- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency
- List of Figures and Tables
- List of Contributors
- The Multifaceted Concept of Transparency
- Constitutional Transparency
- Monetary Policy Transparency
- Fiscal Policy Transparency
- Transparent and Unique Sovereign Default Risk Assessment
- Transparency and Competition Policy in an Imperfectly Competitive World
- Transparency in International Trade Policy
- Transparency of Climate Change Policies, Markets, and Corporate Practices
- Transparency of Human Resource Policy
- Transparency of Innovation Policy
- Labor Market Transparency
- Transparency of Financial Regulation
- Price Transparency and Market Integration
- Transparency and Inward Investment Incentives
- Transparency and Corruption
- Multinational Corporations’ Relationship with Political Actors: Transparency versus Opacity
- Corporate Governance and Optimal Transparency
- Transparency Differences at the Top of the Organization: Market-Pull versus Strategic Hoarding Forces
- Governance Transparency and the Institutions of Capitalism: Implications for Finance
- Transparency and Executive Compensation
- Transparency and Disclosure in the Global Microfinance Industry
- Accounting Transparency and International Standard Setting
- Transparency of Fair Value Accounting and Tax
- Transparency of Corporate Risk Management and Performance
- Stress Testing, Transparency, and Uncertainty in European Banking: What Impacts?
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
For economics, finance, and business purposes, constitutional transparency largely means predictability. Decisions to change a constitution can result in type I errors—accepting changes that do not improve welfare—or type II errors—rejecting a change that would improve welfare. Virtually all written constitutions can change formally through amendments or implicitly through high court interpretations. Evidence shows the two-stage US amendment process is less likely to make type I and type II errors than Supreme Court interpretations. Elites propose European Union (EU) constitutional changes and much the same elites accept them; the procedure appears two-stage but is close to single-stage. Supreme Court, EU, and UK constitutional changes are essentially single-stage procedures, relying on elites. Of the 24 countries and the European Union discussed here, 11 use a two-stage procedure. A wisdom-of-crowds argument supports multistage processes.
Richard J. Sweeney, Sullivan/Dean Professor of International Business and Finance at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
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