- About the Contributors
- Formal Models of Legislatures
- The Sociology of Legislators and Legislatures
- Typologies and Classifications
- Roll-Call Analysis and the Study of Legislatures
- Words as Data: Content Analysis in Legislative Studies
- Debate and Deliberation in Legislatures
- Interviews and Surveys in Legislative Research
- The Experimental Study of Legislative Behaviour
- Candidate Selection: Implications and Challenges for Legislative Behaviour
- The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Legislative Behaviour
- Gender and Legislatures
- Roles in Legislatures
- Legislative Careers
- Procedure and Rules in Legislatures
- The Politics of Bicameralism
- Political Parties and Legislators
- Party Discipline
- Legislative Party Switching
- Legislative Institutions and Coalition Government
- Institutional Foundations of Legislative Agenda-Setting
- Legislatures and Public Finance
- Legislatures, Lobbying, and Interest Groups
- Legislatures and Foreign Policy
- Common Agency? Legislatures and Bureaucracies
- Political Behaviour in the European Parliament
- Sub-National Legislatures
- The Study of Legislatures in Latin America
- Legislatures in Central and Eastern Europe
- Authoritarian Legislatures
- Reluctant Democrats and Their Legislatures
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines legislatures in authoritarian regimes. It first reviews the history of how scholars of authoritarianism have conceived institutions, along with the theoretical arguments specific to authoritarian legislatures. It then discusses the empirical evidence on the circumstances under which the institutions are created and their downstream effects. More specifically, it considers parliaments in regimes most similar to the authoritarian regimes and the role of assemblies or elections in buttressing regime rule. It also analyzes the power of assemblies with respect to policy-making, access to spoils, and access to information about the performance of dictators and the state.
Paul Schuler is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.
Edmund J. Malesky is Associate Professor of Political Science, Duke University.
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