- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter comments on Elinor Ostrom’s 1990 book Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, which issues a direct challenge to conventional economic models of collective action. Focusing on common pool natural resources, Ostrom argues that collective action is a much more common occurrence than predicted by conventional models and proposes eight design principles associated with enduring institutions for resource management. This chapter summarizes Ostrom’s main arguments, including her critique of conventional models on the management of shared natural resources. It also looks at three influential models identified by Ostrom that represent the conventional wisdom: the tragedy of the commons, the prisoners’ dilemma, and the logic of collective action.
Keywords: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, economic models, collective action, natural resources, design principles, resource management, tragedy of the commons, prisoners’ dilemma
Amy R. Poteete is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Concordia University in Montreal. She is the co-author, with Marco A. Janssen and Elinor Ostrom, of Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons, and Multiple Methods in Practice (Princeton University Press). Her work has also been published as chapters in edited volumes and in a variety of journals, including Development and Change, Governance, Human Ecology, the International Journal of the Commons, the Journal of Development Studies, the Journal of Modern African Studies, the Journal of Southern African Studies, and World Development.
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- The Oxford Handbook of Classics In Public Policy and Administration
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- What Makes a Classic?: Identifying and Revisiting the Classics of Public Policy and Administration
- Herbert A. Simon, <i>Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization</i>
- David B. Truman, <i>The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion</i>
- Robert K. Merton et al., <i>A Reader in Bureaucracy</i>
- Harold D. Lasswell, <i>The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis</i>
- C. Wright Mills, <i>The Power Elite</i>
- Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of Muddling Through”
- Thomas R. Dye, <i>Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States</i>
- Herbert Kaufman, <i>The Forest Ranger: A Study in Administrative Behavior</i>
- E. E. Schattschneider, <i>The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America</i>
- V. O. Key, Jr., <i>Public Opinion and American Democracy</i>
- Michel Crozier, <i>The Bureaucratic Phenomenon</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory”
- Aaron Wildavsky, <i>The Politics of the Budgetary Process</i>
- Mancur Olson, <i>The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups</i>
- Theodore J. Lowi, <i>The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States</i>
- Jack L. Walker, “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States”
- Albert O. Hirschman, <i>Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States</i>
- Graham T. Allison, <i>The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis</i>
- George J. Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”
- Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, “A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice”
- Anthony Downs, “Up and Down with Ecology: The ‘Issue-Attention’ Cycle”
- Carol H. Weiss, <i>Evaluation Research: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies</i>
- Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, <i>Implementation</i>
- Oliver E. Williamson, <i>Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications</i>
- Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”
- Michael Lipsky, <i>Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service</i>
- Richard Rose, <i>Do Parties Make a Difference?</i>
- John W. Kingdon, <i>Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies</i>
- Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms”
- Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”
- Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control”
- Paul A. Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein”
- Fritz W. Scharpf, “The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration”
- James Q. Wilson, <i>Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it</i>
- Elinor Ostrom, <i>Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action</i>
- Christopher Hood, “A Public Management for All Seasons?”
- Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, <i>Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate</i>
- Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, <i>Agendas and Instability in American Politics</i>
- Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community: Empirical Foundations, Causal Mechanisms, and Policy Implications
- Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, <i>Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage</i>
- Index
