- Consulting Editors
- List of Contributors
- Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases
- Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences
- Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions
- Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets
- International Antitrust Institutions
- Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective
- Antitrust Settlements
- The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions
- Behavioral Economics and Antitrust
- Experimental Economics in Antitrust
- Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis
- Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury
- Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process
- Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches
- Market Definition
- Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy
- Antitrust, the Internet, and the Economics of Networks
- The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses
- Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement
- Unilateral Effects
- Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory
- Buyer Power in Merger Review
- Vertical Mergers
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter assesses the scope and the specific contribution of laboratory experiments for antitrust. It reviews experiments that have addressed specific antitrust issues, problems, and institutions. The chapter mainly covers experimental studies on collusion (tacit and explicit, conscious parallelism) and exclusionary behavior (predatory pricing, foreclosure, exclusive dealing and bundling).
Hans-Theo Normann, Professor of Economics, Dean of the Graduate School, Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Heinrich-Heine-Universitaet Duesseldorf.
Wieland Muller, Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Vienna.
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