- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance
- The History of Corporate Governance
- Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions
- An International Corporate Governance Index
- Boards and Governance: 25 Years of Qualitative Research with Directors of FTSE Companies
- Process Matters: Understanding Board Behavior and Effectiveness
- Board Committees
- The Governance of Director Networks
- Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: What Do We “Know” and Where Are We Going?
- Corporate Governance: Ownership Interests, Incentives, and Conflicts
- Financial Leverage and Corporate Governance
- Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance
- Auditing and Corporate Governance
- The Market for Corporate Control
- The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in High-Tech Firms
- Family Business and Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in IPOs
- Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and Internationalization
- Corporate Governance in Business Groups
- Governance in Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
- Venture Capital and Corporate Governance
- Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, and Corporate Governance
- Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Governance
- The Financial Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds
- Corporate Governance and Nonprofits: Facing up to Hybridization and Homogenization
- Corporate Governance and Labor
- Corporate Governance and Principal–Principal Conflicts
- Multiple Agency Theory: An Emerging Perspective on Corporate Governance
- An Age of Corporate Governance Failure?: Financialization and its Limits
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter introduces a political-institutional perspective and argues that capital markets can function effectively if political institutions support capitalism, especially capitalism of financial markets. It looks at the shape, support, and extent of capital markets, which are usually questioned in the polity. It explains how these questions are settled, which consequentially affects the extent, form, and effectiveness of capital markets. The chapter also studies the main political economy forms shaping capital markets and the modification or replacement of old institutions.
Mark J. Roe is David Berg Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. His research interests are corporate bankruptcy and reorganization, corporate finance, and corporate law. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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