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date: 05 March 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter describes how methodologies developed in the field of game and information theory can assist in understanding the interaction of competitors in markets, and the study of managerial economics, in general. The chapter highlights, in particular, the role of incomplete information in generating market failures, and provides examples of mechanisms that can alleviate such failures. Some examples of topics addressed are: first- and second-mover advantages, long term strategic commitments versus short term tactical choices made by competitors, erection of entry barriers to secure market power, choices of product-mix, special pricing mechanisms to enhance profitability, and issues related to vertical control and the internal organization of the firm.

Keywords: managerial economics, game and information economics, static and dynamic models of oligopoly, first and second mover advantages, market power, asymmetry of information, vertical restraints, Agency models

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