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date: 28 March 2020

(p. 557) Subject Index

(p. 557) Subject Index

abusive discovery 166
Administrative Procedure Act (1946) 13
administrative state 12–13
ADR (alternative dispute resolution) 280–90
adverse social effects of 286–9
alternatives to 282
and arbitration 280–1, 282
in civil procedure 145–6
contractural ordering of 285–6
in court-annexed mediation 161–2
and direct negotiation 282, 283
ex ante ADR agreements 281, 282, 284–5
ex post ADR agreements 281, 282–4
and facilitated negotiation 283
incentives to turn to 281–2, 290
legal precedents 286–8
and mediation 280–1, 282, 283
network industry failures 288–9
over-convergence 289
private arbitrators 287
and public adjudication 282
public goods undersupply 286–8
social interests in 285–6
and unfacilitated negotiation 282
adversarial system 181–2, 380
adverse selection 284
Against Settlement 287
agencies
accountability for cost-benefit analysis 78–80
attorney as client’s agent 251–2
authority delegated to 40–3
autonomy 44
and Congressional objectives/control 49–50
court oversight 13, 51, 78–80
executive agencies 40–2
guidance documents 46–7
independent agencies 42–5
multiple agencies/conflicting interests 179–80
OIRA/OMB oversight 78–80
political intervention 79
and Presidents Program 79
principal-agent theory 508, 509, 510–11
rulemaking 37–8, 42–51
transparency/disclosure 48–9
agency costs 154–5, 510
agency expertise 44–5
agency problems, and direct negotiation 284
agent rationality 154
Allias paradox 177
Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis 282
American Rule 148, 150, 158, 377
ANC (African National Congress) 32
ancient legal systems 395–406
anthropological studies 398–9
applications 401–6
archaeological research 398
bankruptcy/risk 406
business law 403–4
and conventional contemporary analysis 399–400
criminal law 405–6
data sources 395–9
documents, types of 396–8
ethnographic studies 398–9
evaluation of information 396
family law 404–5
incompleteness of information 396
land law 403
liability systems 402
markets/market ordering 402
(p. 558) nature of data 396
procedure 404
provenance of sources 396
public law 402–3
remedies 405
theoretical considerations 399–400
validation analysis 400–1
see also legal history
antitrust law 21, 266
APA (Administrative Procedures Act)(1946) 45, 46–7, 51
arbitration 280–1, 282
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 162, 163
assignment decisions 85, 93, 95, 99
attorneys see legal profession
Australia, cost-benefit analysis 68
bandwagon equilibrium 234
bargain theory, and constitutions 30–1
Bartley-Fox gun law 355–7
Bayes’ rule 173–4, 175, 177, 230
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 162, 163
Berlin Wall 10
bilateral monopoly 30
BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) 460–1, 508
brutalization effect 315
Bubble Act (1720) 425
Bush, President George W. 67
business regulation powers 18–19
Business Roundtable v. SEC 77, 78
CACs (collective action clauses) 485, 492
Canada, cost-benefit analysis 68–9
capital punishment, as deterrent 311–15
Carter, President Jimmy 67
centrality, of private property 19–20
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC 77
champerty doctrine 250, 253
checks and balances 11–12
Chevron Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council 13
choice of law 527–40
asset-protection trusts 538–9
bankruptcy law and venue 536, 543–4
choice-of-law goals 539–40
comparative impairment approach 529, 531
and conflict of laws 527–44
contract law 536–7
in contracts 530
coordinated methodology 530
coordination through competition 533
corporate law 534–5
foreign judgement recognition 541–2
foreign plaintiff access 544
judgement reciprocity 541
judgement recognition 540–2
jurisdictional competition 532, 533–5, 538, 543–4
legislation on 528
maximizing quality of underlying substantive laws 532–4
maximizing value of 531
New York Convention 541
optimal deterrence 543
overdeterrence 543
personal jurisdiction 543
prisoner’s dilemma 540–1
product liability 537–8
proposed approaches 531–40
Restatement approaches 528–9, 530
securities regulation 535–6
state incentives 540–3
state v. private interests 539–40
tort liability 537–8
trust law 538–9
in United States 528–31
CIL (customary international law) 447–9
citizen candidates 93
civil procedure 143–68
ADR (alternative dispute resolution) 145–6, 161–2
agency costs 154–5
American Rule 148, 150, 158, 377
analytic framework of 147–60
assymetric information with strategic interaction 152–4
basic framework 157–8
basic positive model of litigation 148–9
compliance incentives 159
components of 146–7
court structure 146
court-annexed mediation 161–2
discovery 162, 165–6
(p. 559) dispute resolution 145
divergent expectations of basic positive model 151–2
effects prediction 144
English Rule 377
error types 157
expanding framework 159–60
false positives/negatives 157–8
fundamental divergence 158–9
individual participation 144
litigation incentives 158
litigation investment 158
litigation models 167
normative theory 156–60
and outcome error 144, 159
outcome errors 144
pleading 162–4
positive theory 147–56
procedural rules 146–7
procedure design 143, 166–7
processes 145–6
refinements/expansions, of basic positive model 149–50
rights enforcement 144
rulemaking 146–7, 155–6
sampling procedures 160
scope of 145–6
settlement 145–6, 167
social costs 157, 165–6
strategic interaction and basic positive model 150–1
three applications of 160–6
civil settlememts, and legal change 136
classical deterrence theory 327–8
classical liberal constitution, key elements of 11–19
Clinton, President William 67
Coase assumptions 96
Coase bargaining failure 96
Coasian bargains 95–7
Collective Clemency Bill (2006) 310
common law hypothesis, efficiency of 129–31
common law process, and judge-made law see judge-made law
common property 20–1
competitive governments 88, 89
conflict of interests, corporations 7
conflict of laws, and choice of law 527–44
congested goods 87
Congressional Sentencing Reform Act (1984) 308
conjunctional problem 177
constitutional amendment 33
constitutional deferral 32
constitutional design 28–35
bargain theory 30–1
contract theory 30–1
design dimensions 31–5
design scope 31–2
detail 32–3
flexibility 33
goals/functions of 29–30
iteration 34–5
post-conflict environments 34–5
timing/duration 34
constitutional political economy 28
constitutional structure
the administrative state 12–13
centrality of private property 19–20
checks and balances 11–12
classical liberal constitution 11–19
common property 20–1
contracts 5–9
and corporations 5–9
expenditure 14–16
extension of private models 9–11
federalism complications 17–19
and governance 5
government takings 20–1
individual rights protection 19–26
judicial role 13–14
migration and stability 10–11
optimal 3–26
and private property see private property
processes used in 280–1
public use limitation 21–4
PUDs (planned unit developments) see PUDs
regulation 14–16
separation of ownership 6
separation of powers 11–14
standing and judicial power 16–17
sunrise/sunset clauses 34
unconstitutional conditions 24–6
voting rights 10
constitutions
and economic growth 35
interim 34–5
contest success function 231
contingent fees 154–5, 248–56
contract, economic models of 429
cooperative federalism see federalism
cooperative game theory 149
Cooter and Gell v. Hartmarx 222
corporation tax see taxation
corporations
conflict of interests 7
and constitutional structure 5–9
corporate formation 5–6
corporate structure 7
grievance procedures 13
voting rights 10
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA 77, 78
cost-benefit analysis
agency accountability 78–80
and changing views 74
decision to use 68–9, 75–8
definition of 63
designing cost-benefit regime 67–80
and immigration policy 73
and political economy 71–2
political origins of 65–6
reasons for in regulatory decision-making 62–6
and regulatory decision-making 62–6
requirements 69–71
risk regulation 70–8
and value formation 72–5
court costs 377
court structure, civil procedure economics 146
court-annexed mediation 161–2
courts
agency oversight 13, 51, 78–80
US Supreme Court 17, 76
crime
and guns see guns
and punishment 295–318
criminal law 295–318
ancient legal systems see ancient legal systems
applications 304–9
broken window approach 302
brutalization effect 315
capital punishment as deterrent 311–15
components of criminal justice system 297
concept of justice 316–17
corporate harmful activity 380–1
cost-minimizing 302
court decisions 308–9
crime trend factors 307–8
criminal responsibility 381
demand-for-enforcement 304
deterrence hypothesis 296, 298, 299, 301, 310, 311–16, 318, 325
EBA (Extreme Bounds Analysis) 315–16
education, underlying role of 306–7
and electoral cycles 306
empirical evidence 304–9
equilibrium volume of crime 297
exclusionary rules 308
extent of involvement 298–9
falsifiability of economic approach 296
federal sentencing guidelines 308
and handguns/Right to Carry laws 307
incentives, basic 304–5
incentives, negative 296
incentives, offender 296, 297, 300
incentives, positive 296, 310
and income distribution 300
income-maximizing 302
index crimes 307–8
labor market opportunities, role of 297, 306
labor-theoretic approach 299
law enforcement, optimal 316–17
law enforcement, public 296, 301–2, 305–6
legislative reforms 308–9
liability rules 329
market model 296, 298, 303, 304, 318
methological issues 309–11
negative/derived demand 300
part-time/full-time offenders 299
preferences for crime 299
private “demand” 300–1
private protection, impact of 300, 307
(p. 561) property rules 329
punishment severity 299, 301
risk aversion 302
self-protection 300
sensitivity analysis, role of 314
social income measures 301
and social interaction 300
social welfare function 317
spillover deterrence 301
substantive criminal law, and criminal procedure 326–7
supply of offenses 298–300, 303, 304–5, 313
theory of 297–8
time trend of crime 307
criminal procedure 325–41
abuses of 326
character evidence 171, 192–4, 337
classical deterrence theory 327–8
cost-benefit comparison 330
court costs 377
deterrence effects 339–40
deterrence policy 331–5
double jeopardy rule 338
economics of punishment 327–8
error cost model 326, 335–7, 340
evidence of deterrence effect 339–40
false acquittals 335–6
false convictions 336
game-theoretic model 339
implications of economic theories 331–5
incentive divergence 330
internalization/deterrence goals 328–34
liability rules 329
neoclassical deterrence theory 328–30
penalty restrictions 338–9
plea-bargaining 330, 334, 374–6
pro-defendant rules 338
procedural rules and corruption 340
property rules 329
provisions in US Constitution 339
public choice model 337–9
punishment 329–35, 338, 339
reasonable doubt 336, 338
search warrants 337
sentencing rules 338–9, 340, 373
and social harm 328
and substantive criminal law 326–7
transfer costs of crime 340
criminal prosecution/civil action mix approach 382
customs unions 454
Dames & Moore v. Regan 468
decentralization theorem 84
delegated authority 37–8, 40–3
to international organizations 502, 507–8, 515, 521
Delta Airlines v. August 209
democratic federalism see federalism
democratic rulemaking 37–52
delegated authority see agencies
deliberative democracy 46–9
and democratic outcomes 46–9
and institutions 39–45
and legislative outcomes 49–51
and political accountability 45
presidential control 40–2
procedures 39, 45–51
shared administration powers 42
temporal considerations 42–5
time inconsistency 43
unelected bureaucrats 37
derivative actions 8
deterrence effect, on criminal procedure 339–40
deterrence hypothesis, and criminal law 296, 298, 299, 301, 310, 311–16, 318, 325
deterrence policy, criminal procedure 331–3
deterrence theory
and capital punishment 311–15
classical 327–8
neoclassical 328–30
direct negotiation 282, 283
disclosure 235–9
discount rate 71
discovery 162, 165–6, 234–9
dispute resolution see ADR
(p. 562) domestic commitment trade account 453
domestic-law bonds 492–4
e-rulemaking 48
EBA (Extreme Bounds Analysis) 315–16
economic analysis, of regulation 59–81
economic federalism see federalism
economic models, of contract 429
economics
of alternative dispute resolution see ADR
of ancient legal systems see ancient legal systems
of civil procedure see civil procedure
of criminal law see criminal law
of criminal procedure see criminal procedure
of evidence, and law see evidence
of federalism see federalism
of international law see international law
of international organizations see international organizations
of legal history see legal history
of litigation see litigation
of tax law see taxation
elections
assumptions 92–3
candidate preferences 93
candidates abilities 93
citizen candidates 93
majority rule 93, 97–8
open 93
policy commitment 93
voters’ choices 41
electorate matching 39
Ellsberg paradox 177
ENE (early neutral evaluation) 281
enforcement, of international law 465–78
English Rule 377
Entergy v. Riverkeeper 76
enumerated powers doctrine 18
EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) 63–4, 78
error cost model, criminal procedure 326, 335–7
error costs 31
Europe, contingent/conditional fees 247
European Convention on Human Rights, (Article 6) 14, 378
European Court of Human Rights 469
European Court of Justice 469
European Union
business regulation powers 18–19
competition law 21
contract law 536
enumerated powers 18
evidence
adversarial process 181–2
analytical convenience 173
assume-the-worst rule 180, 182
attorney-client privilege 195
base rate neglect 174–5
Bayes’ rule 173–4, 175, 177
burden of persuasion 190
burden of production 190
burden of proof 187–8, 190
character evidence 171, 192–4, 337
compliance incentives 185–6
correlated private information 188–9, 196
detection avoidance 191–2
endogenous cost signalling 183–8, 196
evidence models v. procedural models 172–3
evidentiary malfeasance 182–3, 191–2
exogenous cost signalling 184–5
finding facts v. inducing compliance 186
hearings fixed costs 189
hearsay 171, 194
inquisitorial process 181–2
irrationality of hindsight bias 176–7
and law 171–96
legal presumptions 187
litigation bias 181
mathematical/economic approaches to 172–89, 196
multiple agents/conflicting interests 179–80
no-lying assumption 180, 182
omission models 178–83
partial provability 180–1
perjury 182–3, 191–2
predictive evidence 193
privileges 194–5
proof burden allocation 187–8
(p. 563) pure probabilistic deduction 173–8, 196
self-incrimination privilege 195
single-agent model 178–9
specific rules of 190–5
subset reporting 179
trace evidence 193
trial selection bias 175–6
verifiability, and contract design 186–7
Executive Order (12291) 67
Executive Order (12866) 67
Executive Order (13422) 67
Executive Order (13563) 61, 67
exit rights 9–10
expenditure 14–16
facilitated negotiation 283
failed governments 3
FDA (Food and Drug Administration) 75
federalism 84–101
choosing federal constitution 100–1
complications 17–19
constitutional decisions 85
cooperative 94–7, 100
democratic 97–100
economic 85–94, 100
economic efficiency perspective 85
institutional decentralization 85–6
and market failures 84
and presidential governance 92–4
Tiebout economy 86–92
Fiji, constitutional review 34
foreign-law bonds 492–4
FRCP (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure)(Rule 41a) 217, 222
FRCP (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure)(Rule 54d) 208
FRCP (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure)(Rule 68) 207–9
free trade 452
Frothingham v. Mellon 17
FSIA (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act)(1976) 489–91
future benefits discount 70–1
game theory, international organizations 508, 509, 511–12, 513, 514, 516, 523
GATT (Article III) 460
GATT (Article XI) 460
GATT (Article XIX) 446–7
GATT (Article XXIV) 454
Geneva Protocol (1925) on prohibited weapons 459–60
Glorious Revolution 419–21, 430
Goldfarb v. Virginia State 266
governance
and constitutional structure 5
presidential, and federalism 92–4
government takings 20–1
Great Britain see United Kingdom
Grutter v. Bollinger 260
Gun Control Act (1968) 347, 348
guns
and crime 307, 344–64
criminal acquisition of 348–52
criminal justice intervention 344, 348–63
criminal use against people 345–7
defense use 346–7
deterrence theory 352–63
firearm tracing 349
handguns 307, 344, 346
illegal gun markets, disruption of 350–2
illegal possession, carrying, use 352–63
illegal supply to criminals 345, 349–50
laws regulating commerce, possession–and use of 347–8
mandatory penalties for unlawful carrying 355–7
objective of federal laws 345
police programs to control high-risk places/people 345, 346, 357–63, 364
policing gun violence hot spots 344, 345, 358–60
policing violent gun offenders 344, 360–3
possession law 347
prohibited 348, 351
recovered 351
Right to Carry laws 307
sentence enhancement for criminal use 345, 353–7, 364
stolen 349–50
supply-side interventions 348, 351
US homicide rate 345–6, 364
victim numbers 344, 345, 363
young black male victims/offenders 346
(p. 564) Haig-Simons definition 117, 120
hard law, in international law 444–6
harms/special harms 23–4
Heller v. District of Columbia 346
Homestead Acts 415
in-excludability 287
independent agencies see agencies
indigence 377
individual rights, protection of 19–26
inquisitorial system 181–2, 380
institutional decentralization 85–6
institutions, and democratic rulemaking 39–45
inter-jurisdictional efficiency 85–6
international agreements, design of 446–7
international dispute settlement bodies 468–9
international finance, and sovereign debt see sovereign debt
international law 439–62
architecture of 439–51
bilteral/multilateral problems/arrangements 455
BITs (Bilateral Investment Treaties) 460–1
CIL (customary international law) 447–9
claimant subsidies 475–6
climate change treaties 455–6
compliance with rule-making 440–4, 448, 455, 465–78
cooperation challenge 440–1
culpable conduct compensation 475–6
and domestic courts 470, 476, 478
enforcement mechanisms 441–4, 457, 465–78
environmental law 454–6
fisheries protection 456
formal enforcement 466–70, 473–4
hard/soft law 444–6
human rights/humanitarian law/agreements 456–8
ICANN arbitration process 467
informal enforcement 470–3
international agreements 441–51
international agreements design 446–7
investment, and national policies 460–2
IOs (international organizations) 449–51
optimal enforcement 476–8
private enforcement 474–6
rationality of 439–40
reciprocity, as compliance mechanism 441–4, 448, 455, 472, 474
repressive regimes, and compliance 457
reputation, as compliance mechanism 441–4, 449, 471–2, 486–7
retaliation, as compliance mechanism 441–4, 448, 471, 520
self-enforcement 466–8, 471, 472, 473–4
sovereign debt 487
sovereign states’ dominance 449
states as institutions 439–40
sub-state actors 439–40
supracompensatory sanctions 477–8
third-party resolution 472–3, 519
topics in 452–62
trade agreements 452–4, 460
United Nations peacekeeping 459
United Nations Security Council 458–9
universal jurisdiction 476
use of force 458–60
WTO dispute resolution 443, 454, 469–70, 477, 517
international organizations 449–51, 501–23
activities of 449–50
adjudication 502, 517–18
adjudication and legislation 522
asymmetric information 519
authority 502, 507
behavioural economics 506
bindingness 502
consensus decisions 515–16
contract completion 510
cooperation and compliance 520
cooperative equilibrium 521
definition 502
delegated authority to 502, 507–8, 515, 521
dispute settlement 502, 517–19, 523
domestic politics 506
enforcement 503, 516, 518–20, 521, 523
entry/exit options 512
flexibility 504
functional features of 502–4
(p. 565) game theory 508, 509, 511–12, 513, 514, 516, 523
government discount factors 515
independence 502, 507, 521–2
and international law 504–5
and international relations 514
law-making powers 450–1
legislation by 502, 514–17, 522
linkage 513–14
loss aversion 506
membership 503, 508, 520–1, 522
multilateral retaliation 520
multimarket contact 513–14
and network externalities 521, 522
non-unanimous rule 515–16
obligation 504
organizational structures 504–5
principal-agent theory 508, 509, 510–11
prisoner’s dilemma model 509, 513, 518, 523, 541
and public choice 505–7
and public interest 505–7
reciprocal commitments 513
renegotiation 519
scope of issues 513–14
self-contingent contracts 518
self-enforcement 516
surveillance 518–20, 523
synergies/conflicts 503, 521–2
third-party resolution 472–3, 519
transaction costs theory 508, 509–10
weakest link public good 510, 520
WTO dispute resolution 443, 454, 469–70, 477, 517, 518
intra-jurisdictional efficiency 86
intrinsic fairness proposition 22
iteration 471
judge-made law
and common law process 129–37, 145, 417
demand-side complications 134–7
efficiency of common law hypothesis 129–31
external constraints 132
inefficient doctrines 130
information selection effects 135–6
interest groups effects 134
internal constraints 132–3
judicial attitudes and preferences 131–2
judicial voting patterns 131–2
plaintiff selection effects 134–5
precedents 130, 133–4
preference satisfaction 133
procedural factors 137
settlement selection effects 136
structural variables 133–4
supply-side complications 131–4
judicial path dependence 137
judicial power, and standing 16–17
judicial role 13–14, 417
judicial salary/compensation 268
judicial tenure 268
jurisdiction, party-controlled 100
jus ad bello rules 458
jus ad bellum rules 458, 459
just compensation, private property 21–4
Kansas City Gun Project 358–9
Katz model 153
Landes-Posner-Gould model 148–56
law
and evidence 171–96
relative autonomy of 431
and society 431
law reviews 269
legal centralism 426
legal fees/lawyers’ compensation 247–56, 273, 372
attorney as client’s agent 251–2
attorney compensation, and plea-bargaining 372
attorney as expert 249
before-the-event cost insurance 249
champerty doctrine 250, 253
client’s private information 249–51
conditional fees 247–53
contingent fees 154–5, 247–56
expertise and commitment 254–6
fixed fees 255–6
high litigation equilibrium 255
hourly fees 248, 254–6, 266
(p. 566) lawyers’ incentives 251–3
legal aid 249
litigation strategy tension 253
low litigation equilibrium 255–6
principal-agent setup 251
risk-averse client and insurance 252–3
stylized fee pattern 254
legal history 409–32
bidirectional histories 411, 423–6
and Black Death in Europe 416
business organization evolution 424–5
child indenture 429
classification of 411–12
colonial law 425–6
common law development 414–15, 417, 421–2
critical legal histories 417, 430–1
and efficiency 414–16
endogenous institutional change 423–4
evolutionary functionalism 430
Glorious Revolution 419–21, 430
gold rush 427
Homestead Acts 415
and industrialization 424–5
interest group theory 414–16
law as dependent variable 411, 412–17
law as independent variable 411, 417–22
law merchants 428
litigation and contracts 411–12, 428–9
medieval trade/law 427–8
paper currency 429
plaintiff judicial choice 417
positive/normative analysis 413
private ordering 411, 426–8
property and credit 424
property rights 412–13
Roman law 412–14
scholarship genres 411–12
securities regulation 416
suit and settlement theory 429
whaling 426–7
women’s rights extension 418–19
legal profession
attorney performance 270–2
attorney quality 270–1
bar exam 259–63
and case outcome 271
clerkship 263–4
disparities in legal representation 271–2
educational debt 259–63
firms’ profitability 274
future of law 273–4
human capital development 267
judges 267–8
law school admission levels 273
law school rankings 260–1
law schools 259–63, 273
leaving 266–7
legal academia 269
legal labor market 263–9
legal practice/firms 264–7
and market for lawyers 259–74
multi-tiered labor model 274
partnership 265–6
legislation
international organizations 502, 514–17
judge-made law see judge-made law
legislative inefficiences 100
legislative matching 38
legislative outcomes, and democratic rulemaking 49–51
legislatures, universalic 98–9
litigant wealth 271–2
litigants’ expectations, in court 230
litigation
and contracts, historical 411–12, 428–9
early see legal history
private civil see private civil litigation
locus standi doctrine 16
LSAT (Law School Admissions Test) 260
Magna Carta 14, 339
Mapp v. Ohio 340
market for lawyers, and legal profession 259–74
Maternity Act 17
mediation 280–1, 282, 283
Mexico, cost-benefit analysis 68–9
migration
(p. 567) and constitutional stability 10–11
and cost-benefit analysis 73
misery index 65
moral hazard 284
Multi-door Courthouse model 280
NAS (National Academy of Sciences) report 311
Nash Bargaining Solution 149
Nash Equilibrium 151, 179, 180, 376, 471
National Firearms Act (1934) 348
natural law 14
NCVS (National Crime Victimization Survey) 346
negative spillover 92
neoclassical deterrence theory 328–30
NEPA (National Environment Policy Act)(1970) 66
network industry 288
NEV (negative expected value) cases 148, 150, 151, 202–5, 211–13, 233–4, 239
New Deal legislation 65
New York Convention 541
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina 486, 495
NP (National Party) 32
NPRM (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking) 46, 47–8
NRDC (National Resources Defense Council) 64–5
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 442–3
Obama, President Barack 67
OIRA (Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) 39–41, 42, 67, 69–70, 78–80
OMB (Office of Management and Budget) 67, 69–70, 71, 78–80
Operation Ceasefire strategy 360–1
optimism bias 376
option theory 150
OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) 68, 74
over-convergence 289
pactum cuota litis 250
Parker v. Brown 19
partition decisions 85, 86, 94, 97
party-controlled jurisdiction 100
PEV (positive expected value) cases 148, 150, 153, 202–5
PI (preliminary injunctions) 232–3
pleading, civil procedure 162–4
policy commitment, elections 93
policy outcome cycling 97–8
preference satisfaction, judge-made law 133
preferences for crime 299
presidential governance
assumptions 92–3
and federalism 92–4
prisoner’s dilemma model 509, 513, 518, 523, 540–1
private civil litigation 201–6
asymmetric costs effect 213–15
consolidated pre-trial 219
contingency fees effect 209–11
costs allocation 137
decision to file effect 211–13
effects on filing 215–17
external effects, and public v. private return to litigation 222–5
fee-shifting effect 205–9, 220–2
FRCP (Rule 41a) 217, 222
FRCP (Rule 54d) 208
FRCP (Rule 68) 207–9
high-stakes 205, 210
likelihood ratio 136
litigation payoffs in single-stage model 202
low-stakes 204
multistage models 211–22
NEV/PEV threshold 202–3
one-stage model 202–11, 225
one-stage model, and NEV suits 202–5
one-stage negative value lawsuit 212
one-way fee/cost shifting 207–9
option value, with consolidated pre-trial 220
option value, and multistage models 215–22
option value, and reversing order 221
option value, and settlement 217–18, 219
option value, and two-way fee shifting 222
order of motions 220
prevailing litigant two-way fee shifting 221, 222
separate v. consolidated motions 218–20
sequential costs effect 213–15
(p. 568) and settlement 203–5, 217–18
settlement and trial payoff 223–4
spillover effects 226
symmetric costs and credible NEV suits 211–13
three-stage model 212–13
three-stage model, with information revelation - marginal payoffs 216
three-stage model, with information revelation - total payoffs 215
two-way fee/cost shifting 206–7, 220–2
private market model 88
private property 20–1
centrality of 19–20
harms/special harms 23–4
just compensation 21–4
and the police power 21–4
protection safeguards 10–11
public use 21–4
probability neglect 74
Problem of Social Cost 409
procedures-as-control 51
property
common property 20–1
confiscation 10–11
private see private property
prosecutorial strategies 370–88
adversarial system 380
attorney compensation, and plea-bargaining 372
bargaining process 372
basic model of prosecution 373–4
budgetary pressure 387
case evolution, and plea-bargaining 385
conviction by offense type 386
conviction rates 385–6
corporate harmful activity 380–2
and corruption 379, 384
cost rules and funding 375, 376–8
court costs 377
criminal prosecution/civil action mix approach 382
criminal responsibility 381
discretion 372
elected prosecutors 378–9
empirical evidence 384–7
governance of prosecutions 383–4
incentive structures 372, 377–8
inquisitorial systems 380
legal instruments 371
literature overview 372–80
loss aversion 376
monopoly of prosecutions 383
multiple defendants 384
optimism bias 376
plea-bargaining 330, 334, 372, 374–6, 385–6, 387
pre-trial resolution 385
prioritizing 374
procedural streamlining 382
procurement of prosecution services 384
prosecution spending 375, 387
prosecutor objectives 378–9
prosecutors’ contractual terms 372
role of prosecutors 370
sanctions 374
scope of 371, 380–2
settlement range 375
spending interdependence 376–8
terms of trade 374
trial costs 375
prospect theory 74
PSB (perfect signal Bayesian) court 230, 235, 237
public adjudication 282
public choice model, criminal procedure 337–9
public goods 14, 15
public use limitation 21
PUDs (planned unit developments) 4, 5–9, 12, 13, 20
Reagan, President Ronald 67
regulation 14–16
regulatory decision-making
budgets 66
and cost-benefit analysis 62–6
definitional limits 60–1
economic analysis of 59–81
representation decisions 85, 92, 94–5, 97
risk regulation 70–8
Roman law see ancient legal systems
(p. 569) Roman law, legal history 412, 413
rulemaker choice 155
rulemaking
in civil procedure 146–7, 155–6
as democratic see democratic rulemaking
screening model 230, 241
SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) 68, 78
Securities Act (1933) 416
separation of ownership 6–7
separation of powers 11–14, 44
sequential caucusing 284
settlement, civil procedure 145–6, 167
settlement bargaining see settlement and trial
settlement and trial 229–44, 281
aggregation of cases 233–4
contest success function 231
discovery and disclosure 234–9
investment by plaintiff and strength of case 239–40
investment by third parties in plaintiff’s case 240–1
investment in cases 239–41
litigants’ expectations 230
negotiation authority delegation 241–3
payoff in private civil litigation 223–4
PI (preliminary injunctions) 232–3
pre-trial motions as signaling devices 232–3
procedural strategies 232–9
PSB (perfect signal Bayesian) court 230, 235, 237
signaling model 231
SIA (State Immunity Act)(1978) 490–1
signaling model 231
social cognition 74
soft law, in international law 444–6
South Africa, death penalty 32
South Korea, cost-benefit analysis 68–9
sovereign debt
asset attachment 494–5
bankruptcy 482
CACs (collective action clauses) 485, 492
collateral granting 494–5
contracts 482–96
creditor enforcement rights 488–9
creditor lawsuit incentives 489
debt contracts 482–7
default costs 496
definitions 483
domestic-law bonds 492–4
domestic/foreign currency 495–6
exchange listing 495–6
exchange rules 488
foreign-domestic law distinction 493
foreign-law bonds 492–4
and international finance 482–97
international law 487, 488–92
legal enforcement rights 485–6, 488–9
legal institutions, importance of 492–4
legal rules, importance of 492–4
literature on 483–7
litigation 486
municipal law 487–92
negative pledge clauses 495
NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina 486, 495
restructuring 483–5
secured debt 494–5
and sovereign bonds 486, 488, 489
sovereign default 483–4
sovereign immunity 483–4, 486, 489–92
sovereign lending law 487–8
unsecured debt 494–5
Spain, Constitution of 29
spillovers, and Tieboult framework 91–2
stagflation 65
Stamp Act 426
standing, and judicial power 16–17
subsidiarity principle 84
sunrise/sunset clauses, constitutional structure 34
supracompensatory sanctions/awards 477–8
Tate Letter 492
Tax Reform Act (1986) 122–3
taxation 4, 14–16, 15, 106–24
ability to pay 107
ad hoc tax 14
administrative constraints, relevance 114–16
(p. 570) behavioural responses 114
consumption taxation 116–20
corporation taxation, entity-level 120–2
deliberately non-neutral 112–13
distributional issues 107–11, 113
DMU (declining marginal utility) 108, 109
double taxation 121
economics of tax law 106–24
efficiency issues 111–16, 121
flat tax 14–15
foreign direct investment 460
high earners 108, 120
imputed rental income 114–15
incentive efforts 108
income tax 114, 116–20, 123
individuals with different wage rates 109
local taxes 16
loss limits 115
lump-sum tax 106–7
mismeasurement 114–15
net capital loss disallowance 116
non-refundability 115–16
normal risk-free return 118
OIT (optimal income tax) 107, 109, 111, 113
optimal commodity tax 112–13
optimal taxation models, and lying 183
political economy 113
and public goods 14, 15, 106
redistribution 107–8
RST (retail sales tax) 116–17
source-based 121–2
special benefits assessment 26
tax neutrality 111–12, 113
tax reform 122–3
and transfer payments 15
unconstitutional 16
uniform head tax 107
VAT (value-added tax) 116–17, 122
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 76
Tiebout economy framework 86–92, 94, 97
partition decision 94
performance of 88–92
public economy conditions/assumptions 87–92
time inconsistency 43
time-slice problem 73
trade agreements 460
trade theory 453–4
transfer costs, of crime 340
trial and settlement see settlement and trial
UCR (Uniform Crime Reports) 295, 309
ultra vires doctrine 6, 16
unconstitutional condition doctrine 24–6
unfacilitated negotiation 282
United Kingdom
checks and balances 12
civil litigation model 475
conviction rates 385–6
cost-benefit analysis 68–9
natural law 14
private prosecutions 383
representation rights 378
United Nations peacekeeping 459
United Nations resolutions 451
United Nations Security Council 458–9, 507, 508
United Nations treaty system 458
United States
as administrative state 12–13
choice of law see choice of law
federalism complications 17–19
homicide rate 345
and human rights treaties 457
treaties 446
United States Constitution 15, 17
amendment issues 33
Second Amendment 346
Fourth Amendment 337, 339
Fifth Amendment 22, 339
Sixth Amendment 248, 339, 377
Eighth Amendment 339
Fourteenth Amendment 19
Nineteenth Amendment 19
(Article I) 18
(Article II) 446
Commerce Clause 18
criminal procedure provisions 339
enumerated powers doctrine 18
as essential principles framework document 33
(p. 571) Reconstruction Amendments 19
and voting behaviour 35
United States Supreme Court 17, 76, 308, 476
universal jurisdiction 476
universalic legislatures 98–9
value formation, and cost-benefit analysis 72–5
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Article 21) 446
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994) 308–9
voters see elections
welfare economics 452
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations 76