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date: 26 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Donald Davidson writes that “[r]easons for intending to do something are very much like reasons for action, indeed one might hold that they are exactly the same except for time.” That the reasons for forming an intention and the reasons for acting as intended are in some way related is a widely accepted claim. This chapter is concerned with exploring the claim that reasons to act provide reasons to intend and the various versions it can take, as well as the related question whether there can be reasons to intend of a different kind. The so-called “exclusivity claim” that only reasons to act provide reasons to intend has been much discussed recently, often in parallel to exclusivity claims concerning reasons for belief. Shah argues in favor of, and Schroeder and McHugh against, exclusivity, for instance. The chapter investigates this discussion in some detail.

Keywords: reasons, intentions, intentional agency, epistemic reasons, state-given reasons, standard/non-standard reasons, the Toxin Puzzle, Donald Davidson

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