Abstract and Keywords
This chapter questions two common interpretations of Leibniz's theodicy. The first interpretation maintains that, all considered, most of the arguments Leibniz uses are traditional. The second interpretation maintains that Leibniz's conception of evil and his justification of God are roughly fixed since the Confessio Philosophi (1672-3). The chapter argues that Leibniz regards injustice as the real evil. It also examines significant revisions in the conception of God and of his relationship (moral and physical concourse) to the action of his creatures, as well as revisions in Leibniz’s understanding of the nature of evil, its origin, and the reason of its permission. Furthermore, it focuses on the way Leibniz deals with difficulties concerning the "conduct of God" and his participation in evil; how he gives a rational justification of God that conciliates his omnipotence, his holiness, the existence of evil, and the freedom of man; and his early necessitarianism.
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