- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law
- Heuristics and Biases
- Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order
- Moral Judgment
- The Importance of Behavioral Law
- Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods
- Biasing, Debiasing, and the Law
- Alternative Behavioral Law and Economics
- Law and Prosocial Behavior
- Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law and Economics
- Law, Moral Attitudes, and Behavioral Change
- Law’s Loss Aversion
- Wrestling with the Endowment Effect, or How to Do Law and Economics without the Coase Theorem
- Probability Errors: Overoptimism, Ambiguity Aversion, and the Certainty Effect
- The Hindsight Bias and the Law in Hindsight
- Behavioral Law and Economics of Property Law: Achievements and Challenges
- Behavioral Economics and Tort Law
- Behavioral Economics and Contract Law
- Consumer Transactions
- Behavioral Economics and Insurance Law: The Importance of Equilibrium Analysis
- The End of Contractarianism?: Behavioral Economics and the Law of Corporations
- The Market, the Firm, and Behavioral Antitrust
- Behavioral Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey
- Behavioral Economics and the Law: Tax
- Litigation and Settlement
- Behavioral Economics and Plea Bargaining
- Judicial Decision-Making: A Behavioral Perspective
- Evidence Law
- Nudges.gov: Behaviorally Informed Regulation
- Environmental Law
- Index of Names
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter critically reviews the behavioral literature on judicial decision-making. Among other things, it presents general theories of judicial decision-making, such as the story model and coherence-based reasoning. It also describes the reflection of a series of well-known cognitive phenomena in judicial decision-making, including the compromise and contrast effects, the effect of legally irrelevant information, the hindsight bias, the omission bias, and the role of anchoring in converting qualitative into quantitative judgments. The chapter examines fact-finders’ reluctance to impose liability based on certain types of evidence. It further reviews the contribution of behavioral studies to better understanding judicial prejudice. Special attention is given to judicial application of legal norms to facts and the effect of the choice between rules and standards on the predictability of judgments. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of two fundamental questions in the behavioral analysis of judicial decision-making: group decision-making and judges’ versus laypersons’ decision-making.
Doron Teichman is Joseph H. and Belle R. Braun Associate Professor in the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Eyal Zamir is the Augusto Levi Professor of Commercial Law at the Faculty of Law, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he served as Dean of the Faculty of Law from 2002 to 2005.
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