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date: 16 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the nature of the sort of reason another’s say-so or testimony provides. The key question concerns the epistemic significance of S’s having testified that p. According to the reductionist view, the epistemic significance of another’s say-so is reduced to the epistemic significance of the audience’s reasons to think that say-so was reliable. Anti-reductionism, by contrast, holds that testimony that p stands by default, in a way analogous to S’s having perceived that p standing by default as a defeasible reason to believe that p. In this chapter I develop the case for each position, and the topic is connected to other issues at the heart of the epistemology of testimony.

Keywords: testimony, epistemology of testimony, reductionism, anti-reductionism, defeaters, social epistemology

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