- Consulting Editors
- Modernization and the Russian Economy: Three Hundred Years of Catching Up
- Command Economy and its Legacy
- Russia’s Economic Transformation
- Transformational Recession
- Growth Trends in Russia After 1998
- Institutional Performance
- Corporate Governance in Russia
- The Russian Tax System
- The Unofficial Economy in Russia
- Russian Corruption
- Russia’s Dependence on Resources
- The Russian Oil Sector
- The Russian Natural Gas Sector
- The Russian Electricity Market: Variants of Development
- The Economics of Mineral Resources
- The Challenge of Reforming Environmental Regulation in Russia
- Economics of the Military-Industrial Complex
- Science, High-Tech Industries, and Innovation
- Blame the Switchman? Russian Railways Restructuring After Ten Years
- Russian Agriculture and Transition
- Russian Banking as an Active Volcano
- Financial and Credit Markets
- Russian Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Policy at the Crossroads
- Economic Geography of Russia
- Russian Fiscal Federalism: Impact of Political and Fiscal (De)centralization
- Regional Challenges: the Case of Siberia
- Labor Market Adjustment: is Russia Different?
- Higher Education Reform and Access to College in Russia
- Russia’s Health Care System: Difficult Path of Reform
- Poverty and Inequality in Russia
- Recent Demographic Developments in the Russian Federation
Abstract and Keywords
Western intelligence always has underestimated Russia’s military-industrial potential. Russia’s weapons production capacity in 1937 vastly exceeded Germany’sand had various technological advantages as well. This chapterdocuments Russia’s weapons production record and the scope of its military-industrial activities and then delves into the rationality and efficiency of the Kremlin’s approach, which is dubbed the “Muscovite system.” Comparisons are made with other European and U.S.models (from a neoclassical economic perspective) to pinpoint strengths and vulnerabilities, with special emphasis on RDT&E, technology transfer, and innovation. VitalyShlykov’s concept of structural militarizationis introduced to illuminate why the core Stalinist military industrial system didn’t vanish with the Soviet Union. Anatoly Serdyukov’s 2009reforms may, however, mark the beginning of the end for structural militarization, and perhaps more problematically the end of a half millennium of Muscovite strategic opportunism.
Keywords: Soviet military forces, Soviet military burden, structural militarization, Soviet-Muscovite military-industrial system, rent granting, military-industrial complex (VPK), revolution in military affairs, Serdyukov reforms
Steven Rosefielde is a Professor of Economics in the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, and a member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences (RAEN). His research interests include Russian, European and Asian economic systems.
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