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date: 10 July 2020

Abstract and Keywords

We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. The former holds that unchosen inequality is in itself bad because it is unfair; the latter denies that inequality is in itself bad, but holds that a given increment in well-being has greater moral value, the lower the level of well-being from which it takes place. We argue that the most plausible versions of these views are “hybrids”: they are concerned with both people’s expected well-being and their final well-being. We also argue that such hybrid egalitarianism is superior to a hybrid prioritarianism because it more fully satisfies a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.

Keywords: egalitarianism, prioritarianism, distributive justice, separateness of persons, risk

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