- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Summaries of Core Literature
- List of Contributors
- Charting the Landscape of Corporate Reputation Research
- Show Me the Money: A Multidimensional Perspective on Reputation as an Intangible Asset
- Keeping Score: The Challenges of Measuring Corporate Reputation
- What Does it Mean to Be Green? The Emergence of New Criteria for Assessing Corporate Reputation
- The Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences
- A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: Its Logic and Limits
- Meeting Expectations: A Role-Theoretic Perspective on Reputation
- It Ain’t What You Do, it's Who You Do It With: Distinguishing Reputation and Status
- An Identity-Based View of Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy: Clarifications and Distinctions Among Related Constructs
- On Being Bad: Why Stigma is not the Same as a Bad Reputation
- Untangling Executive Reputation and Corporate Reputation: Who Made Who?
- Waving the Flag: The Influence of Country of Origin on Corporate Reputation
- Corporate Reputation and Regulation in Historical Perspective
- Industry Self-regulation as a Solution to the Reputation Commons Problem: The Case of the New York Clearing House Association
- How Regulatory Institutions Influence Corporate Reputations: A Cross-country Comparative Approach
- How Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from the Regulation of Retail Finance
- A Labor of Love? Understanding the Influence of Corporate Reputation in the Labor Market
- Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporatemisconduct?
- From the Ground Up: Building Young Firms’ Reputations
- Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as A Form of Reputation Management
- Managing Corporate Reputation Through Corporate Branding
- After the Collapse: A Behavioral Theory of Reputation Repair
- A Framework for Reputation Management Over the Course of Evolving Controversies
Abstract and Keywords
This article, which explores how economists model a firm's reputation, elaborates the standard economic framework for investigating the corporate reputation. The firm has a reputation with specific stakeholders regarding specific characteristics. Any theory of reputation has to develop some theory of belief revision, that is, how firm actions revise stakeholders' beliefs, and then explain how these belief revisions influence the stakeholders' treatment of the firm. The reputation framework predicts opportunistic actions around adverse turning points in firms' histories, when firms realise, but stakeholders do not, that the long-run profits from reputation formation are no longer sufficient to support reputation-forming behaviour. It then shows that economics has dealt many possible reputable characteristics and stakeholders. An interesting avenue for future research would be to cover the boundaries of the economic reputation model to include repair, both superficial and substantive, perhaps following the approaches presented.
Thomas Noe is the Ernest Butten Professor of Management Studies at the Saïd Business School and a Professorial Fellow at Balliol College, University of Oxford. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. Professor Noe's research has focused on developing and experimentally validating rational choice models of financing, investment, governance, and management compensation. His current research focuses on the role of learning in executive compensation determination, the inherent limitations of shareholder democracy, and the role of intra-family altruism in family firm governance. He has served or is serving on numerous panels, program committees, and editorial boards, including for the Review of Financial Studies and the Review of Corporate Finance Studies.
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