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date: 20 September 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Philosophers of religion and theologians have long discussed the following question: should an awareness of disagreement about religious questions lead a theist to lose confidence in his or her own religious convictions? This question spawned a vast literature in the 1980s and 1990s—a literature that both anticipated and partially inspired an explosion of more recent work in epistemology on the topic of disagreement. This chapter seeks to glean insights from this more recent work in epistemology and apply what can be applied to the topic of religious disagreement. Particular attention is given to the prospects for vindicating an affirmative answer to the above question by appealing to so-called ‘conciliationist’ views about disagreement that currently enjoy significant popularity among epistemologists, and to some of the obstacles that arise for that project.

Keywords: disagreement, conciliationism, steadfast views, pluralism, epistemic peer, Uniqueness Thesis, higher-order evidence, first-order evidence, defeat

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