- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- The Multifaceted Concept of Transparency
- Constitutional Transparency
- Monetary Policy Transparency
- Fiscal Policy Transparency
- Transparent and Unique Sovereign Default Risk Assessment
- Transparency and Competition Policy in an Imperfectly Competitive World
- Transparency in International Trade Policy
- Transparency of Climate Change Policies, Markets, and Corporate Practices
- Transparency of Human Resource Policy
- Transparency of Innovation Policy
- Labor Market Transparency
- Transparency of Financial Regulation
- Price Transparency and Market Integration
- Transparency and Inward Investment Incentives
- Transparency and Corruption
- Multinational Corporations’ Relationship with Political Actors: Transparency versus Opacity
- Corporate Governance and Optimal Transparency
- Transparency Differences at the Top of the Organization: Market-Pull versus Strategic Hoarding Forces
- Governance Transparency and the Institutions of Capitalism: Implications for Finance
- Transparency and Executive Compensation
- Transparency and Disclosure in the Global Microfinance Industry
- Accounting Transparency and International Standard Setting
- Transparency of Fair Value Accounting and Tax
- Transparency of Corporate Risk Management and Performance
- Stress Testing, Transparency, and Uncertainty in European Banking: What Impacts?
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
In this chapter I analyze how transparency can deter corruption. I first review the concept of corruption, its types, and the reasons why it exists. I then consider corrupt relationships as multiagency relationships before explaining how transparency can help tackle corruption by solving the information asymmetries in the agency relationships. I argue that increasing transparency, although necessary, is not sufficient to reduce corruption, and I suggest that transparency must be complemented by monitoring and punishment to be effective at reducing corruption.
Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Professor of International Business and Strategy in the D'Amore-McKim School of Business at Northeastern University, Boston, MA.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.