Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 05 April 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter focuses on Terry Moe’s 1984 paper “The New Economics of Organization”, which offers an in-depth analysis of Congressional and presidential influence on the bureaucracy and suggests that these institutions, as well as their officeholders, have the incentive to influence bureaucratic policy. Moe urges scholars of public bureaucracy to emulate economists who study why firms exist in the marketplace. This chapter examines Moe’s main ideas on topics ranging from principal-agent theory to agency losses, the ability of political principals to effectively employ contract design to specify sanctions for bureaucratic agents, and how Congress and the Presidency go about trying to take advantage of bureaucratic manpower and expertise in order to meet their goals.

Keywords: Terry Moe, bureaucracy, firms, principal-agent theory, agency losses, political principals, contract design, sanctions, Congress, presidency

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.