- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics
- List of Figures and Tables
- Introduction: Austrian Economics as a Progressive Research Program in the Social Sciences
- Austrian Methodology: A Review and Synthesis
- The Knowledge Problem
- Market Theory and the Price System
- Austrians versus Market Socialists
- Spontaneous Order
- The Capital-Using Economy
- Capital-Based Macroeconomics: Austrians, Keynes, and Keynesians
- Austrian Business Cycle Theory: A Modern Appraisal
- Free Banking
- Social Economy as an Extension of the Austrian Research Program
- Organizations and Markets
- The Evolution of Property Rights Systems
- On the Origins of Stock Markets
- The Rule of Experts
- The Problem of Rationality: Austrian Economics between Classical Behaviorism and Behavioral Economics
- Dynamics of Interventionism
- Ordoliberalism and the Austrian School
- The Tax State as Source of Perpetual Crisis
- Constitutional Political Economy and Austrian Economics
- Public Choice and Austrian Economics
- The Market Process Theory Perspective on Capitalism: Normative Facets and Implications
- On the Economy-Wide Implications of Kirznerian Alertness
- Contemporary Austrian Economics and the New Economic Sociology
- The Austrian Theory of Finance: Is It a Unique Contribution to the Field?
- Austrian Economics and the Evolutionary Paradigm
- Complexity and Austrian Economics
- <i>The Sensory Order</i>, Neuroeconomics, and Austrian Economics
- What Have We Learned from the Collapse of Communism?
- The Political Economy of Foreign Intervention
- From Subsistence to Advanced Material Production: Austrian Development Economics
- On Your Mark, Get Set, Develop!: Leadership and Economic Development
- The Financial Crisis in the United States
- The Financial Crisis in the United Kingdom: Uncertainty, Calculation, and Error
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter draws on key concepts from the Austrian school of economics to consider both the practical implications for and the ethical evaluation of the ideal constitutional schemes proposed by John Rawls and James Buchanan. With regard to practicalities, the chapter challenges the types of political regimes favored by Rawls and Buchanan on the grounds that they pay insufficient attention to the “knowledge problem.” With respect to moral evaluation, the chapter argues that the contractarian method provides insufficient grounds to judge the legitimacy of political institutions in a world characterized by actors with bounded rationality and diverse standards of evaluation.
Mark Pennington is Professor of Political Economy and Public Policy at King’s College London, UK.
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