- Consulting Editors
- The Oxford Handbook of Christianity and Economics
- List of Contributors
- Economics in the Christian Scriptures
- Economics in the Church Fathers
- Voluntary Exchange and Coercion in Scholastic Economics
- Economics and Theology in Italy since the Eighteenth Century
- From the Foundation of Liberal Political Economy to its Critique: Theology and Economics in France in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
- Theology and the Rise of Political Economy in Britain in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries
- Economics and Theology in Europe from the Nineteenth Century: From the Early Nineteenth Century’s Christian Political Economy to Modern Catholic Social Doctrine
- Economics and Theology after the Separation
- Roman Catholic Economics
- Eastern Orthodoxy’s Theology of Economics
- Reformed Christian Economics
- Theonomy and Economic Institutions
- Anabaptist Approaches to Economics
- Pentecostal Approaches to Economics
- Interface and Integration in Christian Economics
- Weber, Theology, and Economics
- Economic Religion and Environmental Religion
- Christianity and the Prospects for Development in the Global South
- Faith, Religion, and International Development
- Christianity and the Global Economic Order
- Economic Models of Churches
- The Economics of Religious Schism and Switching
- Spiritual Capital
- Religious Labor Markets
- Behavioral Economics of Religion
- Regulation of Religious Markets
- Economic Justice
- Human Nature, Identity, and Motivation
Abstract and Keywords
Schism and switching are important in religious markets when strict monopoly or force is not involved. The Protestant Reformation is an important case and may be seen as entry of a new firm into a previously monopolized market. This was essentially rent dissipation. Other cases may involve religious consumers switching to firms that better match their religious preferences. Firms in such a setting make strategic decisions about doctrine and costs imposed on consumers in order to capture segments of the market. Models of schism predict that it will be less prevalent in hierarchical churches where costs are higher, and this appears borne out by data. Models of switching suggest it will be common when brands of churches are numerous and similar, again borne out by data.
T. Randolph Beard is Professor of Economics at Auburn University.
Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. is Eminent Scholar (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics at Auburn University.
George S. Ford is Chief Economist at the Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economic Public Policy Studies in Washington, DC.
Robert D. Tollison is Wilson Newman Professor and BB&T Senior Fellow in the Department of Economics at Clemson University.
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