- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance
- The History of Corporate Governance
- Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions
- An International Corporate Governance Index
- Boards and Governance: 25 Years of Qualitative Research with Directors of FTSE Companies
- Process Matters: Understanding Board Behavior and Effectiveness
- Board Committees
- The Governance of Director Networks
- Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: What Do We “Know” and Where Are We Going?
- Corporate Governance: Ownership Interests, Incentives, and Conflicts
- Financial Leverage and Corporate Governance
- Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance
- Auditing and Corporate Governance
- The Market for Corporate Control
- The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in High-Tech Firms
- Family Business and Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in IPOs
- Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and Internationalization
- Corporate Governance in Business Groups
- Governance in Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
- Venture Capital and Corporate Governance
- Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, and Corporate Governance
- Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Governance
- The Financial Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds
- Corporate Governance and Nonprofits: Facing up to Hybridization and Homogenization
- Corporate Governance and Labor
- Corporate Governance and Principal–Principal Conflicts
- Multiple Agency Theory: An Emerging Perspective on Corporate Governance
- An Age of Corporate Governance Failure?: Financialization and its Limits
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter studies the problem of multiple agent conflicts. It states that majority of ownership is taken from institutional investors who are also agents to ultimate principals. It studies the dual identities of these institutional investors—who are also called “agent-owners”—and introduces the multiple agency theory. It then expands this theory though an analysis of the potential conflicts and effects caused by agent-owners and other relevant governance actors.
Robert E. Hoskisson currently holds the George R. Brown Chair of Management at the Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Management at Rice University, United States. His research focuses on: corporate and international diversification strategies; governance and innovation, and entrepreneurship; acquisitions and divestitures; business groups and strategies of emerging economy firms; and cooperative strategy. Professor Hoskisson's research has been published widely in top management journals and he has co‐authored over twenty books. He is currently an Associated Editor of the Strategic Management Journal as well as serving in a number of other editorial roles or as a board member at other journals. He is a Fellow of the Strategic Management Society and the Academy of Management.
Jonathan D. Arthurs, Department of Management, Information Systems, and Entrepreneurship, Washington State University
Robert E. White, College of Business, Iowa State University
Chelsea Wyatt, Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University
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