism. See nonintrinsicalism
fitting-attitude analysis 21–6, 35, 48–9, 53–4, 61, 67–73, 81–85, 98–108, 110–2, 135, 430–2
challenges to 21–5, 48, 54, 69–70, 84, 90
and population axiology 430–2
and relative value 98–108
fittingness 2–3, 21–6, 35, 48–9, 53–4, 61, 67–73, 83–5, 89–90
representational notion of 69–73, 83–5, 89–90
formal values 179–80, 185–9
freedom 7, 136, 233, 338, 351–2, 356–78
constraints on 357–64, 367–9
definition 357–64
instrumental value of 364–6
interpersonal comparisons of 374–5
intrinsic value of 364, 366
measurement of 367–77
and preferences 359, 365–6, 370–3
full-information theory 63–4, 164–5
future-orientedness 118, 129–31
goodness simpliciter 4, 13–26, 37–8, 44–61, 64–7, 88, 137–9, 141–2, 145–6, 153, 250–60, 301, 308–9, 313, 400
fundamentality of 13–26, 44–9
nonnaturalism about 45–6, 48
skepticism about 14, 37–8, 49–54, 139, 308–9, 313
happiness 4, 108, 140, 167–8, 175–200, 409–10
Kantian conditionalism about 4, 175–200
and well-being 108, 140, 167–8
Harsanyi’s theorem 5, 249–65
and fairness 257–8, 260
objections to 256–64
and prioritarianism 252, 254–7, 264
health 7, 141, 161, 319, 324, 338–54
and capability 141, 161, 350–2
definition 338–44
interpersonal comparisons of 344–53
measurement of 344–53
and opportunity 338, 345–6, 348–52
and preferences 346–8
impartial spectator 107–9, 306–7
impartiality 107–9, 180, 256, 264, 268, 302, 309, 312
incommensurability 4–5, 151, 171, 177–85, 205–7, 211, 322, 392–4, 434–5
incomparability 4–5, 142–3, 150–3, 177–85, 188–91, 205–22
of abstract values 207, 209–11
definition 205–9
and justified choice 205–6, 216–20
and pluralism 150–3, 177–85, 188–91
of value-bearers 207, 211–2
incompleteness 189–91, 258–9, 344–53
independence axiom 235, 260–1
indeterminacy. See vagueness
inequality aversion 256–8, 435
instrumental value 2, 33–6, 45, 138, 147, 382–7, 390–1
internalism 166–71
interpersonal comparisons 7, 258–9, 309, 325–34, 344–53, 367, 374–5
of freedom 367, 374–5
of health 344–53
of utility 7, 258–9, 309, 325–34
intransitivity 7, 189–91, 327–9
intrapersonal repugnant conclusion 226–8
intrinsic value 1–4, 14, 16–20, 29–41, 44–58, 88, 117, 121, 123, 133–4, 138–51, 176–97, 285–96, 382–97, 432
analysis of 21–6, 45, 48, 53–4, 432
basic vs derivative 138–51
conditional intrinsic value 176–97
unanalyzability of 45–49, 53
versus final value 2, 14, 32–3, 35–6, 46–7
(p. 447) finality sense 30–3
and nature 382–96
skepticism about 3, 14, 37–8, 49–54, 308–9, 313
supervenience sense 30–3
and time 117, 121
intrinsicalism 14, 36–7, 46–7, 286, 294–6
isolation test 30–1, 45, 53
Kaldor-Hicks criterion 7, 318, 328–31
Kantian value dualism 4, 175–200
levelling down objection 275–6, 278–80
lexical ordering 178, 186, 278–9, 282, 401, 416
life worth living 8, 226–8, 275, 400–1, 403–5, 415–8, 428
marginal value. See contributive value
maximalism 217, 219–20
maximin 5, 272, 303, 307
momentary well-being 118–21, 127
monetary equivalents 318–31
inferring of 323–4
monotonicity 235, 288–94
monism 3–4, 136–55, 177–8, 197
arguments against 145–50
arguments for 147–8, 150–3
about goodness simpliciter 143–7
about value-properties 138–9
about well-being 140–1, 143, 146–7
Moore’s additivity principle 290–1
Moorean holism 294–5
moral standing 8, 387–95
neutrality intuition 404–5
nominal-notable comparisons 152, 184–5, 210
non-aggregative principles 6, 272, 274, 278, 282–3, 300–1, 303–5, 307, 309–13
nonanthropocentricism 388–90
non-archimedeanism 225–43
nonidentity problem 8, 275–6, 406, 412–5, 419
noninstrumental value. See final value
nonintrinsicalism 14, 32–4, 36–7, 46–7, 134, 286, 294–6
noncomparability 5, 188–91, 205, 211, 215–6, 322
normative redundancy argument 49–52
normativity 2, 13–26, 159, 161, 163–71, 176, 182–8
number problem 6, 309–13
objective list theory 140–1, 160, 163, 166–8, 170–1, 238
objective value 34, 61, 65–76, 106–7, 140, 160–71, 308, 384–6
objectivism 4, 34, 61, 65–76, 160–71, 384–6
opportunity sets 7, 357–77
organic unities 6, 46–7, 88, 118, 127–9, 251, 285–99, 301, 308–9
and aggregation 301, 308–9
bonum variationis case 289, 292, 295–6
criteria for organicity 287–96
nonidentity definition 287–90
nonproportionality definition 287–90
and time 118, 127–9
outcomism 17–9, 47
paretian egalitarianism 273–5, 278–9, 282–3
Pareto principle 5–6, 188, 269, 273–5, 278, 281, 302–3, 309, 312, 320, 328–30
parity 5, 205, 212–4
person-affecting view 8, 275–6, 279, 400–15, 418–20, 425
inclusivity of 405–12
narrow versus wide 275–6, 279, 415
and the nonidentity problem 412–5
personal good 5–6, 249–64
Pigou-Dalton principle 5–6, 272–8
pleasure 3–4, 14, 54, 117–20, 123, 136, 140–53, 160, 162–4, 206, 225, 229–31, 234, 287, 300–2
definitions of 162–4
and non-archimedeanism 225, 229–31, 234
and time 117–20, 123
pluralism 4, 8, 136–55, 177–85, 193–4, 400–2, 416, 419
arguments against 147–8, 150–3
arguments for 145–50
about goodness simpliciter 141–5
in population axiology 8, 400–2, 416, 419
and practical reason 177–85, 193–4
about value properties 138–9
about well-being 140–5
possibilist analysis of harm 413–15
practical reason 4–5, 136–7, 153, 205–8, 213–4, 216–20
dualism of 4, 153, 175–200
predicative goodness. See goodness simpliciter
preferences 7, 35, 62–5, 75–6, 102–3, 110–2, 129, 131–2, 164–7, 249, 318–28, 331, 338, 345–8, 350, 359, 365–6, 370–3, 430–1
idealizing conditions on 7, 63–5, 164–5, 318, 321–4
non-remoteness conditions on 318, 324–5
and time-bias 131–2
and well-being 164–7, 249, 318–28, 350, 365–6
preferentialism. See desire-satisfactionism
principle of personal good 250–4, 261–2
(p. 448) prioritarianism 5–6, 252, 254–7, 260, 262–4, 267, 272–83, 302–3, 330–1
and aggregation 282–3, 302–3
arguments against 262–4, 280–3
arguments for 278–80
prudential value. See well-being
quality weights 347–8
radical pluralism 142–3, 148–50, 152–3, 402, 419
rational regret 137, 148–50, 195
realism 3, 60–2, 67–76
axiological 3, 61, 70–7
representational 61, 70–7
remoteness problem 318, 324–5
repugnant conclusion 8, 226–9, 231, 236, 400–1, 415–20, 425, 435
rescue case. See number problem
respect 383, 387–91, 394–5
rights 20, 206, 387–8, 394
risk aversion 254–7, 264
risk neutrality 255–6
separateness of persons 6, 280–1, 301, 306–8
silencing 184–6, 192–7
social welfare functions 7, 318, 330–1
species egalitarianism 8, 388–9
strong separability 6, 269, 274, 277–8
subject-relative values 61–7, 96–114, 158–69
subject-relativity requirement 158–69
super-value 152–3, 178–9, 183–6
superiority. See discontinuity
supervenience 2, 30–4, 50, 192, 250
telic egalitarianism. See axiological egalitarianism
temporal bias 129–35
temporal location 3, 117–25
thick concepts 3, 81–90
variability argument 87–90
transformative value 392
trichotomy thesis 208, 212–4
uncompensability 142–3, 148–50
utility functions 5, 250–64, 269–72, 319–331, 365
vagueness 214–5, 417
Value Appearance Thesis 71–6
value-bearers 3, 4, 31–3, 100, 111, 207, 210–2, 286–7, 292–6, 431–2
value-emotion equivalences 3, 81–5, 89–91
value idealism. See attitude-dependence
valuer-dependence 168–9, 385–6
variabilism 410–2
welfare. See well-being
welfare economics 7, 317, 331, 425
welfarism 108, 170–1, 236, 276, 302, 425, 434
well-being 4, 7–8, 14, 61–5, 117–29, 137–43, 146–9, 158–72, 175–200, 226–38, 249–83, 302–3, 308–9, 318–31, 338–52, 356, 366, 375, 399, 420
and cost–benefit analysis 318–31
and freedom 356, 366, 375
and health 338–52
Kantian conditionalism about 175–200
normativity of 163–71
and time 117–29
world-based approaches 399–402, 406–8, 415–20
wrong kind of reason problem 23–4, 48, 54, 69–70, 84, 90. See also fitting-attitude analysis, objections to