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date: 22 November 2019

(p. 587) Index

(p. 587) Index

Accountable care organizations, 109–110
Accounting anomalies, 220–222
Actual punishment policy, 21–25
Advertising-supported media mergers, 428–430
Advocate Health Partners, 92–93
Aetna, 95, 102–104, 106, 532
Affeldt, Pauline, 427, 429
Agency costs, deterrence and, 262–263
Agricultural Marketing Agreements Act of 1937, 539
Agricultural revolution, 206n3
AIDS (Almost Ideal Demand System) demand, 478, 482–486
Airline industry
component production, achieving efficient scale for, 43
national security, conferring market power to promote, 55
Airline Tariff Publishing system, 236
Aktas, Nihat, 155
Alchian, Armen, 208–209
Alcoa, 320, 338, 352
Allen, Bruce T., 565–566
Alliance Movement, 153
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) demand, 478, 482–486
Al-Najjar, Nabil, 220–221
Aluminum Ltd., 338
Amazon, 156
Amelio, Andrea, 435
American Antitrust Institute, 533n11, 535–536
American Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section, 84, 542, 544
American Express, 415
American Medical Association, health insurance and, 96
American Telegraph = Telephone (AT=T)
as dominant firm, 320
essential facilities doctrine and, 395
injunctions and, 270–272
market power and, 339
as national champion, 54–55
networks and, 380
vertical mergers and, 570–572, 580
vertical separation and, 393–394
American Tobacco Company, 337
Anderson, Gary M., 160
Anderson, Simon P., 410
Andersson, Ola, 215
Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, 151
“Antitrust Dilemma,” 148
Antitrust Division. See Justice Department
Antonielli, Marco, 439
Apple, 156, 320, 380, 413
Approximately optimal profit, 217–218
Arcadian, 106, 108
Archer Daniels Midland, 181
Areeda, Phillip, 26, 85, 538, 544–545
Areeda-Turner rule, 336
Arms manufacturing, conferring market power to promote national security, 55
Armstrong, Mark, 205, 412–413, 418, 421, 433
Arrow, Kenneth, 10–11
Asch, Peter, 148
Ascione, Aurora, 182
Ashenfelter, Orley, 487
Asymmetric competition, 419
Attorney incentives in settlements, 179–180
Attorneys’ fees
in class actions, 199–203
contingent fees, 179–180, 199
lodestar method, 199
in settlements, 179–180
share-of-recovery method, 199–201
(p. 588) Auction models, unilateral effects analysis, 496–498
Avenal, Eric, 567–569
Azcuenaga, Mary L., 73
Baby Bells, 270
Bagwell, Kyle, 247
Baidu, 419
Bain, Joe S., 323, 338, 556
Baker, Jonathan, 512
Baker, Jonathan B., 374
Baliga, Sandeep, 220–221
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 50
Banking industry, mitigating regulation, 50–51
Bank Merger Act of 1960, 50
Bargaining. See also Collective bargaining
bargaining models, unilateral effects analysis, 498–500
hospital mergers and, 77–79
Barlet, Corinne, 567–569
Barros, Pedro P., 122
BASFAG (cartel), 181
Bates, Laurie J., 539
Baum, Lawrence, 160
Baumol, William J., 163, 304
Baxter’s Law, 393
Baye, Michael, 218
Baylor University Hospital, 95
Becker, Gary, 18, 20, 24, 256
Bedre-Defolie, Ozlem, 414, 418
Behavioral economics, 205–225
accounting anomalies and, 220–222
analysis of, 223–225
Bertrand markets and, 210–211, 218–221, 223
Cournot markets and, 209–213, 216, 224
economies of scale and, 205–206
esprit de corps, 212–215
imitative behavior, 208–212
overoptimism and, 218–220
overview, 205–208
price fixing and, 210
rationality of rivals, uncertainty regarding, 222
reasons for not pursuing maximum profit, 223–225
relative profit, concerns for, 208–212
satisfactory profit versus maximum profit, 215–218
in Stackelberg markets, 213
vengeful behavior, 212–215
Behavioral psychology, 148–149
Behringer, Stefan, 437
Bell Doctrine, 393
Bell System, 266, 270, 387
Benson, Bruce L., 154, 160
Bentham, Jeremy, 24
Bernhardt, Dan, 173
Bernheim, B. Douglas, 516
Bertrand markets
accounting anomalies and, 220–221
behavioral economics and, 223
coordinated effects analysis in, 511, 513, 517, 523, 525
explicit collusion in, 234
imitative behavior and, 210–211
overoptimism and, 219
price floors and, 239
satisfactory profit versus maximum profit in, 218
tacit collusion in, 231, 233
unilateral effects analysis in, 470, 476, 494–495
vertical mergers in, 561–562, 579
Besanko, David, 220–221
Bhattacharyya, Sugato, 535
Bilateral agreements
consultation in, 127
international antitrust institutions and, 126–128
mutual assistance in, 127
negative comity in, 127
notification in, 126
positive comity in, 128
Bilateral monopoly, 364–378
antitrust policy and, 372–377
collusion, countervailing power through, 375–376
complications of, 372–374
cost curves in, 367–368
countervailing power and, 372–377. See also Countervailing power
economics of, 365–372
(p. 589) formula-price contracts in, 369–372
input price, limits on indeterminacy of, 368–369
mergers, countervailing power through, 376–377
overview, 364, 377–378
simple model, 366–369
theory of, 366
Binger, Brian R., 231
Blair, Roger D., 187, 364, 370
Block, Michael K., 258
Blodgett Memorial Medical Center, 80
Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, 63, 95–98, 105
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Delaware, 92
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, 99
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 65, 104–105
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, 106–107
Boeing, 122
Boone, Jan, 245
Bork, Robert H., 3, 152, 299–300, 307, 457
Boudreau, Kevin J., 438
Boudreaux, Donald J., 153
“Bounty hunter” model, 282–283
Bourjade, Sylvain, 175
Bowley, A.L., 366–367
BP (British Petroleum), 566
Bradley, Robert L., Jr., 154
Brady, Gordon L., 151
Brandeis, Louis (Justice), 13
Brandts, Jordi, 247–248
Brazil, settlements in, 182n14
Breuckner, Jan, 490
Breyer, Stephen (Justice), 298
Briggs, Hugh C., 175
British Petroleum (BP), 566
Brown Shoe Co., 551
Buchanan, James M., 148, 159–160, 162, 164
Budzinkski, Oliver, 119, 122–123, 132, 134
Bundling
in Cournot markets, 246–247
in European Union, 435
as exclusionary conduct, 245–248
experimental economics, 245–248
hospitals and, 86–87
by multisided platform businesses, 435–436
restraint of trade and, 305–306
in Stackelberg markets, 246–247
Bureaucracy, public choice theory of antitrust law and, 157–159
Bureaucratic incentives hypothesis, 154
Bush, George H.W., 570
Business networks, 381n3
Butterworth Hospital, 80
Buyer mergers, 530–540
buyer power defined, 533–534
competitive supply, buyer power with, 531–532
efficiencies from increase in buyer power, 535
empirical analysis, need for, 539–540
in healthcare markets, 532
Merger Guidelines and, 532, 537–539
“mirror image” question, 530
monopsony and, 531–532
overview, 530
potential competitive harm from increase in, 536–537
seller mergers compared, 530n3
upstream competition, effect on, 536–537n20
where suppliers not price takers, 533–540
Buyer power, 529–547
in buyer mergers, 530–540. See also Buyer mergers
overview, 529–530, 547
rationale for antitrust law and, 11–12
in supplier mergers, 540–546. See also Supplier mergers
Cable television, vertical mergers in, 565, 572–573
Cabral, Luís M., 122
Cabrales, Antonio, 247–248
Caliskan, Anil, 246–247
Calvano, Emilio, 414, 418
Campbell, Tom, 374, 544
Canada
Competition Bureau Canada, 541–544
mergers in, 9
supplier mergers in, 541–544
(p. 590) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Schumpeter), 10
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 49, 57
Capps, Cory S., 63, 77–78, 81
Capra, C. Monica, 241
Cargill, 99
CARICOM Competition Commission, 131n13
Carlton, Dennis W., 529
Carnival Corporation, 520
Carstensen, Peter C., 33, 538–539
Cartels
actual punishment policy and, 22–23
coordinated effects analysis and, 515
empty core and, 40–41
in European Union, 129n12
explicit collusion and, 234
imprisonment and, 264–265
national champions, conferring market power to protect, 54
optimal deterrence and, 261
sanctions imposed on, 257
tacit collusion and, 230
in United Kingdom, 214
vengeful behavior and, 214
Cason, Timothy N., 236
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, 13, 151, 333
Cement industry, vertical mergers in, 566n21, 566n22
Certification of class, 190–191
Chakraborty, Ratula, 535–536
Chamberlain, Lawrence H., 152
Chamberlin, Edward H., 229–231, 326, 331, 384, 422
Chandra, Ambarish, 427, 429, 439
Chao, Yong, 436
Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Relief Act of 1995, 51, 53
Charitable organizations, conferring market power to achieve social goals, 53
Charness, Gary, 247–248
Chen, Yongmin, 568
Chicago School
exclusive dealing and, 243
rationales for antitrust law and, 3, 7, 13
vertical merger policy, critique of, 551, 553–559
China
Anti-Monopoly Law of 2007, 5
coordinated effects analysis in, 515
development of law in, 29
evidence in, 30
importance of enforcement regime, 17
international externalities of national competition policies and, 122–123
multisided platform businesses in, 406
Choi, Jay Pil, 435–436, 568–569
Chowdhury, Subhasish M., 433
Church, Jeffrey, 566–570
Church White Paper, 567–568
Cigna, 95
Cinemax, 565
Clabault, James M., 258
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)
class actions under, 201–203
damages under, 260
overview, 187
Class actions, 187–203
attorneys’ fees in, 199–203
CAFA and, 187, 201–203
class certification, 190–191
common proofs, 191–193
coupons, 199–203
deterrence and, 189
economic rationale for, 188–189
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, 190–191
frequency of, 188n3
indirect purchaser actions, 193–194
overview, 187, 203
practical problems, 191–201
predominance requirement, 190–191
prevalence of, 194–195
price and, 192–193
risk neutrality and, 189n4
settlements of, 195–199
treble damages in, 192, 197
Class certification, 190–191
Clayton Act of 1914
bilateral monopoly and, 364, 374–375, 378
class actions under, 187–190, 194
efficiencies and, 453–454, 457
evidence under, 30
exclusionary conduct under, 239
historical background, 151–152, 154
mergers under, 333, 335, 376
remedies under, 255
(p. 591) treble damages under, 259
vertical mergers and, 551
Clinton, Bill, 570
Coal industry, countervailing power and, 375
Coase, Ronald H., 391, 559
Coca-Cola, 551–553
Coleman, Mary, 529
Collard-Wexler, Allan, 427, 429, 439
Collective bargaining
efficiencies, creating countervailing power to facilitate, 49–50
by physicians, 377
Colleges and universities, conferring market power to achieve social goals, 53–54
Collusion
in Bertrand markets, 231, 233, 234, 235
cartels and, 230, 234
conscious parallelism, 235–237
coordinated effects analysis and, 513, 516–519
countervailing power through, 375–376
in Cournot markets, 231–232
in European Union, 293–294
experimental economics, 230–239
explicit collusion, 234–235
Nash equilibrium and, 231–233
nonbinding price announcements, 235–237
oligopoly and, 231, 234–235
overview, 230
posted-offer experiments, 234n6
price ceilings, 237–239
price fixing and, 234
price floors, 237–239
private enforcement actions and, 292–294
tacit collusion, 231–233
technology, effect of, 214–215
in United States, 293
vengeful behavior and, 212–215
Comity, international antitrust institutions and, 126–128
Commerce Department, Export Trade Certificate Program, 44n22
Commitments, vertical mergers and, 574–579
Comparative transaction costs, vertical mergers and, 559
Compensation, deterrence versus, 259–260, 282–287
Competition
asymmetric competition, 419
competitors versus, 9–10
diversity of competition regimes, international antitrust institutions and, 124
healthcare markets, evolving nature of competition in, 68–69
international externalities of national competition policies, international antitrust institutions and, 121–123
loopholes in protection of competition, international antitrust institutions and, 123
monopoly compared, 316, 319
multisided platform businesses, among, 415–419
prior failures in market regulation, mitigating, 51
procompetitive versus anticompetitive conduct, 121n4
profit and, 207–208
public choice theory of antitrust law and, 163–164
restraint of trade. See Restraint of trade
restriction on competition, preventing, 331–333
wealth transfers and protection from. See Wealth transfers and protection from competition
“Competitive bottlenecks,” 418
Competitive supply, buyer power with, 531–532
Competitors
competition versus, 9–10
coordination among to achieve efficient market, 44–48
rationality of rivals, uncertainty regarding, 222
Complete deterrence, 20–22
Component production, achieving efficient scale and, 42–44
Compte, Olivier, 524
Computer industry, injunctions and, 271–274
Concentration effects, 489n58
Conditioning, hospitals and, 86–87
Conduct injunctions, 270–274
Confidentiality in settlements, 173–174
(p. 592) Conglomerate mergers, 552n3
Congress, public choice theory of antitrust law and, 157–159
Connor, Robert A., 69, 257, 265
Conscious parallelism, 235–237
Consent decrees, settlements and, 183
Consultation in bilateral agreements, 127
Consumers, price fixing and, 288–289
Consumer Watchdog, 406
Consumer welfare
efficiencies and, 460
hypothesis, 153
multisided platform businesses and, 413–414
restraint of trade and, 299–300, 307
Contestability theory, 383
Contingent attorneys’ fees, 179–180, 199
Cooper, David J., 247
Cooperation, efficiencies and, 452–453
Cooperative strategy in international antitrust institutions, 126–128
Coordinated effects analysis, 509–526
in Bertrand markets, 511, 513, 517, 523, 525
cartels and, 515
checklist of market factors, 513–516
in China, 515
collusion mechanism, 513, 516–519
in Cournot markets, 513, 517, 525
in European Union, 514, 517
limitations of, 524–526
market definition and, 358
“mavericks” and, 512
mergers and, 333–334
overview, 509–510
parallel accommodating conduct, 522–524
price complexity, implications of, 513, 519–521
structural presumption, 510–513
unilateral effects analysis compared, 466n1
in United States, 514, 517
vertical mergers and, 469n24
Coordinated Price Pressure Index (CPPI), 523–524
Core, restraint of trade and, 299–301
Corts, Kenneth S., 434
Cost curves
in bilateral monopoly, 367–368
in economies of scale, 325
Countervailing power
bilateral monopoly and, 372–377
coal industry and, 375
collusion, through, 375–376
efficiencies, to facilitate, 49–50
labor unions and, 375
mergers, through, 376–377
motion picture industry and, 375–376
split agreements and, 375–376
Coupons in class actions, 199–203
Cournot, Augustin, 366, 558
Cournot markets
behavioral economics and, 224
bundling in, 246–247
coordinated effects analysis in, 513, 517, 525
explicit collusion in, 235
imitative behavior and, 209–212
satisfactory profit versus maximum profit in, 216
SSCO model, 560–561
tacit collusion in, 231–232
unilateral effects analysis in, 355, 492–493
vengeful behavior and, 213
vertical mergers in, 560–561, 567, 575–578
Coursey, Don, 237–238
CPPI (Coordinated Price Pressure Index), 523–524
Crandall, Robert W., 268
Crane, Daniel A., 3, 262–263
Cremieux, Peirre, 183
Cross-border externalities, international antitrust institutions and, 121–123
Cross-elasticities, market definition and, 359–361
Cross-market variation, unilateral effects analysis, 490–491
Current procedural terminology (CPT) code, 66, 90
Cyert, Richard, 216
Dafny, Leemore, 104–106
Dallas Morning News, 433
Dallas Times Herald, 433
Damages
agency costs and, 262–263
(p. 593) deterrence versus compensation, 259–260
optimal deterrence, 260–261
punitive damages in private enforcement actions, 285
as remedy, 259–263
settlements and, 261–262
Daugherty, Andrew F., 174
Davidson, Carl, 495
Davis, Douglas D., 230, 233, 236–237, 248
Deaton, Angus, 482
de Bodt, Eric, 155
Deficiencies of multiple procedures in international antitrust institutions, 123
Dell, 558
Demand curves in monopoly, 316, 322, 326–327
Demand externalities, market failure and, 45–46
Deneckere, Raymond, 495
DePasquale, Christina, 364
Derdenger, Timothy, 436
Destructive competition, market failure and, 38–42
Deterrence
agency costs and, 262–263
class actions and, 189
compensation versus, 259–260, 282–287
complete deterrence, 20–22
optimal deterrence, 260–261
settlements and, 261–262
Developing countries, ICN in, 135
Diagnosis related groups (DRGs), 66
Diagonal mergers, 551n1
Differentiated products, market definition and, 357
DiLorenzo, Thomas J., 153, 164
Dinc, Serdar, 155
Diners Club, 410–411, 415
Direct purchasers, private enforcement actions by, 284, 287
Direct regulation, exemptions facilitating transition to market orientation, 57–58
Discover, 415, 432
Dissolutions, injunctions and, 268–269
Divergence between opposing views of antitrust law, 8–9
Diversion ratios, 472n15
Divestiture
injunctions and, 267–270
of networks, 393
Dixit, Avinash, 247
Dixon, Huw, 217
Dobson, Paul W., 535–536
Doctors. See Physicians
Doganoglu, Toker, 433–434
Doha Declaration, 130
Dolbear, F.T., 231
Dominant firms
economic and policy approaches, 313–340
exclusionary conduct, preventing, 336–337
Lerner Index and, 317, 320, 325–327, 331, 337
market delineation and, 327–331
market power in, 325–327, 331–339. See also Market power
mergers, preventing, 333–334
overview, 313–315, 339–340
predatory pricing, preventing, 334–336
reactive fringe and, 320–323
restriction on competition, preventing, 331–333
structural dismemberment and, 337–339
unilateral effects analysis, 495
unilateral exercise of market power, policies to prevent, 314, 331–339
Double marginalization, vertical mergers and, 557–559
Douglas, William O., 269
Dowd, Bryan E., 69
Downs, Anthony, 158
Dranove, David, 63, 68, 77–78, 81, 96, 106
DRGs (Diagnosis related groups), 66
Dufwenberg, Martin, 238–239
Duggan, Mark, 104–106
Duopoly
accounting anomalies and, 220
imitative behavior and, 209–210
satisfactory profit versus maximum profit in, 217–218
upstream duopoly, 242n11
du Pont, 330
Duso, Tomaso, 155
Dynamic efficiency
mergers and, 459–460
(p. 594) in networks, 392–393
as rationale for antitrust law, 10–11
Eaton, Jonathan, 221
eBay, 320
Economic justifications for exemptions, 34
“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention” (Arrow), 11
Economies of scale
behavioral economics and, 205–206
cost curves in, 325
learning curves in, 324n25
monopoly, as entry barrier for, 324
Edgeworth, F.Y., 300, 494–495
Edlin, Aaron, 298
Effects doctrine, extraterritorial enforcement through, 125–126
Efficiencies, 451–464
agency analysis of, 458–464
in buyer mergers, 535
buyer power, from increase in, 535
consumer welfare and, 460
cooperation and, 452–453
countervailing power to facilitate, creating, 49–50
defense of mergers, 453–458
dynamic efficiency. See Dynamic efficiency
in European Union, 460, 462–463
evolution of doctrine, 453–458
exclusionary conduct and, 458–459
hospital mergers and, 79n50, 83
importance in antitrust law, 451–453
marginal costs and, 459
mergers and, 459–464
in networks, 392–393
overview, 451, 464
in practice, 463–464
price fixing and, 20n5, 452–453
proof of, 461–463
as rationale for antitrust law, 5–8, 10–11
static efficiency. See Static efficiency
unilateral conduct and, 452
in United States, 460
variable costs and, 459
vertical restraints and, 457–458
Eigen-Zucchi, Christian, 154
Einav, Liran, 497
Eisenberg, Theodore, 179
Eisenmann, Thomas R., 419
Ekelund, Robert B., 154
Elasticities, market definition and, 359–361
Electric utilities, facilitating transition from state ownership or direct regulation to market orientation, 58
Elzinga, Kenneth G., 75, 77
Elzinga-Hogart method, 72–75
Emch, Eric, 425
Empty core
cartels and, 40–41
market failure and, 38–42
transportation and, 41
Enforcement regimes, 17–31
actual punishment policy, 21–25
complete deterrence, 20–22
development of law, 27–29
effects doctrine, extraterritorial enforcement through, 125–126
efficiencies and, 458–464. See also Efficiencies
evidence, 29–30
exemptions improving efficiency of, 58–59
harm internalization, 20–22
imprisonment, 23
optimal enforcement policy, 18–21
overview, 17–18, 30–31
predatory pricing, 25–27
private enforcement actions. See Private enforcement actions
procedure, 27, 29–30
public choice theory of antitrust law and, 155–162
substantive standards, 25–27
in United Kingdom, 149
Engelmann, Dirk, 238
England. See United Kingdom
Entry barriers in health insurance, 100–101
Entry effects, 489n58
Erel, Isil, 155
Esprit de corps, 212–215
Essential facilities doctrine, networks and, 395–397
European Coal and Steel Community of 1952, 13
European Commission
(p. 595) enforcement by, 149
horizontal merger guidelines, 354, 462–463, 467
injunctions imposed by, 272–273
nonhorizontal merger guidelines, 554, 568–571, 580
European Community Treaty
actual punishment under, 21
development of law under, 27–28
enforcement under, 149
exclusionary conduct under, 239
European Court of First Instance, 28n8, 155n14
European Court of Justice and General Court, competition versus competitors in, 9
European Union
actual punishment policy in, 21–25
airline industry in, 128n11
bundling in, 435
cartels in, 129n12
collusion in, 293–294
comity in, 128
Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market, 354
Competition Law, 27
Competition Policy System, 119n1
competition versus competitors in, 9
conscious parallelism in, 235
consumers, price fixing and, 288–289
coordinated effects analysis in, 514, 517
development of law in, 27–29
DG Competition Discussion Paper, 354
effects doctrine, extraterritorial enforcement through, 125–126
efficiencies in, 460, 462–463
evidence in, 29–30
exclusionary conduct in, 346, 350
fines in, 257
importance of enforcement regime, 17
leniency programs in, 181
lost profits in, 294–295
merger simulation in, 486, 498
mergers in, 9, 155
monopsony in, 293–294
multisided platform businesses in, 406
nonbinding price announcements in, 235
predatory pricing in, 25–27
private enforcement actions in, 281–282, 285–287, 295–296
public enforcement actions, settlements in, 180–183
resellers under imperfectly competitive conditions, price fixing and, 291
supplier mergers and, 541–543
tying in, 435
unilateral effects analysis in, 467
vertical mergers in, 551–552, 554, 568–570
Evans, David S.
on asymmetric competition, 419
on coordinated behavior, 440
on efficiencies, 438
on exclusionary conduct, 431
on market definition, 424
on multisided platform businesses, 404, 405–406, 409, 411
on product differentiation, 417
Evanston Northwest Healthcare, 71, 76–77
Evidence in enforcement regimes, 29–30
Excess inertia, 386–387
Excess momentum, 387
Exclusionary conduct, 239–248
bundling, 245–248
efficiencies and, 458–459
in European Union, 346, 350
exclusive dealing, 243–245
foreclosure, 242–243
by hospitals, 84–89
limit pricing, 247n16
multisided platform businesses and, 431–438
overview, 239
predatory pricing, 240–242
preventing, 336–337
rebates, 245–246n15
in United States, 346, 350
upstream duopoly, 242n11
Exclusive dealing
experimental economics, 243–245
by multisided platform businesses, 433–434
by newspapers, 433
video games and, 433–436
Exclusive territories in health insurance, 104–105
Exemptions, 33–59
(p. 596) economic justifications for, 34
efficiency of enforcement, improving, 58–59
market failure and, 37–51. See also Market failure
natural monopoly and, 35–36
overview, 33–35, 59
rent seeking and, 34
transition from state ownership or direct regulation to market orientation, facilitating, 57–58
wealth transfers and protection from competition and, 51–57. See also Wealth transfers and protection from competition
Experimental economics, 229–249
bundling, 245–248
collusion, 230–239. See also Collusion
exclusionary conduct, 239–248
exclusive dealing, 243–245
foreclosure, 242–243
overview, 229–230, 248–249
predatory pricing, 240–242
Explicit collusion, 234–235
Externalities
in China, 122–123
demand externalities, market failure and, 45–46
international externalities, international antitrust institutions and, 121–123
membership externalities, 408, 410–411
multisided platform businesses and, 407–408, 410–411
negative externalities, ICN and, 136
network externalities, market failure and, 45–46
in Russia, 122–123
supply externalities, market failure and, 46–47
usage externalities, 407–408, 410
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 181
Facebook, 380, 406
Fairness as rationale for antitrust law, 5–8
Faith, Roger L., 158
Fan, Ying, 429–430, 439
Farrell, Joseph, 298, 374, 427, 468, 493
Favored activities, subsidization of, 56
Favored classes of market participant, wealth transfers to, 56–57
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 394, 565n19, 570
Federal Reserve System, payment cards and, 415
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class actions under, 190–191
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
bargaining models and, 500
Bureau of Economics, 157
buyer mergers and, 532, 537–538
competition law doctrine, mitigating, 51
coordinated effects analysis and, 515, 518, 520–522
efficiencies and, 454, 460, 463
enforcement by, 149–150, 157, 159
evidence and, 30
General Counsel, 30
healthcare markets and, 63, 65, 69
hospital mergers and, 70–74, 76–80, 82–83, 108–109
Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines
mergers and, 333, 376–377
multisided platform businesses and, 406
noncompete agreements and, 333
physician price fixing and fee schedules and, 90–94
remedies sought by, 255
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 91
supplier mergers and, 543
vertical mergers and, 565–566, 572
Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 151–152, 154, 255, 305–306, 306n22
Federation of Physicians and Dentists, 92
Fee, Edward C., 535
Fee schedules, physicians and, 90–92
Fehr, Ernst, 235
Feldman, Roger D., 69
Fibramold, 573
Filistrucchi, Lapo, 427, 429, 437, 439
Fines
in European Union, 257
as remedy, 257–258
(p. 597) settlements and, 180–183
in United States, 257
Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act of 1934, 49, 57
Fixed costs, networks and, 382–384
Fleck, Robert K., 160
Fonseca, Miguel A., 231, 233–235
Food and Drug Administration, 332–333
Foreclosure
defined, 564n16
experimental economics, 242–243
Formula-price contracts in bilateral monopoly, 369–372
Fouraker, Lawrence E., 231
Fox News Channel, 572–573
Freedom to trade. See Restraint of trade
Freiburg School, 13
Friedman, Daniel, 230
Friedman, James W., 234
Friedman, Milton, 207–208, 224–225
Froeb, Luke, 468
Fumas, Vicente Salas, 211
Gabszewicz, Jean J., 410
Gächter, Simon, 235
Game theory, settlements and, 172n1
Ganslandt, Mattias, 513, 526
Garvin, Susan, 247
Gary, Elbert, 214
“Gary Dinners,” 214
Gayle, Wayne-Roy, 524
Gaynor, Martin, 77, 81
General Electric, 122
Gentzkow, Matthew, 439
Geographic boundaries of competition in health insurance, 96–97
Georgetown Law School, 175, 178
Germany, antitrust law in, 13
Gibbons, Robert, 211
Gilbert, Richard J., 566, 568, 582
Giuliani, Rudolph, 572–573
Global Competition Initiative (DOJ), 131
Goals of antitrust law, restraint of trade and, 307
Goeree, Jacob K., 240
Gomez, Rosario, 240
Google, 274, 320, 380, 406, 419
Gordon, R.A., 215
Gordon, Sanford D., 152
Gosman, Martin L., 539
Gowrisankaran, Guatam, 78
Grand unified theory (GUT), 149
Grandy, Christopher, 153
Granger Movement, 153
Great Britain. See United Kingdom
Green, Edward J., 514
Greenhut, M.L., 154
Greenlee, Patrick, 246
Grinnel Corporation, 338
Gron, Anne, 96, 106
Grossman, Gene, 221
Gross Upward Market Power Pressure Index (GUMPPI), 493
Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI), 472–474, 493, 523–524
GUT (Grand unified theory), 149
Hagiu, Andrei, 434, 438
Halaburda, Hanna, 417
Hall, R.L., 220
Hand, Learned, 7, 352–354
Handel, Benjamin, 97
Hanssen, F. Andrew, 160–161, 269
Harm internalization, 20–22
Harrington, Joseph E., Jr., 523
Harrison, Glenn W., 240–241
Harrison, Jeffrey L., 281
Harstad, Ron, 236–237
Hart, Oliver, 563
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, 151, 255, 268–269
Hart-Tirole model of vertical mergers, 563–564
Harvard School, 13
Hastings, Justine S., 566
Hausman, Jerry A., 501
HBO, 565
Head, Keith, 122
Healthcare markets, 63–110
accountable care organizations and, 109–110
bargaining models and, 499–500
buyer mergers in, 532
(p. 598) current procedural terminology (CPT) code, 66, 90
diagnosis related groups (DRGs), 66
evolving nature of competition in, 68–69
health insurance, 94–108. See also Health insurance
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 106–107
hospitals, 69–89. See also Hospitals
integrated delivery systems (IDSs), 109
market mechanisms, 65–69
“medical arms race,” 68–69
mergers in, 377
in Netherlands, 65–66n6
overview, 63, 65
physicians, 89–94. See also Physicians
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 67, 69, 106–107
pricing in, 66–67
reform, effect of, 108–110
supplier induced demand in, 68n9
usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) fees, 67, 97
value chain in, 65–66
Health insurance, 94–108
Aetna-Prudential, 102–103
divestitures, 106
empirical evidence regarding monopsony, 103–104
entry barriers, 100–101
exclusive territories, 104–105
geographic boundaries of competition, 96–97
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 106–107
insurer market structure, 97–98
managed care, 96
market share and, 96–97n96
Medicaid, 101–102
Medicare, 101–102
mergers, 106–108
MFN clauses and, 104–105
monopoly and, 99–100, 105–108
monopsony and, 98–105
overview, 94
preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 67, 69, 106–107
private health insurance, 95
selective contracting, 97–98
self-insurance, 67n8
United-PacifiCare, 102–103
in United States, 95
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 106–107
Heifetz, Aviad, 219
Helland, Eric A., 179
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
in healthcare markets, 69n10, 72, 81, 106
market definition and, 350, 355–358, 361
unilateral effects analysis and, 473, 492
Hewlett-Packard, 558
Hicks, John, 7
Highland Park Hospital, 71, 76–77
Hinloopen, Jeroen, 246–247
Historical background of public choice theory of antitrust law, 151–155
Hitch, C.J., 220
HMOs (Health maintenance organizations), 106–107
Hoffman, Elizabeth, 231
Holcombe, Randall G., 154
Holt, Charles A., 230, 233, 236–237, 248
Home of Websites (software), 419
Homogeneous goods
market definition and, 355–357
unilateral effects analysis and, 355–357, 491–495
Honeywell, 122
Horizontal agreements, restraint of trade and, 301–303
Horizontal differentiation, 467n6
Horizontal integration, injunctions and, 270
Hortaҫsu, Ali, 566
Hosken, Daniel, 486
Hospital mergers, 70–83
bargaining and, 77–79
critical loss analysis, 75–76n37
efficiencies and, 79n50, 83
Elzinga-Hogart method, 72–75
empirical evidence, 499n85
Evanston, 71, 76–77
leverage and, 77–79
litigated cases, 64
(p. 599) market definition and, 72–74
nonprofit status and, 79–82
overview, 70–72
quality and, 83
state action immunity and, 82–83
willingness-to-pay and, 77–79
Hospitals, 69–89
bargaining models and, 499–500
bundling and, 86–87
conditioning and, 86–87
exclusionary conduct by, 84–89
mergers, 70–83. See also Hospital mergers
Ortho test, 88n75
overview, 69–70, 89
PeaceHealth, 87–88
staff privileges, 84–86
tying and, 86–87
United Regional, 88–89
Hovenkamp, Herbert
on behavioral economics, 225
on buyer mergers, 538
on buyer power, 544–545
on healthcare markets, 85
on injunctions, 269
on rationales for antitrust law, 7, 13
on restraint of trade, 299, 307
Huck, Steffen, 205, 213, 216, 224, 231
Humana, 95, 106, 108
Huryn, Kathleen D., 175
Hylton, Keith N., 17
Hypothetical monopolist test, 354–358, 424
Iaryczower, Matias, 161
IBM, 183, 320
ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission), mitigating regulation, 50
Imitative behavior, 208–212
Imprisonment as remedy, 23, 263–265
Inderst, Roman, 534–535
India, Competition Law of 2002, 5
Indicative price rise (IPR) analysis, 475n28
Indirect network effects, 405
Indirect purchasers
class actions, 193–194
private enforcement actions by, 284, 287
Industry elasticities, 481n43
Information pooling, market failure and, 47–48
Injunctions
computer industry and, 271–274
conduct injunctions, 270–274
dissolutions and, 268–269
divestiture, 267–270
horizontal integration and, 270
mergers and, 267–269
monopoly and, 267–268
newspapers and, 271
overview, 265–266
structural injunctions, 266–270
vertical integration and, 269
Injury requirement for private enforcement actions, 283–287
Innovation
networks and, 384
unilateral effects analysis and, 500–501
Institutional failure. See Market failure
Insufficient friction, 387
Insurance industry
health insurance, 94–108. See also Health insurance
market facilitation in, 48
Intel Corporation, 183, 320, 553, 558, 582
Intended beneficiaries of antitrust law, 4–5
Interest groups, public choice theory of antitrust law and, 162–164
Internal Revenue Service, health insurance and, 95
International antitrust institutions, 119–141
bilateral agreements and, 126–128
challenges facing, 135–141
comity and, 126–128
cooperative strategy, 126–128
deficiencies of multiple procedures in, 123, 137
diversity of competition regimes and, 124, 138
economics and, 120–125
effects doctrine, extraterritorial enforcement through, 125–126
international externalities of national competition policies and, 121–123
loopholes in protection of competition and, 123, 137–138
(p. 600) multilateral strategy, 129–130
multilevel lead jurisdiction model, 139–141
network strategy, 130–134
overview, 119–120, 141
strategies of, 125–134
trade agreements, in, 129–130
unilateral strategy, 125–126
unsolved problems in, 135–141
International Competition Network (ICN)
Advocacy Working Group, 133
Agency Effectiveness Working Group, 132
Cartel Working Group, 132
consensual best-practices recommendations, 135–136
deficiencies of multiple procedures in, 137
in developing countries, 135
diversity of competition regimes and, 138
enforcement cooperation and, 139n17
limitations of, 136–139
loopholes in protection of competition and, 137–138
Merger Guidelines Workbook, 541
Merger Working Group, 133
negative externalities and, 136
network strategy and, 130–134
overview, 119–120, 128, 141
success of, 135–136
timeline of working groups, 134
Unilateral Conduct Working Group, 133
International externalities, international antitrust institutions and, 121–123
Internet. See Networks
Internet Explorer (browser), 267, 271
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), mitigating regulation, 50
Intertemporal variation, unilateral effects analysis, 488–490
“Invisible hand,” 217
iOS (operating system), 413
IPR (Indicative price rise) analysis, 475n28
Isaac, R. Mark, 231, 234, 237–238, 240
Israel, Mark, 529
Japan, antitrust law in, 13
Java (software), 271–272
Jayaratne, Jith, 509
Jefferson Parish Hospital, 85
Jeld-Wen, 573
Jenny, Frédéric, 524
Jeziorski, Przemslaw, 426, 430
Judicial review, public choice theory of antitrust law and, 159–162
Jullien, Bruno, 432, 435
Jung, Yun Joo, 222, 241
Jury trial, settlements and, 178n8
Justice Department (DOJ)
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors, 37n4
buyer mergers and, 532, 537–539
consent decrees and, 183
coordinated effects analysis and, 515, 519, 522
Corporate Leniency Program, 174, 176, 180–183
countervailing power and, 376
Economic Analysis Group, 555
efficiencies and, 454, 460
enforcement by, 149–150, 156, 159
exclusionary conduct by hospitals and, 86, 89
Global Competition Initiative, 131
healthcare markets and, 63, 65, 69
health insurance and, 99, 102–108
hospital mergers and, 70–74, 83
imprisonment statistics, 263–264
International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, 131
Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines
mergers and, 333, 376
physician price fixing and fee schedules and, 91
Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, 268, 274
remedies sought by, 254
Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, 91
structural dismemberment and, 337–339
supplier mergers and, 543
vertical mergers and, 554–556, 571, 573–574
Workload Statistics, 263–264
Kagel, John H., 222, 241, 247
Kaplow, Louis, 264–265, 345, 348, 351–352, 355
Kaserman, David L., 370
(p. 601) Katz, Michael, 388
Kaysen, Carl, 152, 338
Keating, Bryan, 466
Keeler, Emmet, 81
Kell West Regional Hospital, 88
Kelly, Trish, 539
Kingsbury Commitment, 380
Kinney, 551
Kirkwood, John B., 535–537, 544
Klein, Tobias J., 427, 429
Klick, Jonathan, 179
Klodt, Henning, 122–123
Kneuper, Robert, 258
Kodak, 320
Kopit, William G., 79–80
Kovacic, William, 524
Krattenmaker, Thomas G., 570
Kreps, David M., 222, 241, 495
Krishnan, Ranjani, 81
Ku6 (software), 419
Kuhn, Kai-Uwe, 516
Kwoka, John E., 274
Labor unions
countervailing power and, 375
favored classes of market participants, wealth transfers to, 57
Lande, Robert H., 154, 257, 265
Landeo, Claudia M., 244–245
Landes, William M., 18, 160, 256, 348, 351
Langenfeld, James, 258
Larouche, Pierre, 239
League of Nations World Economic Conference, 129
Learning curves in economies of scale, 324n25
Leavens, Donald R., 158
Lederman, Mara, 434
Lee, Darin, 490
Lee, Robin S., 433–434
Leniency programs
in European Union, 181
settlements and, 180–183
Lerner Index
dominant firms and, 317, 320, 325–327, 331, 337
market definition and, 347
market power and, 325–327
Leslie, Christopher, 225
Levenstein, Margaret C., 515
Leverage, hospital mergers and, 77–79
Levin, Daniel, 222, 241
Li, Ting, 435
Libecap, Gary D., 231
Limit pricing, 247n16
Linear demand, 478–480
Linear tariffs, 534
Linux (operating system), 273
List, John, 224
Lodestar method of attorneys’ fees, 199
Logit demand, 478, 480–482, 485n53
Lost profits
in European Union, 294–295
private enforcement actions and, 294–295
in United States, 294–295
Loyalty pricing, restraint of trade and, 305–306
Ludwick, Richard, 81
“Lumpiness” of costs, 40n7
Lundgren, Carl, 212
Lynk, William, 80–81
Magnuson-Moss Warranty/Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1976, 151
Makris, Miltos, 158
Malmendier, Ulrike, 220
Managed care
bargaining models and, 499–500
health insurance, 96
Mandalay Resort Group, 520–521
March, James, 216
Marginal costs, efficiencies and, 459
Market definition, 345–362
coordinated effects analysis, 358
criterion for, 348–350
differentiated products, 357
elasticities versus cross-elasticities, 359–361
homogeneous goods, 355–357
hospital mergers and, 72–74
hypothetical monopolist test, 354–358
incoherence of process, 346–350
Lerner Index and, 347
market power and, 346–348
market redefinition, 346–348
market share and, 346–348
(p. 602) Merger Guidelines and, 354
multisided platform businesses and, 423–426
overview, 345–346, 361–362
thresholds of market share, 350–354
unilateral effects analysis, 355–357
Market delineation
in dominant firms, 327–331
market power, to assess whether firm possesses, 329–331
proposed action, dealing with, 328–329
SSNIP test, 328–330
Market facilitation, market failure and, 48–49
Market failure, 37–51
competition law doctrine, mitigating, 51
coordination among competitors to achieve efficient market and, 44–48
countervailing power to facilitate efficiencies, creating, 49–50
demand externalities and, 45–46
destructive competition and, 38–42
efficient scale for component production, achieving, 42–44
empty core and, 38–42
information pooling and, 47–48
“lumpiness” of costs and, 40n7
market facilitation and, 48–49
network externalities and, 45–46
networks and, 386, 389
overview, 37–38
supply externalities and, 46–47
theories of, 37–38
Market orientation, exemptions facilitating transition to, 57–58
Market power
in dominant firms, 325–327, 331–339
empirical evidence, 345n1
exclusionary conduct, preventing, 336–337
Lerner Index and, 325–327
market definition and, 346–348
market share and, 346–348
mergers, preventing, 333–334
multisided platform businesses and, 422–423, 425–426
noncompete agreements and, 332–333
predatory pricing, preventing, 334–336
restriction on competition, preventing, 331–333
specific goals, conferring to achieve, 52–55
structural dismemberment and, 337–339
unilateral exercise of, policies to prevent, 314, 331–339
Market redefinition, 346–348
Market share
health insurance and, 96–97n96
market definition and, 346–348
market power and, 346–348
thresholds, 350–354
Martin, Stephen, 236–237, 242–243, 433
Mason, Charles F., 247
Masonite, 519, 573
MasterCard, 330, 415
“Mavericks,” 512
Maximum profit
competition and, 207–208
reasons for not pursuing, 223–225
satisfactory profit versus, 215–218
Mazzeo, Michael J., 96, 106
McBride, Mark E., 175
McCann, Robert W., 79–80
McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 47
McCaw, 570–572, 580
McChesney, Fred S., 147, 149, 156
McCormick, Robert E., 157, 162
McDonald, Michael J., 154
McDonnell Douglas, 122
McFadden, Daniel, 485
MCI, 394
McKay, Amy Melissa, 157
McKenzie Hospital, 86–88
Media, advertising-supported mergers, 428–430
Medicaid, 66, 101–102
“Medical arms race,” 68–69
Medicare, 66, 101–102
Advantage plans, 106–108
Melnick, Glenn A., 68, 81
Membership externalities, 408, 410–411
Menger, Carl, 366
Merger Guidelines
buyer mergers and, 532, 537–539
buyer power and, 547
coordinated effects analysis and, 509–510, 513–515, 522, 524–525
countervailing power and, 376–377
(p. 603) dominant firms and, 328–330
efficiencies and, 454–462
evolution of, 454–458
hypothetical monopolist test and, 354–356
multisided platform businesses and, 427
public choice theory and, 150–151
supplier mergers and, 541
unilateral effects analysis and, 466–469, 471, 473, 476, 488, 490–492, 496, 500
vertical mergers and, 555–556
Mergers
advertising-supported media mergers, 428–430
buyer mergers, 530–540. See also Buyer mergers
buyer power and, 529–547. See also Buyer power
in Canada, 9
conglomerate mergers, 552n3
coordinated effects analysis, 333–334. See also Coordinated effects analysis
countervailing power through, 376–377
diagonal mergers, 551n1
dynamic efficiency and, 459–460
efficiencies of, 459–464. See also Efficiencies
in European Union, 9, 155
healthcare markets, 377
health insurance, 106–108
hospital mergers, 70–83. See also Hospital mergers
injunctions and, 267–269
merger simulation, 475–487. See also Merger simulation
monopoly and, 269n13
of multisided platform businesses, 426–430
opposing views of antitrust law and, 8–9
preventing, 333–334
seller mergers, 530n3
static efficiency and, 452
supplier mergers, 540–546. See also Supplier mergers
unilateral effects analysis, 333–334. See also Unilateral effects analysis
in United Kingdom, 154–155
upward pricing pressure and, 334
vertical mergers, 551–582. See also Vertical mergers
Merger simulation, 475–487
AIDS demand, 478, 482–486
in European Union, 486, 498
framework, 476–478
linear demand, 478–480
logit demand, 478, 480–482, 485n53
overview, 475–476
parameterizing demand functions, 478–486
in United States, 486, 498
use of, 486–487
Metcalfe’s Law, 385
MFN (Most favored nation) clauses
health insurance and, 104–105
settlements and, 173
MGM Mirage, 520–521
Michielsen, Thomas, 427, 429
Microsoft
as dominant firm, 320, 330
exclusionary conduct by, 434–435
injunctions and, 266–267, 270–273
market power and, 339
as multisided platform business, 413, 421n20
settlements and, 183
vertical mergers and, 553, 558, 582
Microsoft Office (software), 582
Milgrom, Paul, 247
Miller, Geoffrey P., 179
Miller, James C., III, 163
Miller, Nolan, 211, 213
Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, 335
Milutinovic, Veljko, 284
Minimum efficient scale, 35–36
Monopoly
actual punishment policy and, 22–24
bilateral monopoly, 364–378. See also Bilateral monopoly
competition compared, 316, 319
complex example of, 318–320
defined, 315
demand curves in, 316, 322, 326–327
dominant firms. See Dominant firms
economies of scale as entry barrier, 324
entry barriers, 323–325
framework, 315–317
health insurance and, 99–100, 105–108
(p. 604) hypothetical monopolist test, 354–358
injunctions and, 267–268
market definition. See Market definition
mergers and, 269n13
monopsony, linking to, 99–100
multisided platform businesses, 404–441. See also Multisided platform businesses
natural monopoly. See Natural monopoly
networks and, 380–398. See also Networks
one monopoly rent theorem, 390
optimal enforcement policy and, 18–20
ownership of unique resource as entry barrier, 323–324
patents as, 324n23
restraint of trade and, 303–305
rise of, 323–325
single-monopoly profit principle, 556–557
size and sunkenness of needed investments as entry barrier, 324–325
Monopsony
buyer mergers and, 531–532
buyer power and, 531–532
in European Union, 293–294
health insurance and, 98–105
Medicaid and, 101–102
Medicare and, 101–102
monopoly, linking to, 99–100
private enforcement actions and, 292–294
rationale for antitrust law and, 11–12
standard model, 365
in United States, 293
Moresi, Serge, 524
Morgan, John, 218
Moss, Diana L., 274
Most favored nation (MFN) clauses
health insurance and, 104–105
settlements and, 173
Motion picture industry, countervailing power and, 375–376
Motta, Massimo, 182, 239
The Movie Channel, 565
MSNBC, 572
Muellbauer, John, 482
Müller, Wieland, 213, 229, 238–239, 245–247
Multihoming, 417–419
Multilateral strategy in international antitrust institutions, 129–130
Multilevel lead jurisdiction model of international antitrust institutions, 139–141
Multiple-system operators, vertical mergers and, 565
Multisided platform businesses, 404–441
advertising-supported media mergers, 428–430
asymmetric competition, 419
bundling by, 435–436
in China, 406
competition among, 415–419
“competitive bottlenecks,” 418
competitive constraints, 420–421
consumer welfare and, 413–414
coordinated behavior, 438–440
critical mass, 431–433
defined, 408–410
economic analysis of, 404n2
economics of, 407–414
efficiencies, 438
in European Union, 406
exclusive dealing by, 433–434
externalities and, 407–408, 410–411
hypothetical monopolist test and, 424
indirect network effects, 405
market definition and, 423–426
market power and, 422–423, 425–426
mergers of, 426–430
multihoming, 417–419
overview, 404–407, 440–441
payment cards, 415, 438n39
platform viability, 431–433
predatory pricing by, 436–437
pricing and, 411–413
product differentiation and, 416–417
social welfare and, 413–414
tying by, 435–436
unilateral effects of mergers, predicting, 426–428
upward pricing pressure and, 427
Muris, Timothy J., 246
Murphy, Kevin M., 211
Mutual assistance in bilateral agreements, 127
Mutual Hospital Insurance, 98
Nain, Amrita, 535
Nash equilibrium
(p. 605) bargaining models and, 498, 500
nonbinding price announcements and, 236
price ceilings and, 238
tacit collusion and, 231–233
vertical mergers and, 575
National champions, conferring market power to protect, 54–55
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 335n54
National Recovery Administration, 335n54
National security, conferring market power to promote, 55
Natural monopoly
exemptions and, 35–36
minimum efficient scale and, 35–36
networks as, 382–384
technology and, 35–36
Need Based Financial Aid Act of 2007, 53
Negative comity in bilateral agreements, 127
Negative externalities, ICN and, 136
Netease (software), 419
Netherlands, healthcare markets in, 65–66n6
Netscape (browser), 271, 434
Network effects, 385–389
Network externalities, market failure and, 45–46
Networks, 380–398
antitrust policy implications, 393–397
behavioral remedies, 395–397
business networks, 381n3
contestability theory and, 383
divestiture of, 393
dynamic efficiency in, 392–393
essential facilities doctrine and, 395–397
excess inertia and, 386–387
excess momentum and, 387
fixed costs and, 382–384
indirect network effects, 405
innovation and, 384
insufficient friction and, 387
market failure and, 386, 389
as natural monopoly, 382–384
network effects, 385–389
one monopoly rent theorem and, 390
overview, 380, 397
product differentiation and, 384
social networks, 381n3
static efficiency in, 392–393
structural separation of, 393–395
sunk costs and, 383
technology, impact of, 382–383
technology lock-in and, 386–387
types of, 380–381
vertical exclusion in, 389–392
vertical integration in, 389–392
virtual networks, 381
Network strategy in international antitrust institutions, 130–134
Neven, Damien J., 155
Nevo, Aviv, 78
Newbery, David M.J., 568, 582
Newhouse, Joseph, 79
Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970, 56
Newspapers
advertising-supported media mergers, 428–430
exclusive dealing by, 433
favored activities, subsidization of, 56
injunctions and, 271
predatory pricing by, 437
New West Health, 106–107
Niskanen, William A., 158
Noel, Michael, 419, 424
Noether, Monica, 68
Nonbinding price announcements, 235–237
Noncompete agreements, 332–333
Noneconomic objectives of antitrust law, 12–14
Nonprofit organizations, hospital mergers and, 79–82
Nonstandard economics. See Behavioral economics
Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 513, 526
Normann, Hans-Theo, 213, 231, 233–238, 242–243, 246–247
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 49, 375
North Texas Specialty Physicians, 93
Notification in bilateral agreements, 126
Nowell, Cliff, 247
Null core
cartels and, 40–41
market failure and, 38–42
transportation and, 41
Obama, Barack, 156
O’Brien, Daniel P., 468
(p. 606) Ocean shipping, conferring market power to promote national security, 55
Oechssler, Jorg, 217, 231
Offerman, Theo, 220
Oligopoly
accounting anomalies and, 221
explicit collusion and, 234–235
imitative behavior and, 208–212
SSCO model, 560–561
tacit collusion in, 231
One monopoly rent theorem, 390
OpenTable, 407–410, 413, 420, 428, 440
Optimal deterrence, 260–261
Optimal enforcement policy, 18–21
Oracle, 498
Ordover, Janusz A., 163, 355, 509, 525, 561
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 120, 130, 405
OSS model of vertical mergers, 561–563, 578–579
Outcome-focused view of restraint of trade, 299–301
Overoptimism, 218–220
PacifiCare, 102–103, 106–107
Page, William H., 254
Palmyra Park Hospital, 82
P=O Princess Cruises plc, 520
Panzar, John C., 304
Parker, Geoffrey, 419
Pass-on defense, private enforcement actions and, 284
Patents as monopoly, 324n23
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 63, 108–110
Pauly, Mark, 79
Payment cards as multisided platform businesses, 415, 438n39
Pazgal, Amit, 211, 213
PCAIDS model, 482–486
PeaceHealth, 86–88
People Soft, 498
PepsiCo, 551–553
Perloff, Jeffrey M., 174–176, 178
Perry, Martin K., 493
Peters, Craig, 486
Petrin, Amil, 501
Pharmaceutical industry, noncompete agreements in, 332–333
Pheobe Putney Health System, 82
Philipson, Thomas J., 80
Phoenix (software), 419
Physicians, 89–94
Advocate Health Partners, 92–93
caselaw, 92–94
collective bargaining by, 377
fee schedules and, 90–92
Foundation of Physicians and Dentists, 92
North Texas Specialty Physicians, 93
overview, 89–90
price fixing and, 90–92
TriState Health Partners, 93–94
Piette Durrance, Christine, 187
Piskorski, Mikolaj Jan, 417
Plott, Charles R., 237–238
Podolny, Joel, 214
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 180
Porter, Robert H., 493, 514
Positive analysis, 150
Positive comity in bilateral agreements, 128
Posner, Richard A.
on healthcare markets, 80
on imprisonment, 264
on injunctions, 268, 270
on market definition, 348, 351
on monetary penalties, 262–263
on public choice theory, 148, 152, 160
on rationales for antitrust law, 7
on restraint of trade, 299, 304, 307
Posted-offer experiments, 234n6
Potters, Jan, 215, 220
Pozen, Shari A., 147
Predatory pricing
in European Union, 25–27
as exclusionary conduct, 240–242
experimental economics, 240–242
by multisided platform businesses, 436–437
by newspapers, 437
preventing, 334–336
substantive standards, 25–27
in United States, 25–27
(p. 607) Predominance requirement in class actions, 190–191
Preferred Health Services, 90
Preferred provider organizations (PPOs), 67, 69, 106–107
Premdor, 519, 573
Price ceilings, 237–239
Price complexity, coordinated effects analysis and, 513, 519–521
Price coordination, 358
Price discrimination, opposing views of antitrust law and, 8
Price fixing
actual punishment policy and, 22–23
consumers and, 288–289
efficiencies and, 20n5, 452–453
explicit collusion and, 234
imitative behavior and, 210
optimal enforcement policy and, 20
physicians and, 90–92
resellers under imperfectly competitive conditions and, 289–292
Price floors, 237–239
Pricing
in healthcare markets, 66–67
multisided platform businesses and, 411–413
predatory pricing. See Predatory pricing
Private enforcement actions, 281–296
attorneys’ fees in, 179–180
“bounty hunter” model, 282–283
collusion and, 292–294
confidentiality of settlements, 173–174
consumers, price fixing and, 288–289
by direct purchasers, 284, 287
economic models regarding, 288–295
in European Union, 281–282, 285–287, 295–296
by indirect purchasers, 284, 287
injury requirement, 283–287
lost profits and, 294–295
monopsony and, 292–294
overview, 281–282, 295–296
pass-on defense and, 284
punitive damages in, 285
resellers under imperfectly competitive conditions, price fixing and, 289–292
settlements in, 172–180
single damages versus treble damages, 174–176
standing requirement, 283–287
in United States, 281–285, 287, 295–296
Private health insurance, 95
Procedure in enforcement regimes, 27, 29–30
Process-focused view of restraint of trade, 299–301
Product differentiation
multisided platform businesses and, 416–417
networks and, 384
Salinger differentiated products model, 564–565
unilateral effects analysis and, 467–491
Product variety, unilateral effects analysis and, 500–501
Professional sports
favored activities, subsidization of, 56
supply externalities in, 46–47
Profit
approximately optimal profit, 217–218
competition and maximization of profit, 207–208
lost profits, private enforcement actions and, 294–295
reasons for not pursuing maximum profit, 223–225
relative profit, concerns for, 208–212
satisfactory profit versus maximum profit, 215–218
Prudential, 102–104, 106, 532
Public choice theory, 147–165
behavioral psychology and, 148–149
bureaucracy and, 157–159
Congressional oversight and, 157–159
continuation of competition, antitrust law as, 163–164
enforcement and, 155–162
historical background of antitrust law and, 151–155
interest groups and, 162–164
judicial review and, 159–162
overview, 147–151, 164–165
positive analysis and, 150
(p. 608) Public enforcement actions, settlements in, 180–183
Public interest theory, 152
Punitive damages in private enforcement actions, 285
Qihoo 360 (software), 406, 419
Quality, hospital mergers and, 83
Railroad industry
component production, achieving efficient scale for, 43
regulation, mitigating, 50
Rajabiun, Reza, 161
Ramanarayanan, Subramaniam, 104–106
Ramey, Garey, 247
Ramey, Valerie, 234
Ramírez, Carlos D., 154
Ramseyer, J. Mark, 243–244
Rasmusen, Eric B., 243–244
Rationale for antitrust law, 3–14
buyer power and, 11–12
competition versus competitors, 9–10
divergence between opposing views, 8–9
dynamic efficiency, 10–11
efficiencies, 5–8
fairness, 5–8
intended beneficiaries, 4–5
monopsony and, 11–12
noneconomic objectives, 12–14
overview, 3–4
static efficiency, 10–11
Rationing rules, 495n74
Reactive fringe, dominant firms and, 320–323
Reagan, Ronald, 570
Rebates, 245–246n15
Redisch, Michael, 79
Regulation
direct regulation, exemptions facilitating transition to market orientation, 57–58
market regulation, mitigating prior failures in, 50–51
Reiffen, David, 567–568, 579
Reinganum, Jennifer F., 174
Reitman, David, 246
Reksulak, Michael, 147, 149
Relative profit, 208–212
Remedies, 254–275
conduct injunctions, 270–274
damages, 259–263. See also Damages
fines, 257–258
imprisonment, 23, 263–265
injunctions, 265–274. See also Injunctions
monetary penalties, 256–263
overview, 254–256, 274–275
structural injunctions, 266–270
Rent seeking
exemptions and, 34
wealth transfers and protection from competition and, 52
Research and development, achieving efficient scale for component production, 43
Resellers under imperfectly competitive conditions, price fixing and, 289–292
Restraint of trade, 298–308
bundling and, 305–306
consumer welfare and, 299–300, 307
core and, 299–301
goals of antitrust law and, 307
horizontal agreements and, 301–303
loyalty pricing and, 305–306
monopoly and, 303–305
outcome-focused view, 299–301
overview, 298–299
process-focused view, 299–301
retail price maintenance and, 301, 306
vertical agreements and, 306
Restrictive Business Practices Code, 130
Retail price maintenance (RPM), 301, 306
Rey, Patrick, 175, 242–243, 524
Reynolds, Robert, 216, 493
Reynolds, Stan, 231
Ries, John, 122
Risk neutrality, class actions and, 189n4
Roberts, John, 247
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, 71
Robinson, James, 68
Robinson, Joan, 326, 331
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, 52, 151, 335, 539
Rochet, Jean-Charles
on coordinated behavior, 439
on exclusionary conduct, 435
on market definition, 424
on market power, 422
(p. 609) on multihoming, 417
on multisided platform businesses, 405, 408
on pricing, 411–413
Roll, Richard, 155, 219
Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 155
Rosen, Harvey S., 485
Roux, Catherine, 235
Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 520
RPM (Retail price maintenance), 301, 306
Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 172, 174–176, 178, 180
Ruhmer, Isabel, 439–440
Ruinous competition, market failure and, 38–42
Russia, international externalities of national competition policies and, 122–123
Ruud, Paul, 176, 178
Sacher, Seth, 81
Salant, Stephen, 216, 493
Salinger, Michael A., 551, 560, 564
Salinger differentiated products model of vertical mergers, 564–565
Saloner, Garth, 561
Salop, Steven C., 307, 468, 561, 570
Samba (software), 273
Samuels, Warren J., 160
Santerre, Rexford E., 539
Satisfactory profit, 215–218
Satterthwaite, Mark, 77–78, 81
Schaffer, Mark, 209
Scheelings, Richard, 538
Scheinkman, Jose A., 495
Schelling, Thomas, 222
Schmalensee, Richard, 348, 404, 409, 411, 413, 431, 440, 513
Schumpeter, Joseph, 10–11
Schwartz, Marius, 532, 538
Scott Morton, Fiona, 214
Seabright, Paul, 175
Segal, Ilya R., 243–244, 433
Seldon, Arthur, 151
Selective contracting in health insurance, 97–98
Seller mergers, 530n3
Selten, Reinhard, 241
Sentencing Guidelines, 258
Settlements, 172–184
attorney incentives, 179–180
attorneys’ fees in, 179–180
in Brazil, 182n14
of class actions, 195–199
confidentiality in, 173–174
consent decrees and, 183
decision between settlement and litigation, 172–174
deterrence and, 261–262
empirical framework, 176–178
fines and, 180–183
game theory and, 172n1
jury trial and, 178n8
leniency programs and, 180–183
MFN clauses and, 173
overview, 172, 184
private enforcement actions, 172–180
public enforcement actions, 180–183
single damages versus treble damages, 174–176
SGL (cartel), 181
Shaffer, Greg, 534
Shanley, Mark, 68
Shannon, Chris, 219
Shapiro, Carl, 355, 374, 388, 427, 468, 473, 493, 512, 522
Shapiro, Jesse M., 439
Share-of-recovery method of attorneys’ fees, 199–201
Shelanski, Howard, 451
Sherman Act of 1890
actual punishment under, 21, 23
bilateral monopoly and, 364, 372, 375, 378
bundling under, 305–306
cartels under, 230
class actions under, 187
collusion under, 328
coordinated effects analysis and, 526
damages under, 259
development of law under, 27
efficiencies and, 452, 457
enforcement under, 149, 155–156
exclusionary conduct under, 239
fines under, 258
framers’ intentions, 3
historical background, 151–154
(p. 610) horizontal agreements under, 301–303
hospital staff privileges and, 84–85
imprisonment under, 263
intended beneficiaries of, 5
loyalty pricing under, 305–306
mergers under, 335
monetary penalties under, 257
monopoly under, 161n24, 303
per se violations, 328, 332
predatory pricing under, 25
price fixing under, 328
remedies under, 254–255
restraint of trade under, 161n24, 299
Showtime, 565
Shughart, William F., II, 147, 149, 153–154, 156, 159–160, 163–164
Shum, Matthew, 161
Sibley, David S., 246
Siegel, Sidney, 231
Sierra, 106
Simon, Carol, 68
Simon, Herbert, 215
Sina (software), 419
Singer, Ethan S., 490
Single damages, 174–176
Single-monopoly profit principle, vertical mergers and, 556–557
Sinkinson, Michael, 439
Skitol, Robert A., 539
Small, Kenneth A., 485
Small-business hypothesis, 153
“Small but significant and nontransitory increase in price” (SSNIP) test, 328–330, 406, 425, 427, 429
Small buyers, supplier mergers and, 545
Smith, Adam, 217
Smith, Angela M., 244
Smith, Vernon L., 237–238, 240, 246
Snyder, Christopher M., 242–243
Snyder, Edward A., 183
Social goals, conferring market power to achieve, 52–54
Social networks, 381n3
Social welfare, multisided platform businesses and, 413–414
Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act of 1980, 51
Sohu (software), 419
Song, M., 421, 426, 430
Sony PlayStation, 434
South Africa, antitrust law in, 14
Spence, A. Michael, 414
Spiegel, Yossi, 219, 247
Spier, Kathryn E., 173, 244–245
Split agreements, 375–376
Sports
favored activities, subsidization of, 56
supply externalities in, 46–47
Spulber, Daniel F., 380
SSCO model of vertical mergers, 574–578
Stackelberg markets
bundling in, 246–247
vengeful behavior in, 213
Staff privileges in hospitals, 84–86
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, 50
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 337
Standard setting, market facilitation and, 49
Standards Setting Organization Development Act of 2004, 49
Standing requirement for private enforcement actions, 283–287
State action immunity, hospital mergers and, 82–83
State ownership, exemptions facilitating transition to market orientation, 57–58
Static efficiency
mergers and, 452
in networks, 392–393
as rationale for antitrust law, 10–11
Static pricing pressure, vertical mergers and, 581–582
Stigler, George J., 3, 109, 147–148, 152–153, 155, 256, 510, 544
Strahilevitz, Lior Jacob, 417
Structural dismemberment, 337–339
Structural injunctions, 266–270
Structural presumption of coordinated effects analysis, 510–513
Structural separation of networks, 393–395
Suetens, Sigrid, 245
(p. 611) Sunder, Shyam, 230
Sunk costs, networks and, 383
Sun Microsystems, 271–273
Supplier mergers, 540–546
ability to prevent anticompetitive effects, 541–545
in Canada, 541–544
empirical analysis, need for, 545–546
european Union and, 541–543
overview, 540–541
small buyers and, 545
in United Kingdom, 541–543
in United States, 541
Supply externalities, market failure and, 46–47
Suslow, Valerie Y., 515
Sutton, John, 568
Switzer, Sheldon, 216, 493
Sykes, Alan O., 355, 525
Syverson, Chad, 566
Tacit collusion, 231–233
Tangency equilibrium, 327
Taobao (software), 419
Tate, Geoffrey, 220
Technology
collusion, effect on, 214–215
natural monopoly and, 35–36
networks, impact on, 382–383
Technology lock-in, 386–387
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 270
Telecommunications industry
national champions, conferring market power to protect, 54–55
network externalities in, 45
networks in. See Networks
packetization in, 383–384
Telser, Lester, 301, 391
Tencent (software), 406, 419
Thoeni, Christian, 235
Thomas, Charles J., 516
Thomas, Diana W., 156
Thomas, Shawn, 535
Thompson, T. Scott, 425
Thunder Video (software), 419
Tianya (software), 419
The Times (London), 437
Time Warner, 572–573
Tirole, Jean
on coordinated behavior, 439
on exclusionary conduct, 435
on foreclosure, 242–243
on market definition, 424
on market power, 422
on multihoming, 417
on multisided platform businesses, 405, 408
on pricing, 411–413
on vertical mergers, 563
Tobacco, antitrust law and, 14
Tollison, Robert D., 147, 154, 157–158, 160, 162
Tosco, 566
Town, Robert J., 71–72, 77–78, 81
Trade agreements in international antitrust institutions, 129–130
Trajtenberg, Manuel, 501
Transportation industry
empty core and, 41
networks in, 381
Treasury Department, 415
Treaty of Rome (1957)
generally, 3, 13
cartels under, 230
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2009)
generally, 3
development of law under, 27
intended beneficiaries of, 5
private enforcement actions under, 281
Treble damages
in class actions, 192, 197
under Clayton Act, 259
single damages versus, 174–176
TriState Health Partners, 94
Tschantz, Steven, 468
Tudou (software), 419
Tullock, Gordon, 151, 156, 158–159, 162, 164
Tunney Act of 1974, 183
Turner, Donald F., 26, 152, 338
Turner Broadcasting, 572–573
Tying
in European Union, 435
hospitals and, 86–87
by multisided platform businesses, 435–436
(p. 612) UCAR International, 181
“Ultimatum game,” 212–213
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 130
Unilateral conduct, efficiencies and, 452
Unilateral effects analysis, 466–502
auction models, 496–498
bargaining models, 498–500
in Bertrand markets, 470, 476, 494–495
coordinated effects analysis compared, 466n1
in Cournot markets, 355, 492–493
cross-market variation, 490–491
differentiated products, 357
dominant firm model, 495
empirical evidence, 487–491
in European Union, 467
homogeneous goods and, 355–357, 491–495
innovation and, 500–501
intertemporal variation, 488–490
market definition and, 355–357
mergers and, 333–334
merger simulation and, 475–487. See also Merger simulation
overview, 466–467, 501–502
product differentiation and, 467–491
product variety and, 500–501
in United Kingdom, 467–468
upward pricing pressure and, 468–476, 488, 491
Unilateral exercise of market power
exclusionary conduct, preventing, 336–337
mergers, preventing, 333–334
policies to prevent, 314, 331–339
predatory pricing, preventing, 334–336
restriction on competition, preventing, 331–333
structural dismemberment and, 337–339
Unilateral strategy in international antitrust institutions, 125–126
Unions
countervailing power and, 375
Favored classes of market participants, wealth transfers to, 57
United Healthcare, 92–93, 95, 102–103, 106–107
United Kingdom
cartels in, 214
Competition Commission, 150
Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, 467, 542–543
enforcement in, 149
Fair Trading Act 1973, 155
Guidelines to Merger Policy, 155
Merger Assessment Guidelines, 467–468
mergers in, 154–155
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 154
supplier mergers in, 541–543
unilateral effects analysis in, 467–468
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 130
United Regional Health System, 65, 88–89
United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 338
United States. See also specific Act or entity
actual punishment policy in, 21–25
collusion in, 293
comity in, 128
conscious parallelism in, 235
consumers, price fixing and, 288–289
coordinated effects analysis in, 514, 517
development of law in, 27–29
effects doctrine, extraterritorial enforcement through, 125–126
efficiencies in, 460
evidence in, 29–30
exclusionary conduct in, 346, 350
fines in, 257
importance of enforcement regime, 17
lost profits in, 294–295
merger simulation in, 486, 498
monopsony in, 293
nonbinding price announcements in, 235
predatory pricing in, 25–27
private enforcement actions in, 281–285, 287, 295–296
private health insurance in, 95
public enforcement actions, settlements in, 180–183
resellers under imperfectly competitive conditions, price fixing and, 292
Sentencing Guidelines, 258
supplier mergers in, 541
vertical mergers in, 570–574
Upstream competition
(p. 613) buyer mergers, effect of, 536–537n20
vertical mergers, effect of, 561n13
Upstream duopoly, 242n11
Upward pricing pressure (UPP)
mergers and, 334
multisided platform businesses and, 427
unilateral effects analysis and, 468–476, 488, 491
in vertical mergers, 580
Usage externalities, 407–408, 410
U.S Steel Corporation, 338
Usual, customary, and reasonable (UCR) fees, 67, 97
Utilities, networks in, 381
Value chain in healthcare markets, 65–66
Van Alstyne, Marshall, 419
van Damme, Eric, 239
Variable costs, efficiencies and, 459
Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 209–210
Vengeful behavior, 212–215
Vertical agreements
restraint of trade and, 306
retail price maintenance and, 306
Vertical differentiation, 467n6
Vertical exclusion in networks, 389–392
Vertical integration
injunctions and, 269
in networks, 389–392
Vertical mergers, 551–582
application of post-Chicago School models, 579–581
in Bertrand markets, 561–562, 579
in cable television, 565, 572–573
in cement industry, 566n21, 566n22
Chicago School critique of policy, 551, 553–554, 555–559
Church White Paper, 567–568
commitments and, 574–579
comparative transaction costs and, 559
coordinated effects analysis and, 469n24
in Cournot markets, 560–561, 567, 575–578
double marginalization and, 557–559
empirical evidence, 565–566
in European Union, 551–552, 554, 568–570
Hart-Tirole model, 563–564
multiple-system operators and, 565
Nash equilibrium and, 575
1960s policy, 554–555
OSS model, 561–563, 578–579
overview, 551–554, 582
policy effects of post-Chicago School literature, 566–574
post-Chicago School qualifications, 552–554, 559–566
recommendations for practical policy, 574–582
Salinger differentiated products model, 564–565
single-monopoly profit principle and, 556–557
SSCO model, 560–561, 574–578
static pricing pressure and, 581–582
in United States, 570–574
upstream competition, effect on, 561n13
upward pricing pressure in, 580
Vertical restraints, efficiencies and, 457–458
Viacom, 565
Vickers, John, 211, 213
Video games, exclusive dealing and, 433–436
Virtual networks, 381
Visa, 330, 415
Vistnes, Greg, 77–78, 81
Vita, Michael G., 81
Vogt, William B., 71–72, 77, 81
Wealth transfers and protection from competition, 51–57
favored activities, subsidization of, 56
favored classes of market participant, wealth transfers to, 56–57
market power, conferring to achieve specific goals, 52–55
national champions, conferring market power to protect, 54–55
national security, conferring market power to promote, 55
rent seeking and, 52
social goals, conferring market power to achieve, 52–54
Webb-Pomerene Export Act of 1918, 54
Weinberg, Matthew, 486
Weir, Charlie, 154–155
Wengstrom, Erik, 215
(p. 614) Werden, Gregory L., 468
Wesley Medical Center, 99
Wey, Christian, 535
Weyl, E. Glenn, 414, 427
Whinston, Michael D., 243–244, 433, 435, 516
White, Alexander, 427
White, Edward D. (Justice), 298, 303, 307
White, Lawrence J., 313
White, William D., 68
White Sands Health Care System, 90
Wiley, John S., Jr., 243–244
Williams, Arlington W., 234, 237–238
Williamson, Oliver, 8, 452
Willig, Robert D., 304, 355, 466, 468, 516, 525
Willingness-to-pay, hospital mergers and, 77–79
Wils, Wouter P.J., 181
Wilson, Robert, 222, 241
Windows (operating system), 271–272, 413, 435, 582
Windows Media Player, 272, 435
World Economic Conference, 129
World Trade Organization (WTO), 130, 140
Wright, Joshua D., 538
Wright, Julian, 418, 433–434
Wyzanski, Charles E., Jr. (Judge), 307
Xerox, 320
Xu, Frances Zhiyun, 173
Yehezkel, Yaron, 247
Yi, Sang-Seung, 568–569
Yoo, Christopher S., 380
Youku (software), 419
Zwanziger, Jack, 68, 81