- Consulting Editors
- The Oxford Handbook of Economic Conflict Resolution
- Communication in Bargaining Experiments
- Communication Media: Implications for Negotiation Process and Outcome
- Intermediation and Diffusion of Responsibility in Negotiation: A Case of Bounded Ethicality
- Deception in Negotiations: The Role of Emotions
- Communication Media
- Models of Coalition Formation in Multilateral Negotiations
- Gaming With Fairness: Some Conjectures on Behavior in Alternating-Offer Bargaining Experiments
- Wages, Inequity, and Questions About Incentive Schemes
- Social Comparison in Negotiation
- The Utility of Relationships in Negotiation
- Connectivity and Cooperation
- Trust, Distrust, and Bargaining
- Evolution and Breakdown of Trust in Continuous Time
- Negotiating Reputations
- Bargaining and Negotiations: What Should Experimentalists Explore More Thoroughly?
- Biased Beliefs in Negotiation
- Bluffing, Agonism, and the role of Overconfidence in Negotiation
- Risk in Negotiation: Judgments of Likelihood and Value
- Heterogeneity in Ultimatum Bargaining: The Role of Information, Individual Characteristics, and Emotions
- A Model of When to Negotiate: Why Women Don't Ask
- Explaining and Predicting Cultural Differences in Negotiation
- Bargaining Games with Joint Production
- Upstream and Downstream Negotiation Research
Abstract and Keywords
This article compares the framing of trusting actions and the role of extending trust versus the lack of distrust in achieving exchange efficiencies. It uses experiments to investigate empirically the impact of the presumption of trust. It also reports new evidence comparing behavior in the distrust game (DTG) and the trust game (TG). The data indicates that the parties to a negotiation should build trust incrementally as healthy skepticism signals merely a lack of trust and not a betrayal signaled by loss of trust. In the experiments, the default of full trust increased efficiency and inequality, with trustors much worse off than trustees, and much worse off than they would have been if they had withdrawn all trust. Trust building is important for the parties to be able to share information on issues and underlying interests.
Iris Bohnet is Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, Director of the Women and Public Policy Program, Associate Director of the Harvard Laboratory for Decision Science and a vice chair of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Zürich. A behavioral economist, combining insights from economics and psychology, her research focuses on decision-making, and on improving decision-making in organizations and society. In particular, she analyzes the causes and consequences of trust and employs experiments to study the role of gender and culture in decision-making and negotiation.
Stephan Meier is Associate Professor of Business at Columbia Business School. His research focuses on behavioral strategy.