- The Oxford Handbook of Law, Regulation, and Technology
- List of Contributors
- Law, Regulation, and Technology: The Field, Frame, and Focal Questions
- Law, Liberty, and Technology
- Equality: Old Debates, New Technologies
- Liberal Democratic Regulation and Technological Advance
- The Common Good
- Law, Responsibility, and the Sciences of the Brain/Mind
- Human Dignity and the Ethics and Regulation of Technology
- Human Rights and Human Tissue: The Case of Sperm as Property
- Legal Evolution in Response to Technological Change
- Law and Technology in Civil Judicial Procedures
- Conflict of Laws and the Internet
- Technology and the American Constitution
- Contract Law and the Challenges of Computer Technology
- Criminal Law and the Evolving Technological Understanding of Behaviour
- Imagining Technology and Environmental Law
- From Improvement Towards Enhancement: A Regenesis of EU Environmental Law at the Dawn of the Anthropocene
- Parental Responsibility, Hyper-parenting, and the Role of Technology
- Human Rights and Information Technologies
- The CoExistence of Copyright and Patent Laws to Protect InnovationA Case Study of 3D Printing in UK and Australian Law
- Regulating Workplace Technology: Extending the Agenda
- Public International Law and the Regulation of Emerging Technologies
- Torts and Technology
- Tax Law and Technological Change
- Automatic Justice?: Technology, Crime, and Social Control
- Surveillance Theory and its Implications for Law
- Hardwiring Privacy
- Data Mining as Global Governance
- Solar Climate Engineering, Law, and Regulation
- Are Human Biomedical Interventions Legitimate Regulatory Policy Instruments?
- Challenges from the Future of Human Enhancement
- Race and the Law in the Genomic Age: A Problem for Equal Treatment Under the Law
Abstract and Keywords
Despite the ‘Age of Genomics’, many scholars who study race and the law resist biological insights into human psychology and behaviour. Contemporary developments make this resistance increasingly untenable. This chapter synthesizes recent findings in genomics and evolutionary psychology, which suggest cause for concern over how racial concepts function in the law. Firstly, racial perceptions engage a ‘folk-biological’ module of psychology, which generates inferences poorly adapted to genomic facts about human populations. Racial perceptions are, therefore, prone to function in ways more prejudicial than probative of many issues relevant to criminal and civil liability. Secondly, many folk biological inferences function automatically, unconsciously, and without animus or discriminatory intent. Hence, current equal protection doctrine, which requires a finding of discriminatory intent and is a central mechanism for guaranteeing people equal treatment under the law, is poorly suited to that task. These facts support but complicate several claims made by Critical Race Theorists.
Robin Bradley Kar is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Illinois College of Law. He earned his bachelor of arts magna cum laude from Harvard University, his J.D. from Yale Law School, and his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, where he was a Rackham Merit Fellow, Rackham Predoctoral Fellow and Charlotte Newcombe Fellow. He is also a former law clerk to the Honorable Sonia Sotomayor, now an Associate Justice for the U.S. Supreme Court. One of Professor Kar’s primary research interests is in moral psychology, where he has focused on identifying and describing the special psychological attitudes that animate moral and legal systems. To that end, he has developed a general account of the human sense of moral and legal obligation, which draws on recent advances in a number of cognate fields (including evolutionary game theory, sociology, psychology, anthropology, animal behavioral studies, and philosophy), and which provides a more fundamental challenge to economic assumptions about human action than is present in the behavioral economics literature. More recently, Professor Kar has been studying the conditions under which legal systems (including international legal systems) can emerge and remain stable as independent institutions, beginning from the simpler forms of social complexity that typically precede law. Professor Kar also has broad research interests in jurisprudence and moral and political philosophy and in those areas of the law that appear to reflect moral imperatives. His work in these areas proceeds from the conviction that many longstanding jurisprudential and normative questions can only be adequately addressed without a better understanding of moral psychology.
John Lindo, University of Chicago
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