- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach became widely known through the collective volume by Peter Hall and David Soskice that investigates the cross-national institutional variations of advanced economies. They distinguish two ideal types of capitalism: the Liberal Market Economy (LME) model following neoclassical economics and the Coordinated Market Economy (CME) with a consensus-enhancing institutional infrastructure between firms as well as employers and unions. This chapter introduces the approach, summarizes the main contributions along key institutional spheres, and discusses applications of its comparative typology. Furthermore, it criticizes the initially rather static and apolitical approach which led to subsequent revisions and extensions. The recent financial and economic crisis has deepened the controversy over the fate of coordinated market economies subject to institutional changes resulting from intensified global economic pressures and transnational diffusion of liberalization.
Keywords: Varieties of Capitalism, political economy, comparative public policy, institutional change, institutional complementarity, coordination, liberalism, employers, trade unions
Bernhard Ebbinghaus is Professor of Macrosociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Germany. His research covers comparative social policy, industrial relations, and labor market developments in Europe, Japan, and the USA. Before being appointed to a Chair in Mannheim in 2004, he was Senior Researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Kennedy Fellow at Harvard University, as well as Visiting Professor at the Universities of Wisconsin–Madison and Jena. He is the co-author (with Jelle Visser) of Trade Unions in Western Europe since 1945 (Macmillan, 2000), co-editor (with Philip Manow) of Comparing Welfare Capitalism (Routledge, 2001), and author of Reforming Early Retirement in Europe, Japan and the USA (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Address is Chair in Macrosociology, University of Mannheim, D-68131, Mannheim, Germany. Email: bebbinghaus@sowi.uni-mannheim.de
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- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
