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date: 18 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article presents an overview of multiple studies using data from Internet markets to examine the role of reputation in building trust. It specifically addresses the interaction of reputations and dispute resolution. Parties that care more about their reputations deliver more power to their partners in these negotiations. Endogenous feedback is systematically affected by strategic incentives and psychosocial behaviors and is thus less informative than it might be. Reducing the gaming opportunities in feedback provision tends to increase market efficiency. Economic engineering may help to support the effectiveness of reputation building. Market platforms such as eBay continuously monitor and improve trust and trustworthiness on their platform. It is believed that the various phenomena observed on eBay generalize beyond Internet markets.

Keywords: reputation, trust, Internet markets, negotiations, endogenous feedback, feedback provision, economic engineering, eBay, trustworthiness

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