- Consulting Editors
- The Oxford Handbook of Managerial Economics
- Managerial Economics: Introduction and Overview
- Managerial Economics: Present And Future
- Market Power: How Does it Arise? How is it Measured?
- Advances in Cost Frontier Analysis of the Firm
- Supply Chain Design for Managing Disruptive Risks
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Game and Information Theory in Modern Managerial Economics
- Issues in the Analysis of Time, Risk, and Uncertainty
- Behavioral Economics and Strategic Decision Making
- Advances in Pricing Strategies and Tactics
- Product Distribution and Promotion: An Analytical Marketing Perspective
- Market Imperfections and Sustainable Competitive Advantage
- The New Managerial Economics of Firm Growth: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities
- Strategies for Network Industries
- Internalization Theory as the General Theory of International Strategic Management Past, Present and Future
- Competitive Strategy in the Nonprofit Sector
- Organizational Design and Firm Performance
- Design and Implementation of Pay for Performance
- Vertical Merger
- The Evolving Modern Theory of the Firm
- Financing the Business Firm
- Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
- Managing Workplace Safety and Health
- Merger Strategies And Antitrust Concerns
- On the Profitability of Corporate Environmentalism
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter describes how methodologies developed in the field of game and information theory can assist in understanding the interaction of competitors in markets, and the study of managerial economics, in general. The chapter highlights, in particular, the role of incomplete information in generating market failures, and provides examples of mechanisms that can alleviate such failures. Some examples of topics addressed are: first- and second-mover advantages, long term strategic commitments versus short term tactical choices made by competitors, erection of entry barriers to secure market power, choices of product-mix, special pricing mechanisms to enhance profitability, and issues related to vertical control and the internal organization of the firm.
Keywords: managerial economics, game and information economics, static and dynamic models of oligopoly, first and second mover advantages, market power, asymmetry of information, vertical restraints, Agency models
Esther Gal-Or is the Glenn Stinson Chair in Competitiveness and a Professor of Business Administration and Economics in the Katz Graduate School of Business at the University of Pittsburgh.
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