- Phenomenological method: reflection, introspection, and skepticism
- Transcendental phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning
- Respecting appearances: a phenomenological approach to consciousness
- On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology
- The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject
- Intentionality without representationalism
- Perception, context, and direct realism
- Colours and sounds: the field of visual and auditory consciousness
- Bodily intentionality, affectivity, and basic affects
- Thought in action
- Sex, gender, and embodiment
- At the edges of my body
- Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
- Self-consciousness and World-consciousness
- Self, consciousness, and shame
- The (many) foundations of knowledge
- The phenomenological foundations of predicative structure
- Language and non-linguistic thinking
- Sharing in truth: phenomenology of epistemic commonality
- Responsive ethics
- Towards a phenomenology of the political world
- Other people
- Experience and history
- The forgiveness of time and consciousness
- Hermeneutical phenomenology
- Something that is nothing but can be anything: the image and our consciousness of it
- Phenomenological and aesthetic epoché: painting the invisible things themselves
- Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter, which is concerned with the phenomenology of perception, especially the role of content and context in the intentionality of perception, tries to provide an account of the structure of perceptual experience and its intentional relation to its objects. In particular, it presents an analysis of consciousness and intentionality in perception. Perceptual experience is sensuous and paradigmatically intentional. The intentional character of a visual experience of an object is different to the successful intentional relation between the experience and the object (in veridical perception). The twin-tomatoes experiment reveals that content alone does not settle which tomato is the correct object of perception. Perception gives a direct awareness of an object in the sense that the external object is itself the object of perception, and the object is actually present to the subject and experienced as actually present in the context of perception.
David Woodruff Smith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine. He is the author of Husserl (2007), Mind World (2004), The Circle of Acquaintance (1989), and other works on intentionality, consciousness, phenomenology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ontology, and early twentieth-century philosophy (analytic and continental).
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