- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology
- About the Contributors
- What is Philosophical Methodology?
- The Methodology of the History of Philosophy
- Methodology in Nineteenth-and Early Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
- Nineteenth-Century and Early Twentieth-Century Post-Kantian Philosophy
- Logical Empiricism
- Ordinary Language Philosophy
- Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism
- Philosophical Naturalism
- Method in Analytic Metaphysics
- The Pragmatic Method
- Reflective Equilibrium
- Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History
- Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis
- Philosophical Progress
- Conceivability and Possibility
- Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology
- Disagreement in Philosophy: Its Epistemic Significance
- Faith and Reason
- Experimental Philosophy
- Transcendental Arguments
- Physics and Method
- Linguistic and Philosophical Methodology
- History of Ideas: A Defense
- The Methodology of Political Theory
- Philosophy and Psychology
- Logic and Philosophical Methodology
- Philosophy of Mathematics: Issues and Methods
- Methods in the Philosophy of Literature and Film
- Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
- The Methodology of Legal Philosophy
- Critical Philosophy of Race
- Index of Names
Abstract and Keywords
Philosophy and psychology have always been inseparable, particularly with regard to issues of methodology. The chapter begins with a brief history of the a priori and introspectivist traditions of both, and of the various forms of behaviorism that were a reaction to them. It then turns to the “computational” and “functionalist” approaches to the mind that grew out of the development of the computer and especially the linguistic work of Noam Chomsky. These blossomed into the research program of “cognitive science” that combines work in linguistics, psychology, neuroscience, biology, and computer science to empirically address questions about the nature and architecture of the mind, and issues in semantics, epistemology, and moral psychology. the chapter concludes by briefly discussing two important cases concerning the nature of consciousness, its supposed “unity,” and various forms of self-blindness, which raise surprising empirical questions about our introspective access to our mental states.
Louise Antony is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
Georges Rey, Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.