- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Summaries of Core Literature
- List of Contributors
- Charting the Landscape of Corporate Reputation Research
- Show Me the Money: A Multidimensional Perspective on Reputation as an Intangible Asset
- Keeping Score: The Challenges of Measuring Corporate Reputation
- What Does it Mean to Be Green? The Emergence of New Criteria for Assessing Corporate Reputation
- The Building Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences
- A Survey of the Economic Theory of Reputation: Its Logic and Limits
- Meeting Expectations: A Role-Theoretic Perspective on Reputation
- It Ain’t What You Do, it's Who You Do It With: Distinguishing Reputation and Status
- An Identity-Based View of Reputation, Image, and Legitimacy: Clarifications and Distinctions Among Related Constructs
- On Being Bad: Why Stigma is not the Same as a Bad Reputation
- Untangling Executive Reputation and Corporate Reputation: Who Made Who?
- Waving the Flag: The Influence of Country of Origin on Corporate Reputation
- Corporate Reputation and Regulation in Historical Perspective
- Industry Self-regulation as a Solution to the Reputation Commons Problem: The Case of the New York Clearing House Association
- How Regulatory Institutions Influence Corporate Reputations: A Cross-country Comparative Approach
- How Reputation Regulates Regulators: Illustrations from the Regulation of Retail Finance
- A Labor of Love? Understanding the Influence of Corporate Reputation in the Labor Market
- Does Reputation Work to Discipline Corporatemisconduct?
- From the Ground Up: Building Young Firms’ Reputations
- Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as A Form of Reputation Management
- Managing Corporate Reputation Through Corporate Branding
- After the Collapse: A Behavioral Theory of Reputation Repair
- A Framework for Reputation Management Over the Course of Evolving Controversies
Abstract and Keywords
This article employs a historical example, the New York Clearing House Association (NYCHA), to consider how firms rely on reputational solutions to fill the ‘institutional vacuum’ left by lack of formal regulation. It demonstrates that the effects of negative spillover on market confidence produced a reputation commons for banks during times of panic, and that the NYCHA was founded as a collective institutional solution for ameliorating the problem of reputation commons. The difficult fact in protecting reputational commons is that it requires many direct competitors in an industry to cooperate. The success of the NYCHA in mitigating panics was a result of the system of loan certificates, and of the monitoring and sanctioning regime that backed the system. The NYCHA confirms that self-regulation can solve the problem of reputation commons. The trend of globalisation in recent decades provides new possibilities for exploring industry self-governance as a solution for reputation commons.
Lori Qingyuan Yue is Assistant Professor at the USC Marshall School of Business. She received her Ph.D. in business administration from Columbia University. She studies evolutions of market institutions and market structures. Her recent research topics include the endogenous institutional failure in generating market dynamics, the incomplete information model in private politics, and the asymmetric effects of fashions on the formation and dissolution of interorganizational networks. Her research has been published in journals such as American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, and Organization Science.
Paul Ingram is the Kravis Professor of Business at the Columbia Business School, and Faculty Director of the Columbia Senior Executive Program. His Ph.D. is from Cornell University, and he was on the faculty of Carnegie Mellon University before coming to Columbia. He has served as a consulting editor for the American Journal of Sociology, a senior editor for Organization Science, an associate editor for Management Science, and on the editorial boards of Administrative Science Quarterly and Strategic Organization.
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