- The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Probability for Everyone—Even Philosophers
- Pre-history of Probability
- Probability in 17th- and 18th-century Continental Europe from the Perspective of Jacob Bernoulli’s <i>Art of Conjecturing</i>
- Probability and Its Application in Britain during the 17th and 18th Centuries
- A Brief History of Probability Theory from 1810 to 1940
- The Origins of Modern Statistics: The English Statistical School
- The Origins of Probabilistic Epistemology: Some Leading 20th-century Philosophers of Probability
- Kolmogorov’s Axiomatization and Its Discontents
- Conditional Probability
- The Bayesian Network Story
- Mathematical Alternatives to Standard Probability that Provide Selectable Degrees of Precision
- Probability and Nonclassical Logic
- A Logic of Comparative Support: Qualitative Conditional Probability Relations Representable by Popper Functions
- Imprecise and Indeterminate Probabilities
- Symmetry Arguments in Probability
- Frequentism
- Subjectivism
- Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference
- The Propensity Interpretation
- Best System Approaches to Chance
- Probability and Randomness
- Chance and Determinism
- Human Understandings of Probability
- Probability Elicitation
- Probabilistic Opinion Pooling
- Quantum Probability: An Introduction
- Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics
- Probability in Biology: The Case of Fitness
- Probability in Epistemology
- Confirmation Theory
- Self-Locating Credences
- Probability in Logic
- Probability in Ethics
- Probability and the Philosophy of Religion
- Probability in Philosophy of Language
- Decision Theory
- Probabilistic Causation
- Name Index
- Subject Index

## Abstract and Keywords

Bayesianism and frequentism are the two grand schools of statistical inference, divided by fundamentally different philosophical assumptions and mathematical methods. Bayesian inference models the subjective credibility of a hypothesis given a body of evidence, whereas frequentists focus on the reliability of inferential procedures. This chapter gives an overview of the principles, varieties and criticisms of Bayesianism and frequentism, compares both schools, taking in an examination of Deborah Mayo’s account of frequentism, an innovative proposal in which she presented as crucial the concept of degrees of severity; and applies them to salient topics in scientific inference, such as p-values, confidence intervals and optional stopping. author OK

Keywords: probability, statistical inference, Bayesianism, frequentism, p-value

Jan Sprenger, Department of Philosophy, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

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- The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy
- List of Contributors
- Introduction
- Probability for Everyone—Even Philosophers
- Pre-history of Probability
- Probability in 17th- and 18th-century Continental Europe from the Perspective of Jacob Bernoulli’s <i>Art of Conjecturing</i>
- Probability and Its Application in Britain during the 17th and 18th Centuries
- A Brief History of Probability Theory from 1810 to 1940
- The Origins of Modern Statistics: The English Statistical School
- The Origins of Probabilistic Epistemology: Some Leading 20th-century Philosophers of Probability
- Kolmogorov’s Axiomatization and Its Discontents
- Conditional Probability
- The Bayesian Network Story
- Mathematical Alternatives to Standard Probability that Provide Selectable Degrees of Precision
- Probability and Nonclassical Logic
- A Logic of Comparative Support: Qualitative Conditional Probability Relations Representable by Popper Functions
- Imprecise and Indeterminate Probabilities
- Symmetry Arguments in Probability
- Frequentism
- Subjectivism
- Bayesianism vs. Frequentism in Statistical Inference
- The Propensity Interpretation
- Best System Approaches to Chance
- Probability and Randomness
- Chance and Determinism
- Human Understandings of Probability
- Probability Elicitation
- Probabilistic Opinion Pooling
- Quantum Probability: An Introduction
- Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics
- Probability in Biology: The Case of Fitness
- Probability in Epistemology
- Confirmation Theory
- Self-Locating Credences
- Probability in Logic
- Probability in Ethics
- Probability and the Philosophy of Religion
- Probability in Philosophy of Language
- Decision Theory
- Probabilistic Causation
- Name Index
- Subject Index