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date: 20 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Three philosophical questions guide this chapter: what is mind, what is language, and what is reference (or meaning)? Emphasis centres upon Origen’s episteme of ‘ultimate presuppositions’, first principles, philosophy of mind and language, theory of intentionality, aesthetics of scriptural exegesis, and prayer. His approach to self-knowledge and subjectivity is key to his claims concerning the limits of thought and language, the intentionality of mental acts, and distinctions made between ordinary and ideal languages. As a focusing mechanism, contemplative prayer is examined as an intentionally aesthetic episteme-noesis that gives a logos access to Logos. Here prayer maps ideal types of thought and speech that non-propositionally, discursively, and non-discursively allow for a noesis and praxis of the logikoi, epinoiai, and theoremata of the Logos-Christ. Such mapping denotes Origen’s epistemology of theology as a ‘sigetic-discursive’ model of negative theology.

Keywords: property language, logical possibility, causal possibility, logos, Logos, aesthetics of prayer, self-knowledge, subjectivity, intentionality, limits of mind, limits of language

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