- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Summaries of Core Literature
- List of Contributors
- Charting the Landscape of Corporate Reputation Research
- Show Me the Money: A Multidimensional Perspective on Reputation as an Intangible Asset
- Keeping Score: The Challenges of Measuring Corporate Reputation
- What Does it Mean to Be Green? The Emergence of New Criteria for Assessing Corporate Reputation
- The Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences
- A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: Its Logic and Limits
- Meeting Expectations: A Role-Theoretic Perspective on Reputation
- It Ain’t What You Do, it's Who You Do It With: Distinguishing Reputation and Status
- An Identity-Based View of Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy: Clarifications and Distinctions Among Related Constructs
- On Being Bad: Why Stigma is not the Same as a Bad Reputation
- Untangling Executive Reputation and Corporate Reputation: Who Made Who?
- Waving the Flag: The Influence of Country of Origin on Corporate Reputation
- Corporate Reputation and Regulation in Historical Perspective
- Industry Self-regulation as a Solution to the Reputation Commons Problem: The Case of the New York Clearing House Association
- How Regulatory Institutions Influence Corporate Reputations: A Cross-country Comparative Approach
- How Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from the Regulation of Retail Finance
- A Labor of Love? Understanding the Influence of Corporate Reputation in the Labor Market
- Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporatemisconduct?
- From the Ground Up: Building Young Firms’ Reputations
- Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as A Form of Reputation Management
- Managing Corporate Reputation Through Corporate Branding
- After the Collapse: A Behavioral Theory of Reputation Repair
- A Framework for Reputation Management Over the Course of Evolving Controversies
Abstract and Keywords
This article argues that reputation plays a key role in regulatory processes and decisions based on a case study of the British Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). By exploring multiple interactions of the FOS with different actors, such as financial firms, the media, consumers, politicians, and the Financial Services Authority, it reveals the mechanisms through which reputation regulates regulators. Two key streams in the regulatory and public administration literature analyse regulators' management of the attitudes of external stakeholders. Regulators' conceptualisation of their role shapes their impact upon the reputation of regulated firms. They also do not seek positive reputations per se. It is then suggested that regulators are inclined to self-bind, formalise, and rationalise their use of discretion when facing or perceiving high risks to reputation. Regulatory reputation-management strategies are not always consistent with regulatory identity.
Sharon Gilad is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and the Federman School of Public Policy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her research contributes a New Institutional perspective to the analysis of regulatory agencies’ interaction with their multiple audiences, and of firms’ responses to regulation.
Tamar Yogev is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Corporate Reputation at the Said Business School and an Associate Member at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. Tamar's research interests include economic sociology, organization studies, social networks, and sociology of culture and art. Tamar's research focuses on the role of exchange relations in markets and their effects on reputation. Her work provides insight into reputation in markets that are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty, primarily the art market.