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date: 21 November 2019

(p. 739) Index

(p. 739) Index

a posteriori
/a priori distinction 132 n, 148–9, 175, 231, 234–7
analytic/synthetic distinction 65
and empirical claims 63
and science 137
and theoretical virtues 176
knowledge as critical to understanding historical texts 512
route to the Church-Turing thesis 615
the necessary a posteriori 233, 238–9, 242, 333–5, 340
whether metaphysics should be 165
whether thought experiments involve a posteriori knowledge 240–1
a priori see also intuition, thought experiments
/a posteriori distinction 132 n, 148–9, 175, 231, 234–7
and conceivability 328–30
and conceptual analysis 10 n, 259
and contingency 238–40
and Frege 135 n
and idealization 138
and innate beliefs 237
and introspection 555
and Kant 70–1, 73–4, 83, 89, 96, 447, 451–2
and metaphysics 70, 165, 175–6
and naturalism 80, 148, 679
and necessity 63–5, 239
and Wittgenstein 133–4, 141
distinctions 231, 236–8
nature of 132 n, 133, 139
role in philosophy 11, 240–1, 253
traditional notion of 234–5
abductive inference see inference to the best explanation
abstract objects see a priori, intuition, nominalism
abstraction 268, 521, 544 see also idealization
accommodation 133, 138, 167, 220, 392, 448–9, 466, 482, 592–3, 662, 665, 694
aesthetics 124, 657 see also philosophy of art
analogies
appeals to 381, 396
between alief and belief 568
between feminism and philosophy of race 709–10, 717
between human and divine creativity 658
between intuition and perception 419, 574
between philosophy and science 322, 538, 541
Carnap’s definitions as analogues of Schlick’s implicit definitions 97
compositional analysis of sentences as analogue of scientific part/whole explanation 136
conceptual analysis as analogue of scientific part/whole explanation 135
exploitation of as methodological heuristic 349
Kant’s constructions as analogues of mathematical constructions 85
models as material analogies 265, 280
Wittgenstein’s charge that we overstretch them 133, 141, 143–4
analysis 249–60 see also conceptual analysis
Ackerman’s acount 252–4
Chalmers’s account 259–60
distinguishing philosophical analyses from others 252
King’s account 254–6
Lewis’s account 257–8
method of 11 n
objects of 251–2, 254–5
reductive 270
Sosa’s account 251–2
using models 264
(p. 740) analytic
/synthetic distinction 231–3, 570
and different accounts of meaning 243
and language 99
and social practice 246
and the a priori 231–2
epistemological account 244–6
Frege-analytic 232
metaphysical account 242–4
of judgment 88
project 311–12
role in philosophy 244
anthropology of philosophy 35–6, 45
anti-realism 80, 222
antinomy 77, 86, 114
appearance 182–3, 341–2
applied philosophy 659–60, 662
arbitrariness 222–3
argument by elimination 241, 450
arithmetic 50–1
armchair philosophy 120, 154–6, 176, 662, 704 see also intuition
association 448, 452
authority 123, 320, 662, 666–7 see also competence
axiom of infinity 52–3
background assumptions see presuppositions
background knowledge 567
basic reasons 402–3
basic truths 310–11, 319
begging the question 80, 125–6, 330, 471, 515, 517
behaviorism 557–60
being 185–8
Benacerraf’s dilemma 625–9
biting bullets 197, 295, 494
borderline cases 672–3
brute facts see starting points
burden of proof 4, 140
capacities 4–5, 80
Cartesian 188, 310–11, 455
causation 16, 161–2
central case method 682–3
ceteris paribus laws 136
Church-Turing thesis 614–15
circularity 142, 205, 233, 245 n, 296, 329–30, 401–2, 609, 631, 719
claims about the past 196–7
clarity 12, 93, 108, 138, 193, 195, 328, 515, 546, 644
classes 52, 54–5, 57
cognitive science 5, 66, 149, 151, 162, 191, 294, 323, 487 n, 561,
coherence 31, 101, 104, 189, 215 n, 216, 219, 227, 460, 514
common ground 17, 383
common sense 104–5, 166–8
competence 561, 662 see also concepts
compositionality 8
conceivability 326–30, 334–5, 341–3
concepts
a priori 447
and epistemic justification 331–3, 336
and history of philosophy 36
and intuition 424
and Kant 73
and political theory 530–2
concept formation 88–9
conception of effects is conception of object 195
conceptual change 599, 678, 720
constitutive 96–7
desiderata 532–4
distinctions 321–2
folk concepts 664, 677–84, 720
Frege’s hierarchy of 50
moralized 533–5
nature of 534–5
of art 658
of race 710–12
pluralism about 142
pragmatic method 193
preconceptual 185, 187
scientific 95
systemization 134
universal 58, 76
conceptual framework 80, 95, 97, 99–101
confabulation 577–8, 666
confirmation 16, 98–9, 101, 107–8, 233, 283, 300, 563, 588
consciousness 181, 183, 186–9, 449–50, 575–8
consensus 31, 44, 165, 173, 217, 245, 249, 279, 293, 295, 297, 314, 318, 320, 374, 377, 412, 423, 426, 549, 567, 635, 643, 664, 720
conservatism 219, 221, 226
consistency 618–19, 663
constancy hypothesis 189
constructive interpretation 684–6
constructive method 84
constructs 556, 674–6
content see also meaning
cognitive 448
of a philosophical view 195, 200, 202
of mental attitudes 181
of statements 195–7
context
and analyticity 243
content-fixing 476
novel contexts and language 122
of discourse 118
of justification and discovery 106
effect of local community on philosophical views 172
social 94, 103, 105–6
continuity 147, 165, 626
contradictions see paradox
conventions 16, 266, 273, 355, 527, 529–30, 619, 624
coordination problem 94–6, 102
counterexamples 7, 132, 228, 571, 593–4, 615, 635, 661
counterfactuals 338–9
critical demonstration 661
critical philosophy of race see philosophy of race
criticism 315
de re/de dicto 492
debunking 665, 660–1, 686–7
deductive argument 171, 610
deference 147, 679
definition 95–6, 155, 162, 531, 630–1, 673, 698–701
descriptive/normative distinction 10–11, 14, 690–1, 703
descriptivity 672, 674
dialectic 86–7, 124
direct access 341–2
directedness see intentionality
disagreement
and agnosticism 389
and folk concepts 683–4
and legal philosophy 686–7
and ordinary language philosophy 118
and political theory 547–9
and reflective equilibrium 221–3
as prima facie evidence of error 416, 419
Christensen’s view 383–4
conciliatory views 380–1
cross-cultural 222
egalitarian view 384–9
equal weight view 382–3
majority rules view 386–90
methodological 664
methods of resolution 132–3
minimal reliability proviso 390
permissivism 377–80
philosophical consequences 317–18, 375–6
resolution 194
right reasons view 377–8
steadfast/conciliatory 391–2
total evidence view 378–80
dissolution of philosophical problem 113–14
distinctions 236
divine revelation see faith
doxography 34 n
doxology 34–6, 45
El Greco fallacy 567
elegance 168
eliminatedivism 19–20
eliminativism 6–7, 54–5, 357, 430, 719–20
empathy 9
empirical adequacy 473, 541
empirical challenge 120, 127
(p. 742) empirical claims
and a priori knowledge 232, 236 n, 240, 329
and Carnap 99–100, 108
and common sense 166
and legal philosophy 683, 686
axiom of infinity 52
history of philosophy 32
logic 51
modality 62–4
empirical concepts 142–3
empirical deduction 447
empirical justification 59, 115, 320 n, 569
empirical kinds 340–1
empirical perspective 83
empirical reasoning 619
empirical research
against the reliability of introspective access 577–8, 602–3, 651, 666
and aesthetics/philosophy of art 660–2, 665–7
and armchair philosophy 155, 304–5, 414, 437
and conceptual analysis 152–3, 258
and consciousness 577
and determinism 600
and epistemology 151, 570
and ethics 151, 571–5
and introspection 578
and intuition 386, 418, 425
and metaphysics 469
and morality 571–5
and personal identity 576
and philosophy of literature and film 650–3
and philosophy of race 721
cautions 591, 597–8, 600–3
increasing role of 150
ordinary language philosophy 120–1, 127
semantics of logical terms 138
empirical stance 95
empirical truth 104
empirical underdetermination 205–6
empiricism 88, 95, 189–90, 557 see also naturalism
epistemic accessibility 534
epistemic conscientiousness 401–2
epistemic norms 274–5
epistemic trust 401–6
epistemologism 9–13
epistemology
and cognitive science 569–70
and feminist philosophy 703
and mathematics 626–8
and science 151
epistemic relations 256
impact of semantics on 500–1
naturalized 137
of logic 232
role of 106
Russell’s 58
self-evaluation 401
testimony 404–5
Williamsonian view 15
error 7, 161, 180, 223, 298 see also disagreement
essence 181–2
essentialism 672–3, 696, 720
ethics
and neuroscience 596–9
and political theory 543–4, 547
and psychology 571–5
and science 150–1
character traits 572
moral dumbfounding 574
evidence
analysis as 653
and armchair philosophy 154
and intelligibility 124–5
belief in God 407
intuitions as 154, 184, 541
progress as 149
scientific 598
social practices as 662–3, 677
standards 651
existentialism 725
experimental philosophy
aims and implications 304, 410–11, 420, 426–8, 436–7
and conceptual analysis 151–3
and ethics 571–5
and philosophy of mind 150
and reflective equilibrium 228
challenges to intuition 414–17 (p. 743)
cross-cultural differences in intuition 416
example -Asian disease case 432–3
example -natural kind case 434–5
example -reference 428–31
example -truetemp case 414
how it drives philosophical inquiry 436–7
linguistic experiments 560
explanation
and description 134
and justification 53
and mathematics 634–5
and theory selection 684–5
as ground for theoretical commitment 497
deductive-nomological 107
explanatory gap between objective and subjective knowledge 577
of theoretical success 471–2
principle of 75
reductive 259–60
scientific 135–9
transcendental deduction 451, 453
explanatory power 168
expressive power 57
extension see meaning
externalism 233, 238
faith see belief
feminist philosophy
criticisms of analytic philosophy 12, 693–4
questions 690–4
relation to other branches 690–4, 703
relation to other disciplines 691–4
fiction
and imaginative access to other’s minds 649
as philosophical works 647, 710
empirical support for claims about 651
evolutionary function 648
learning from 652–3
literature and film 643–4
simulation theory of 660
some philosophical texts as 646
Walton’s theory of 664
fictionalism 625, 629
fictions
ahistorical readings of texts 514
and nominalism 612
autonomy of philosophy as 519
Russell’s treatment of classes 55–6
Russell’s view of physical objects 58–60
scientific models as fictional scenarios 266, 279
theoretical entities as 313
thought experiments as 240–1, 297
first principles 77, 82, 84–5, 628 see also starting points
folk concepts 152–3, 436, 658, 664, 677–84
folk intuitions 152, 301, 305
folk opinion 159, 166, 176, 296
folk theories 257–8, 289, 351, 418, 423 n, 424–5, 434, 537, 557, 664, 720
foundationalism 219–20, 314–15, 318–19, 570
framing effects 414, 433
fruitfulness
and biological reduction 7–8
and heuristics 349
and syntactic theories 489
Anderson’s challenge to feminist philosophy of science 693
as advantage to one reading of the pragmatic maxim 195
as criterion for theoretical success 313–14
as guide 20
as justification for presuppositions 87
as philosophy’s value to computer science 608
as reason to adopt an approach 571
as reason to believe an intuition is true 319
as reason to take a religious view seriously 317
lack of as objection to conceptual analysis 677
of Foucault’s analyses of state racism 718
game theory 272
generality 132, 671
genetic fallacy 520
Gestalt theory 189
(p. 744) Gettier cases 118, 152, 154, 215 n, 240, 312, 400
grounding
for beliefs or judgments 76, 239, 290, 310, 314, 320, 402, 405–6, 460
for disciplines or practices 37–8, 52, 89, 180, 288–9, 589, 627
for principles or theories 4 n, 8, 41, 70, 77, 684
Hempel’s problem 13
hermeneutics
account of understanding 186
and historical texts 511
and legal philosophy 679–80
and psychoanalysis 556
characterizing philosophical questions 325
Heideggerian 182–4
of suspicion 42–3
tradition 9–10
versus epistemology 517
heuristics
and the Church-Turing thesis 615
arbitrariness 353–8
continuity reasoning 359–61, 363–4
continuous functions 361–2
covert definite descriptions 352–3
definite descriptions 350–2
diagrams 369–70
discontinuous functions 362–3
efficacy of 568
eliminativism 357
general advice 349, 358–9, 363, 366, 370
idealization as 545
indefinite descriptions 352–3
intensional concepts 367–9
mismatch of degrees 364–6
moral judgment 574
nomological possibility 338
surrogate concepts 366–9
utility of 348–9
whether transcendental dialectic is 87
hierarchicalism 17–8
hierarchies 165
historical texts 33, 36, 42, 186, 512–14, 516–18
history of ideas 505–6
history of philosophy
ahistorical readings of texts 511–15
aims of 33, 42, 519–20
analytical method 511–15
and anthropology 35
and doxology 34
and intellectual history 34, 41
and metaphysics 173
and race 712–3, 715–8
and sociology 38
as history 39–40
discipline boundaries 28, 32
fracturing of discipline 507–10
historical texts 516–17
historicism 515–18
history of ideas 506–7
method of internal critique 516–17
methodological advice 44
methodological implications of 44–6
opposing views of 514
origins of current practice 29
philosophical value of 324, 513
relativism 520–3
study of intentions 517–20
Humean naturalism see naturalism
hypotheses 7–9
hypothetical cases see thought experiments
idealism 78–80, 83, 88–9, 96, 201, 455, 460, 623
idealization 137–8, 264, 270, 544–6, 561
imagination 279–81, 327, 466, 649 see also conceivability
incompleteness theorem 615–16
independence 62–4
indeterminacy 357
indispensibiity 612
induction 57, 106, 359, 364
inference
ampliative 239
evaluating rules of 302–3
principle of 75
rules of 245
to the best explanation 313, 471–2, 628
inferentialism 245–6
innate knowledge 560, 570, 574
(p. 745) instrumentalism 612
intellectual history 506
intellectualism 189–90
intelligibility 73, 115, 124–5 see also meaning
intensions 258–9
intentionality 181–2, 186–7, 190, 564
interaction 664
interpretation 468, 472–3, 475, 601–3, 647
introspection
and evidence of Gricean intentions 345
and grammatical judgments 562
and the phenomenal character of aesthetic experience 661
and transcendental deduction 450–1
character of concepts not available to 154
introspective psychology 87, 181, 555–6
understanding of being as prior to 185
way of ruling out unstable judgments 414 n
intuition 11, 74, 83–4, 86, 108, 132, 164, 296–7, 319–20, 330, 662, 677, 720 see also armchair philosophy
acceptance of 294–5
and common sense 166
and conceptual diversity 435
and empirical research 152–4, 304–6
and metaphysics 163–4
and phenomenology 184–6
and reflective equilibrium 217, 223, 227–9
as evidence 400, 422–4, 541
discounting 138–9
epistemic profile 295–6
epistemic status 163, 418–19
fragile inferences 303
importance of respecting 533
intuitive disequilibrium 433
Kant 73
linguistic 561
logically structured 185
messiness of 134
methodological basicness of 291–3, 295
naturalist challenges 414–17
nature of 133, 163, 289, 293, 412–13
perception comparison 418–19
primacy of 303
rationalism 81
reliability of 417–19, 424–6
role in philosophy 228, 420–1
skeptical arguments about 288
sources of/correctives for error 297–301
status of 290–1
variation in 416–17, 426–8, 431
intuitionism 623–4, 626, 630
invalidity 610
isomorphism 269
judgment 77, 225, 454, 466, 595–6, 650, 665
justification 52–3, 106, 215–6, 226, 253, 290–1, 301–2, 469
knowledge see also epistemology
and experience 235–6
and race 720–1
conception of 96
constitution v explanation 235
foundational 98, 240
limitations on 59
literature and film as source of 650–2
of animal minds 9–10
of modal facts 332, 335–7
of nomological possibility 338–9
philosophical 320–2
situated 702–3
language
acquisition 559–62
alternative languages 99
and dispute resolution 194
and empirical research 120–1, 127
and epistemology 500–1
and logic 138, 617–18
and metaphysics 170–1, 497–500
as cause of philosophical puzzles 133–4
assignment of meanings 98
character/content distinction 243–4
competence with 255–6
compositional theories of 135–6
conditions on the use of words 121 n
departing from ordinary use 695
family resemblance 127 n
historical texts 513
linguistic framework 101, 104–5
mathematical 634
metalanguage 100–1 (p. 746)
multiplicity of senses 118
novel contexts 122
oddness v nonsense 126
of thought 149, 563
ordinary language philosophy 117
plasticity 122
priority of ordinary use 120, 681
reference 99, 162
referential view 119 n, 127
rule following 118
semantics/pragmatics distinction 125
theories of meaning 521–2
truth and reference 561
two-dimensionalism 238, 258–9
varying standards of competence 255–6
word usage 120–1
legal philosophy
controversies in 17
questions in 671–2, 687–8
linguistic analysis 160–1, 674, 676 see also conceptual analysis
linguistic turn 65, 119, 143–4
linguistics 487–95, 501–2 see also language
literature 646–7
logic
and language 138
and mathematics 624
and metaphysics 170–1
branches of 607–8
coordination problem 94
epistemic status 232
modal 331, 617–18
non-classical 618
pedagogy 610–1
philosophy of 609
protocol sentence debate 97
universality of 521
logical
atomism 58, 63
empiricism 65, 93–109
fictions 55
form 490–2
positivism 232
possibility see also modality 62
truths 232, 245
logical fictions see fictions
logically proper names 63
logicism 50–2
materialism see reduction
mathematics
and continuity reasoning 361
and empirical science 632–3, 636–7
and metaphysics 170
and modality 332
and ordinary discourse 626
as methodological model 165
epistemic access 626–8
interaction with reality 636
purity 637–8
semantics 634
what should philosophers know 633–4
maxims 61, 76, 194
mental experience see phenomenology
mental faculties 148–9, 330-1. 338–9, 447–8, 567–8
mental states
analysis of 257–8
and literature and film 649
computational/representational 563–6
content theories of 564
functionalism 563
ineliminable reference to 558
modularity 149, 566–9
ontology of 599
relation to bodily states 565
metamethodology 3
metaphilosophy 14, 37, 131. 290, 294, 348, 370, 410
metaphysical necessity/possibility see modality
metaphysics
aims of 70, 468
and common sense 166–8
and conceptual analysis 159–62
and empirical research 17
and intuition 163–4
and language 160–1, 170–1, 497–500
and logic 170–1
and mathematics 170 (p. 747)
and Moorean beliefs 167–8
and naturalism 148, 155, 469
and neuroscience 600–3
and physics 467
and pragmatism 196 n, 205
and race 718–20
and science 150, 165
and the a priori 175–6
and theoretical virtues 168–9
continuity with science 164–5
epistemic status 174–5
locavore position 469–72, 476, 480–1
metaphysical deduction 74
metaphysical exposition 73
natural ontological attitude 469–71, 475
nature of 105
of social institutions 674
practice of 160
progress of 174–5
method of cases 115–8, 152, 291–2, 704 see also intuition, thought experiments
method of construction 85
methodological
aphorisms 20
axioms 4–5
positivism 681, 683, 685–7
rationalism 288–9
reductionism 7–8
methodology
as precondition for inquiry 15–16
definition of 93, 468
mistakes see error
modality 326–43
Cartesian arguments 339–43
conceptual/metaphysical distinction 334
knowledge of 332, 335–7
metaphysical necessity 343–6
metaphysical possibility 62–3
modally demanding concepts 534
necessary a posteriori 233, 333–4
necessary truths 232
necessity 64
nomological 337–9
modeling
and game theory 272
and thought experiments 278–81
assignments 266
concrete models 265–6
construals 266
epistemic landscape models 276–8
epistemic network models 275–6
example -division of cognitive labor 274–5
example -fairness and social contract 272
example -origin of meaning 273
example -scientific discovery 276–8
example -segregation 262–3
fidelity criteria 266–7
how-to 281–3
in absence of real world targets 268
in neuroscience 594–5
model creation 268
model/target relations 269–70
modeling v thought experiments 281
models as fictional scenarios 266, 279
models as structure plus interpretation 266–7
nomological possibility 338
practice of 264–6
target systems 267–8
modularity see mental faculties
modus ponens 244–5
Moorean beliefs 167–8
moral philosophy see ethics
multiple realizability 14, 614
music 662–3
natural/social distinction 695, 702, 704, 711, 719–20
naturalistic skepticism 71
naturalized epistemology 569–70
necessity see modality
neo-Kantians 88
Netlogo 283
neurophilosophy 588
neuroscience
and ethics 596–9
and metaphysics 600–3
cautions 591
grounding assumptions 589
in philosophy 587–8
influence on philosophy 592–3
methods of 589–92
(p. 748) neutrality problem 101
Newtonian method 88
nihilism 69, 81, 86–7
about intuitions 288
about normative facts 541
historicist 69, 80–2, 86–7, 89
nominalism 612, 623
about abstract objects 386
about mathematical objects 623–5
about sets 612
and Benacerraf’s dilemma 629
nonsense 113, 123, 196, 242
normative reading of pragmatism 203–4
normativity 197, 272, 530, 533, 536–7, 541, 549, 643, 663, 681
numbers 50, 57 see also mathematics
objectification 700–2
objectivity 452, 459
and bivalence 623
and deciding amongst theories 140
and empirical deduction 447
and mathematical objects and claims 623–6
and metaphysical necessity 316
and philosophical disagreement 383–4
and possibility 341–2
and pragmatism 197 n, 204
and reflective equilibrium 222
and representation of objects 452–3, 455
and the intentionality of subjective experience 181
and the method of construction 85
and transcendental deduction 75
as ground of entities 186
behaviorism and objective psychology 557–8
explanatory gap between objective and subjective knowledge 577
objective validity 454
subjective experience of 459–60
observation see empirical research, science
Occam’s razor see simplicity
ontology 15, 50, 55, 58, 100, 186–7, 313, 466, 529, 623, 662–3 see also existence claims
oppression 697–700
order effects 414 see also empirical research, science
ordinary beliefs see common sense
ordinary language philosophy 3, 112–29
and begging the question 125–6
and disagreement 118
and empirical investigation 120–1, 127
and Gettier cases 118
and Kant 114
and philosophical questions 122
and rule following 121
and the method of cases 115–18
and theories of language 127
and Wittgenstein 144–5
notable figures in 112
objections to 119–29
premises of 113
process of 114–15
shared assumption 117
theorist’s question 116, 117 n
paradigm cases 682–3
paradox
about race, arising from realist and essentialist views about natural kinds 720
and discontinuity at infinity 363
and Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy 133–4, 137, 141–2
conceivability of contradictions 327–8
formal methods as guard against slipping into 171
Kripkenstein’s skeptical paradox 614
multiple plausible solutions to 364
of analysis 249–60
possible responses to 132
problems for the notion of truth 613
resulting from referential pluralism 430
Russell’s 51–2
sorites paradox and arbitrariness heuristic 354
sorites paradox and continuity heuristic 359–61
parsimony see simplicity
patterns 282
pedagogy 288, 633–5
Peirce’s problem 13
perception 88, 116, 181, 189–90, 448–50, 555, 567
perspective 660
(p. 749) pessimistic meta-induction 175
phenomenology 179–91
aims of 181–3
as methodology 179
as science 180–1
description 661
philosophical role 180
philosophical analysis see analysis
philosophical anthropology 711
philosophical progress see progress
philosophical questions see questions
philosophy
aims of 31, 49, 131, 313–15, 321–2
and economics 529
and mathematics 310
and neuroscience 587–8
and psychology 555–6
and science 66, 89, 149–50, 322–5
applied v pure 659
as a critical project 692–3, 709–10
as a posteriori 236, 312–14, 592
as conceptual analysis 154
continuity with everyday practice 124
desiderata of philosophical solutions 124
discipline boundaries 30–1, 37, 40, 43, 99–100, 151, 153, 607–8, 646–7, 665, 710, 721–2
impact of race 715–17
importance of engaging with historical texts 506
inadequacy of analytic philosophy 725–6
interaction among its branches 12, 173, 467, 543–4, 547, 611–20, 712–13, 715–18
marginalized perspectives 720
motivations 519–20
objects of study 66, 119–20, 198–9, 321–2
parochialism 428, 435–6
relation to other disciplines 487, 630, 659
revisionary proposal 141
role of 98, 105, 107, 109
value of 130, 140
philosophy of art 657, 667 see also aesthetics
philosophy of language 19, 487, 495–502 see also language
philosophy of law see legal philosophy
philosophy of literature and film
and science 648–53
and theory of literature and film 643–4
discipline boundaries 642
interaction with literary theory 645–6
philosophy of mind 650
questions in 641
philosophy of logic see logic
philosophy of mathematics 622–5, 629–32 see also mathematics
philosophy of mind see also mental faculties, mental states
and cognitive science 566–70
and empirical research 149–50
and evolution 570–1
and logic 613–14
philosophy of physics 465–7 see also naturalism, realism
philosophy of race 709–10
and social and political philosophy 723–4
and the Continental tradition 725–6
as social category 715–16
critical philosophy of race 709
history of the concept of race 712–18
questions in 715
philosophy of science 47, 150-1 see also science
physics 59, 150, 165
platitudes 155
political theory
aims of 527
analytic 525–6
and disagreement 547–9
and idealization 544–6
and moral philosophy 543–4, 547
conditions of theorizing 527
discipline boundaries 526–30
methodology 529
modes of theorizing 528
substantive questions 529
positivism 96, 506
possibility space 472
possible worlds 331, 336, 613 see also modality
post-Kantian idealists 81–2
pragmatism 193–206
absolute idealism 201
aims of 196, 198
and feminist philosophy 12 (p. 750)
as methodology 193–4
maxim, activist reading 198–200
maxim, Peircian reading 195–7
maxim, practical reading 202–6
maxim, subjectivist reading 200–2
pragmatic maxim 194
restrictions on scope 197 n
preconditions 15–16, 445
predictions 106
presuppositions
about language as representational and compositional 117
ahistorical readings of texts jeopardize ability to spot 512
and transcendental argument 79, 445, 447
as begging the question 351
background assumptions 18, 163, 172, 391
failure of 352
fruitfulness as justification for 87
in metaphysics 164, 172–3, 205
misguided ones as source of philosophical questions 130, 141 n
of ordinary language philosophy 127
role in language as justification for 161
theoretical progress as justification for 149
uncovering racist presuppositions as project for philosophy of race 713
primitives 564
and Heidegger’s phenomenology 183
bottoming out in 531, 564
Davidson’s view of truth as 613
desirability of minimizing 145
view that the purpose of physical theory is to posit a primitive ontology 466
Williamson’s view of knowledge as 15
principle of interpretive charity 514–15
principle of tolerance 98–9
principles 535–6, 662
priority rule 275
privileged standpoints 692
probability 105–6
proof theory 615
properties 187–8, 251–7
propositional functions 54–5
propositions 160, 254–6
protocol sentences 97, 99, 102–3
psychologism 88
psychology 149, 571–5 see also empirical research, science
quantification 55–7, 491
quantum mechanics 14, 170, 466, 472–4, 477–83
questions see also disagreement
about conceptual analysis and metaphysics 160–1
agnosticism about 374–6
and ordinary language 122
as resting on a mistake 114
assumption they are meaningful 117
empty 65
futility v meaninglessness 198–9
general v particular 644–5
in feminist philosophy 690–4
in philosophy of physics 467
in political theory 529
methodological 32, 109
normative 530
of philosophy of mathematics 622, 624
reframing 19–20
sense of 118
rational faculty 71–2, 79 see also intuition
rationalism see a priori, intuition
rationality 41 see also rational faculty
rationalization 573
reality and phenomenology 181
reality objection 79, 86–7
reasoning
belief formation 70, 396
empirical v mathematical 619
reasonable beliefs 397–8, 548–9
reasons 399–401, 405
suppositional 239
surrogate 264
recursion theory 613–5
reduction
and conceptual analysis 259–60
arithmetic to set theory 135 (p. 751)
direction of justification 53
eidetic 181
materialism 257
mental states 155
methodological 7–8, 14
phenomenological 181
transcendental 181
reductive analysis 58–60
reflection 76 see also introspection
reflective equilibrium 108, 533, 541–2, 663
applicability to different subfields 213
as concerning content of beliefs 214–15
as unending process 215
coherentist v foundationalist 218–19
constraints on initial beliefs 217
deliberative v descriptive 217–18
description of 214
initial inputs 223, 225, 227
justification provided by 216
narrow v wide 218
objection from conservatism 221
objection from disagreement 221–3
objection from error 223
objection from unreasonable beliefs 224–8
origins 213
refutation see theories
refutation of idealism 78, 455–7
regulative ideals 89
reliabilism 148
representation 450, 452–4
representationalism 189
resiliance 445, 454
revisionist 664
rigor 171
rule following 122
Russell’s paradox 51–2
science see also naturalism, physics
aims of 106
and metaphysics 164–5
and philosophy 131, 135–40, 147
and philosophy of literature and film 648–53
history of 46–7
methodology 313
miracles argument 471–3
multiple frameworks 476
philosophy of 274
protocol sentences 102
scientific discovery 276–8
scientific ideal 89
scientific knowledge 99
scientific process 103
success 275–8
testing 94
theories 96, 101
seemings see intuition
self-awareness 188 see also introspection
semantic view 265
semantics see also language
aims of 486
generative 488
logic 613
mathematics 625, 628–9, 636
meta-semantics 244
pragmatics 19
semiotics 643
sense data 59–60, 62
sense experience 189
sensibility 73, 75, 83
sentient agents 59
similarity 270–1
simplicity 12–3, 133, 168, 540
skepticism 69, 78, 288–9, 310, 444, 459, 720
slippery slope arguments 360
social and political philosophy 723–4
social construct 695, 700
social practices 662–3
social structures 697–8
sociology of philosophy 38–9
starting points 132, 225, 227–8, 253, 681–2
state space 265
stipulation 96
structures 265–6
subject matter 660
subject-object dichotomy 189
subjectivity 76, 181–2, 200, 459
supervaluation 357
supervenience 257
suspension of judgment see disagreement
syllogism 77
synonomy 232
(p. 752) synthesis 448, 451
synthetic 10 n, 65, 71, 96, 175–6, 231–4, 244, 322, 397
tautologies 64
teleolgical judgments 76
testimony 404–6
theology 41
theoretical aims 673
theoretical constraints 121, 470
theoretical knowledge 134
theories 133, 142–3, 536–8
acceptability conditions 549
assumptions 681–2
avenues of support 541–4
belief and content 472, 480–1
complexity 140
comprehensiveness 548
costs v virtues 687
desiderata 645, 698
development of 132, 315–17
different accounts of and modeling 265
evaluation of 131, 468–9, 471, 540–1
interpretation v discovery 543
theory selection 12–5, 684–5
thought experiments 10–1, 154, 542, 573, 593, 667 see also intuition, method of cases
a priori/a posteriori 240–1
and models 278–81
design of 418
Williamson-style account 12
transcendental 187
transcendental aesthetic 73
transcendental analysis 71
transcendental analytic 74–5, 83
transcendental argument
against external world skepticism 459–60
Descartes’ cogito 445
dialectical strength 445, 449, 451, 454, 456, 457
epistemic status of premises 444–5
for beliefs about external world 460
for moral responsibility 457
for valuing yourself as rational agent 458
methodological evaluation of 461
nature of 78
type of necessity at issue 445–6
transcendental deduction 75, 447–55
transcendental dialectic 76
transcendental exposition 74
truth 99–100, 141–2, 612–13, 624
and history of philosophy 515–16, 522
and motivation 274
coherence theory 104
correspondence theory 460, 470
pragmatic theory of 193
v pragmatic choice 619
truth-aptness 541
truth-makers 333
unconditioned premises see first principles, starting points
underdetermination 475
undermining 123
uniqueness objection 79, 85–6
unity of apperception 448–9
use see language
verbal disputes 357
verificationism 105, 195
Vienna Circle 13 n, 180, 196, 526
view from nowhere 324
what counts as philosophy see philosophy, discipline boundaries
word use see language
working-hypothesism 7–9