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date: 17 August 2019

(p. ix) List of Figures and Tables

(p. ix) List of Figures and Tables

Figures

  1. 2.1 Shift in the transformation function 46

  2. 3.1 Conceptual framework for transparency aspects 71

  3. 3.2 Transparency trends across monetary policy frameworks 76

  4. 5.1 Number of sovereign “defaults” 1824–2004 120

  5. 5.2 Type I error for agency ratings, Z˝-score, and Z-Metrics agency equivalent (AE ratings (1989–2008): one-year prediction horizon for publicly owned firms) 127

  6. 5.3 Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from capital market CDS spreads, January 1, 2009–March 4, 2013. Assumes 40% recovery rate (R). PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)). 131

  7. 5.4 Greece: Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from sovereign CDS spreads vs. 75th percentile corporate PD, 2008–2012 (11/16).Assuming a 40% recovery rate (R); based on the median CDS spread (s). CDS implied PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)) 134

  8. 5.5 Portugal: Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from sovereign CDS spreads vs. 75th percentile corporate PD, 2008–2012 (11/16). Assuming a 40% recovery rate (R); based on the median CDS spread (s). CDS implied PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)) 134

  9. 5.6 Ireland: Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from sovereign CDS spreads vs. 75th percentile corporate PD, 2008–2012 (11/16). Assuming a 40% recovery rate (R); based on the median CDS spread (s). CDS implied PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)) 135

  10. 5.7 Spain: Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from sovereign CDS spreads vs. 75th percentile corporate PD, 2008–2012 (11/16). Assuming a 40% recovery rate (R); based on the median CDS spread (s). CDS implied PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)) 135

  11. 5.8 Italy: Five-year implied probabilities of default (PD) from sovereign CDS spreads vs. 75th percentile corporate PD, 2008–2012 (11/16). Assuming a 40% recovery rate (R); based on the median CDS spread (s). CDS implied PD computed as 1 – e(–5*s/(1 – R)) 136

  12. 6.1 Competition policy 145

  13. (p. x) 9.1 Stylized returns to different stages of education and training 204

  14. 12.1 Country averages of actual risk-based capital ratios worldwide 268

  15. 12.2A Capital ratios of the world’s biggest banks prior to the bailout period. Tier 1 capital ratio 268

  16. 12.2B Capital ratios of the world’s biggest banks prior to the bailout period. Total risk-based capital ratio 269

  17. 12.2C Capital ratios of the world’s biggest banks prior to the bailout period. Common equity to total assets 270

  18. 12.2D Capital ratios of the world’s biggest banks prior to the bailout period. Tangible equity to total assets 271

  19. 12.3 Selected G-SIBs in Europe and the United States ranked both by reported total assets and total assets when derivatives are on a gross, not net (US GAAP), basis (IFRS), 2011 273

  20. 12.4 Differences in total assets of US G-SIBs due to differences in the accounting treatment of derivatives (2011) 274

  21. 12.5 Impact of the treatment of derivatives on the leverage ratios (assets-to-equity) for the US and European G-SIBs (2011) 275

  22. 16.1 Degrees of opacity and transparency 345

  23. 16.2 Theoretical view of the relationship among transparency, legitimacy, and trust 346

  24. 16.3 Degree of legitimacy and transparent behavior 348

  25. 18.1 The onion model of BoD and TMT transparency 375

  26. 18.2 Transparency of different types of BoD and TMT characteristics: The strategic hoarding perspective 379

  27. 19.1 The association between governance transparency and social trust 404

  28. 19.2 The association between transparency and behavioral trust formation 406

  29. 19.3 The association between transparency and equity participation 407

  30. 19.4 The association between governance transparency and cost of equity 408

  31. 19.5 The association between transparency and financial architecture 408

  32. 22.1 IASB’s governance structure 467

  33. 25.1 Evolution of the market-to-book ratios from 2006 to 2012 522

  34. 25.2 Cumulative average abnormal return, 2006–2013 527

  35. 25.3 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns—Exercise announcement 532

  36. 25.4 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns—Methodology disclosure 533

  37. 25.5 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns—Exercise results 535

(p. xi) Tables

  1. 2.1 Simplified Amendment Rules, 25 Countries/Federations 36

  2. 3.1 Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency 73

  3. 5.1 Financial Crises, Advanced Countries 1870–2010 119

  4. 5.2 Financial Health of the Corporate, Nonfinancial Sector: Selected European Countries and the United States in 2008–2012 (6/30) 128

  5. 5.3 Financial Health of the Corporate, Nonfinancial Sector: Selected European Countries and United States in 2008–2012 (6/30) 129

  6. 5.4 Weighted Average Median Five-Year (PD) for Listed Nonfinancial and Banking Firms (Europe and United States), 2010 133

  7. 5.5 Private vs. Public Firm Model PDs in 2010 and 2099 137

  8. 6.1 Combination of Perfect Market Criteria 147

  9. 6.2 Incentives to Collude According to the Degree of Information and the Type of Products 148

  10. 8.1 Firms’ Disclosures of Climate Change Risks in US SEC Filings (number of firms with some disclosure of the information indicated) 185

  11. 12.1 Information on Factors Considered for Large/Interconnected Banks of Selected Countries 277

  12. 12.2 Information on Regulations for Large/Interconnected Banks of Selected Countries 278

  13. 12.A1 Selected Information on Bailout and Capital Ratios of the World’s Biggest Banks 282

  14. 12.A2 Accounting Standards for Selected Countries That Are Headquarters of the World’s Biggest Banks 284

  15. 15.1 Agency Relationships in a Corrupt Transaction, the Impact of Transparency, and the Limitations of Transparency for Reducing Corruption 327

  16. 18.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of BoD and TMT Transparency: Market-pull versus Strategic Hoarding Perspective 376

  17. 18.2 Corporate Governance in Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 380

  18. 18.3 Transparency Patterns at European TMTs and BoDs 381

  19. 19.1 Disclosure Variables from Bushman et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2008) for Countries That Have Both Reported 401

  20. 21.1 Transparency and Disclosure in Relation to Key Stakeholders 438

  21. 22.1 Market Proxies of Accounting Transparency 462

  22. 22.2 Factors Associated with Accounting Transparency 463

  23. 22.3 Accounting Standards Issued by the IASB as of August 2013 468

  24. (p. xii) 22.4 World’s Major Economies (G-20) and the Adoption of IFRS 471

  25. 24.1 Hedging Gains/Losses and Sample Firm Characteristics—Annual and Quarterly 507

  26. 24.2 Discretionary Accruals and Hedging Gains/Losses 510

  27. 24.3 Hedging Gains/Losses by Industry 511

  28. 24.4 Regression of Risk Measures on Hedging Gains/Losses 515

  29. 24.5 Performance Differences for Firms that Do or Do Not Report Hedging Gains/Losses 516

  30. 25.1 Overview Cross-border Stress Tests of European Banks, 2009–2013 529

  31. 25.2 Stress-Tested Banks Average Residuals—Exercise Announcement 532

  32. 25.3 Average Residuals of Stress-Tested Banks—Methodology Disclosure 533

  33. 25.4 Average Residuals of Stress-Tested Banks—Results Disclosure 535

  34. 25.5 CAAR Differences between Business Models 536

  35. 25.A1 Stress-Tested Banks 539