- India and the World Economy, 1757–1947
- Battles Half Won: Political Economy of India's Growth and Economic Policy Since Independence
- Estimating Rural Poverty: Distributional Outcomes, Evaluations, and Policy Responses
- Microfinance: The Shg-Linkage Program
- Microinsurance: A Case Study of the Indian Rainfall Index Insurance Market
- Caste and Upward Mobility
- Performance of Indian Manufacturing in the Postreform Period
- Informal Sector and the Developing World: Relating Theory and Evidence to India
- Structural Transformation and Jobless Growth in the Indian Economy
- Development, Displacement, and Food Security: Land Acquisition in India
- Reforming Primary and Secondary Schooling
- Higher Education Reforms in India
- Health and Health Care Policy in India: The Case for Quality of Care
- Population Dynamics in India and Implications for Economic Growth
- The Dynamics and Status of India's Economic Reforms
- Political Economy of Infrastructure Spending in India
- Aspects of Bureaucratic Corruption
- Distributive Conflicts and Indian Economic Policy: Some Notes On Political Economy
- Economic Growth and Ecological Sustainability in India
- Fiscal Rules in India: are they Effective?
- Financial Frictions and Monetary Policy Transmission in India
- Monetary Policy, Capital Flows, and the Exchange Rate
- India's Trade and Exchange-Rate Policies: Understanding the Bop Crisis and the Reforms Thereafter
- Domestic Financial Sector Reforms
- The Convergence Debate and Econometric Approaches: Evidence from India
- The Globalization Debate and India
- India at the WTO: From Uruguay to Doha and Beyond
- An Estimated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy
- Development Patterns in China and India: Perspective with A Ces Production Function
- What More do we want to know about the Indian Economy?
Abstract and Keywords
This article attempts to identify treatments of corruption that draw on characteristics of underdevelopment either as causes or as consequences. There is a very small amount of literature (both empirical and theoretical) on corruption in the Indian context. A primary reason for the lack of empirical work is the unavailability of data: Both parties typically benefit from corruption, and, therefore, neither has an incentive to report it. The article looks at three aspects of government corruption in developing countries, and in India in particular: red tape, rent-seeking, and the abundance of intermediaries (such as middlemen). The article argues that if wasteful red tape is specifically a characteristic of public provision (not private), then provision should be privatized, as suggested by the “efficient corruption” literature. The article emphasizes that there is very little work on intermediation (and the role of intermediaries) in corruption, an analysis of which is necessary to understand the structure of corruption markets, especially in the Indian context.
Gautam Bose (University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia)
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