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date: 19 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article explores the epistemological significance of disagreement in philosophy in the light of some currently prominent theories of disagreement. More specifically, it asks whether the kind of pervasive and intractable disagreement that is characteristic of philosophy warrants a certain kind of skepticism about the subject. Some hold that, given the kind of disagreement found in philosophy, it would be irrational to hold confident views about controversial philosophical questions. According to this line of thought, the rational response to the diversity of opinion within philosophy is that of the philosophical agnostic, who consistently suspends judgment about controversial issues. Against this, it is argued that there is no plausible view about the epistemology of disagreement on which philosophical agnosticism is compelling.

Keywords: disagreement, philosophy, epistemology, philosophical agnosticism, controversy, diversity

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