Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 03 April 2020

Abstract and Keywords

A method of perspectivism originally aiming to resolve conflicts, appears in Nietzsche’s version to generate more inconsistencies and paradoxes than it solves: what is distinctive is his skepticism about norms and values. Yet a preponderance of preferences and valuations seem to infect Nietzsche’s stance of value neutrality. Thus, a logical paradox arises on his perspectival theory of truth: how can he prefer his own skeptical theory of truth, without conflicting with his own leveling perspectivism? To deflect the criticism that Nietzsche is mixing up descriptions and evaluations, the debate must be relocated to an alternative framework: one unconventional enough to allow his skepticism and naturalism to be in play simultaneously. Arguably, Nietzsche’s skeptical epistemology can survive self-referential paradoxes about truth and justification, by sidestepping two standard responses and embracing self-refutation as part of a wider pattern of self-criticism by anti-systematic, skeptical philosophy. Within this framework his skeptical critique of truth allows for a naturalized notion of action-guiding beliefs.

Keywords: perspectivism, Nietzsche, skepticism, naturalism, skeptical epistemology, normativity, self-refutation paradox, logical paradoxes

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.