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date: 26 June 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter explores the recent debate about the relationship between reasons and rational requirements of coherence—for example, requirements to be consistent in one’s beliefs and intentions. Such requirements seem plausible because they explain what is wrong with incoherence. But it is unclear whether there are always reasons to comply with such requirements. And it is plausible that, if there are not, then there are no such requirements. The first half of this chapter defends these claims. The second half of the chapter discusses an alternative view of what is wrong with incoherence, defended by Kolodny and others. On this view, the problem with incoherence is that it guarantees that you have some attitude that you should not have or that you lack some attitude that you should have. The chapter raises and discusses three problems for this view.

Keywords: reasons, rational requirements, coherence, Broome, Kolodny

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