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date: 15 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

To what extent are theological questions knowable? This chapter outlines some tools for addressing this question by first giving some plausible structural constraints on knowledge. These constraints include the absence of false beliefs in nearby worlds, connections to other mental states, and the relationship between knowledge and rationality and moral worth. Then it uses these constraints to explore the relationship between the possibility (or impossibility) of theological knowledge and various issues including private interpretation, faith, the problem of evil, religious diversity, and morally good action. Even with these relatively simple structural features of knowledge in hand, we can outline some potential difficulties for familiar discussions in the epistemology of theology, and point to some new considerations that bear on familiar questions. Thus we hope to show that careful thinking about the structural constraints on knowledge, especially as related to sceptical concerns, is of interest to familiar epistemological debates in theology.

Keywords: knowledge, scepticism, testimony, interpretation, religious diversity, problem of evil

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