- Consulting Editors
- Modernization and the Russian Economy: Three Hundred Years of Catching Up
- Command Economy and its Legacy
- Russia’s Economic Transformation
- Transformational Recession
- Growth Trends in Russia After 1998
- Institutional Performance
- Corporate Governance in Russia
- The Russian Tax System
- The Unofficial Economy in Russia
- Russian Corruption
- Russia’s Dependence on Resources
- The Russian Oil Sector
- The Russian Natural Gas Sector
- The Russian Electricity Market: Variants of Development
- The Economics of Mineral Resources
- The Challenge of Reforming Environmental Regulation in Russia
- Economics of the Military-Industrial Complex
- Science, High-Tech Industries, and Innovation
- Blame the Switchman? Russian Railways Restructuring After Ten Years
- Russian Agriculture and Transition
- Russian Banking as an Active Volcano
- Financial and Credit Markets
- Russian Trade and Foreign Direct Investment Policy at the Crossroads
- Economic Geography of Russia
- Russian Fiscal Federalism: Impact of Political and Fiscal (De)centralization
- Regional Challenges: the Case of Siberia
- Labor Market Adjustment: is Russia Different?
- Higher Education Reform and Access to College in Russia
- Russia’s Health Care System: Difficult Path of Reform
- Poverty and Inequality in Russia
- Recent Demographic Developments in the Russian Federation
Abstract and Keywords
The essay describes the current state of corporate governance in Russia and the dynamics of recent years. Important features of the environment that affect corporate governance include weak legal institutions that lead to high private benefits to control, underdeveloped capital markets, high levels of ownership concentration, and significant state involvement in business. In this situation, the main conflict of interest is not between a manager and many dispersed shareholders but between large and small shareholders, different large shareholders, and minority shareholders and managers/board members in state-owned companies. Many of these features are similar to other emerging markets but are substantially different from conditions faced by firms in developed countries. Despite substantial improvement during the 2000s, the quality of corporate governance in Russia is much lower than in developed countries, primarily because of the low quality of Russian institutions.
Ruben Enikolopov is a Nordea Assistant Professor of Finance at the New Economic School in Moscow, and a Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. His research interests include political economy, economics of mass media, development economics and corporate finance.
Sergey Stepanov is a Human Capital Foundation Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance at the New Economic School in Moscow. His research interests include corporate finance and microeconomics.
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