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date: 26 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Because there are different kinds of emotions and different kinds of reasons, the question of the relation between emotions and reasons splits into several ones. This chapter focuses on whether emotions can inform us about normative reasons for actions. It starts with a brief defense of the claim that the Perceptual Theory, according to which emotions are perceptual experiences of values, is better placed than its main competitors, Feeling Theories and Conative Theories. On the basis of this, the chapter argues for two claims: that when things go well, emotions allow us to track our practical reasons, and that under certain conditions, which involve a kind of “standby control,” we are able not only to track reason, but to manifest reason-responsiveness when we act on our emotions. The upshot is that an agent can manifest reason-responsiveness even if she acts akratically, that is, against her better judgment.

Keywords: akrasia, control, emotions, normative reasons, perception, practical reasons, reason-responsiveness, values

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