- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter discusses George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” a stinging analysis of regulation from a political economy perspective. Published in 1971, Stigler’s paper challenged the idea that regulation is designed and operated primarily for the benefit of business, rather than solely to advance the overall public interest by correcting market failures. By offering a serious take on regulatory capture, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” changed the way economists analyze government regulation while exerting tremendous influence on a variety of disciplines such as public policy. Stigler’s chapter also sparked extensive research on business–government relations across a wide range of industries, from airlines and mining to banking and manufacturing.
Keywords: George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, political economy, business, regulatory capture, government regulation, public policy, business–government relations, industries
Christopher Carrigan is Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Public Administration at the George Washington University Trachtenberg School and a scholar at the GW Regulatory Studies Center. His research focuses on regulatory policy-making, exploring responses to regulatory disasters as well as the impacts that politics and organizational design have on regulator behavior and performance. Previously a fellow with the Penn Program on Regulation at the University of Pennsylvania, he received his Ph.D. from the Harvard Kennedy School and an MBA from the University of Chicago. Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration
Cary Coglianese is the Edward B. Shils Professor of Law, Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Penn Program on Regulation, University of Pennsylvania.
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- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
