- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law
- Heuristics and Biases
- Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order
- Moral Judgment
- The Importance of Behavioral Law
- Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods
- Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law
- Alternative Behavioral Law and Economics
- Law and Prosocial Behavior
- Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics
- Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change
- Law’s Loss Aversion
- Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law and Economics without the Coase Theorem
- Probability Errors: Overoptimism, Ambiguity Aversion, and the Certainty Effect
- The Hindsight Bias and the Law in Hindsight
- Behavioral Law and Economics of Property Law: Achievements and Challenges
- Behavioral Economics and Tort Law
- Behavioral Economics and Contract Law
- Consumer Transactions
- Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The Importance of Equilibrium Analysis
- The End of Contractarianism?: Behavioral Economics and the Law of Corporations
- The Market, the Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust
- Behavioral Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey
- Behavioral Economics and the Law: Tax
- Litigation and Settlement
- Behavioral Economics and Plea Bargaining
- Judicial Decision-Making: A Behavioral Perspective
- Evidence Law
- Nudges.gov: Behaviorally Informed Regulation
- Environmental Law
- Index of Names
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
Recent years have witnessed the beginning of an important trend in environmental law and policy, namely the endeavor to integrate insights from the behavioral sciences into regulatory design and implementation. This chapter offers an assessment of the behavioralist turn, arguing that traditional precautionary environmental regulation—criticized by behavioralists as reflective of lay cognitive errors in risk perception—may be defended as providing significant bias correctives of its own. It finds in such perceptions a variety of contextual factors that may be of normative importance and shows that there are powerful reasons to believe that public demand for protection against harmful market externalities may systematically understate the societal need for protection. Drawing from fundamental behavioral scientific insights, the chapter suggests that environmental law must allow for public deliberation about the rearrangement of social rules and incentives in a manner that induces people to act to serve the common good.
Adrian Kuenzler is Branco Weiss Fellow of Society in Science at Yale Law School.
Douglas A. Kysar is Joseph M. Field ’55 Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
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