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date: 03 April 2020

Abstract and Keywords

Philosophy of science as a discipline did not arise until the late nineteenth century. The issues for the Romantic Period’s philosophers emerged from the heritage of Kant’s philosophy; for example, Friedrich Schelling’s Naturphilosophie attempted to heal the breech between depictions of nature and the real world in itself, while the early neo-Kantian Jakob Fries sought to extend Kant into new directions. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe opposed the Newtonian mechanical tradition by arguing that no individual way of knowing (Vorstellungsart) was privileged. The philosophy of organism occupied numerous thinkers over the first half of the century, while a reconsideration of the problem of induction appeared at mid-century. Popular philosophies of science such as scientific materialism and monism provoked a philosophical response in the Back-to-Kant movement of the second half of the century, while developments in natural science itself led to re-examination of the scientific realism accompanying much of nineteenth century science.

Keywords: genuine science, Naturphilosophie, intellectual intuition, problem of induction, Vorstellungsart, teleomechanical program, scientific materialism, monism, Back-to-Kant movement, scientific realism

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